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Man’s character is his daimon1 
 
HERACLITUS, FRAGMENT 119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 For the ancient Greeks, the daimon was non-human power somewhere between people and gods, 
without any negative connotations. An example would be the daimon of Socrates. The daimon had a wisdom 
that has nothing to do with our modern conceptions of good or evil: It was a force of nature that could offer 
hints about fateful situations and actions. 
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Introduction 
The current dissertation investigates the association between personality (in the 
case of the current dissertation: intelligence and dispositional valuations) and people’s 
ability to understand each other’s thoughts and feelings (mutual understanding). If there is 
any association between a personality trait and a certain phenomenon, then the 
consequences of the underlying process should be most readily apparent in people with 
extreme values of this trait. Thus, it can be useful to focus on extreme groups in order to 
understand the mechanism behind such an association. Regarding the link between 
intelligence and mutual understanding, the following debate about intellectual giftedness, 
which appeared in the online version of the Dutch Volkskrant newspaper (in November 
2001), is a case in point. One participant, who apparently had a critical view of gifted 
individuals, posted a comment stating that “[…] gifted people live ‘in their own world’.” 
He went on to say that “Often, the social isolation is even exacerbated by a lack of 
empathy for fellow human beings, which often gives rise to arrogance (people are stupid, 
cannot think, etc.)”. One reader, apparently someone with first-hand experience, reacted:  
 
You have no idea what you are talking about. Being gifted is not about […] 
choosing deliberately to be socially awkward. Giftedness comes closer to 
trying your very best for years to participate in small-talk but just not being 
able to succeed. After every spontaneous effort, people look surprised and 
depreciate you as being a weirdo, nerd, or dork, just because you think the 
typical social conversation is too trivial to come up with an appropriate 
contribution. So that leaves only two options: Either you think three times 
how to say something in order to belong to the group, or you just keep quiet 
and remain silent in a corner. I hope you understand that a computer or a 
good book are a lot more pleasant than these two other options. 
 
Of course, this discussion is dominated to a large degree by stereotypes and 
untested assumptions. Yet in a nutshell, it captures all the questions of the current 
dissertation. The first commentator (so it seems) addresses a so-called main effect: 
According to this individual, there exists a generally negative association between a 
person’s intelligence and his or her empathic skills. In defense, the second commentator 
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points to the existence of dyadic effects, which are dependent on the interplay between two 
interaction partners. In his opinion, gifted people suffer from a mismatch between their 
interests and those of most other people. The current dissertation addresses these questions 
more systematically. In contrast to the opinion of the first commentator, a model by 
Simonton (1985) hypothesizes that intelligence is positively associated with the ability to 
understand other people. Like the second commentator, however, the model also assumes 
that between-person differences in intelligence limit the ability of the more intelligent 
person to make him- or herself understood. Putting this model to the test, it is first 
investigated whether intelligence and dispositional valuations exert a main effect on 
people’s ability to establish a sense of mutual understanding. Second, it is tested whether 
differences between interaction partners in terms of these traits influence their ability to 
communicate their thoughts and feelings. Third, the question is asked what the combined 
influence of main and dyadic effects is in an extreme group of intellectually gifted 
individuals. 
Before I go on to address these questions, my thanks go out to many people  and 
institutions. First of all, I wish to thank the Max Planck Institute for Human Development 
in Berlin and the Dutch Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds for providing me with the necessary 
funding to complete this research. I am also indebted to Jacque Eccles and Alexandra 
Freund for commenting on earlier versions of this thesis, and to Susanne Scheibe who 
skillfully and conscientiously acted as its proof reader. Thanks also go to Alain May, who 
collected the data of Study 1.II for his master’s thesis, and to my former student assistants 
Benjamin Bornschein, Wenke Burde, and Katherina Flaig, who helped me in collecting 
and evaluating the data of Study 4. Also, I greatly benefited from conversations with my 
colleagues at the department of Personality Psychology at Humboldt University: Rainer 
Banse (now at the University of York), Judith Lehnart, Franz Neyer, Lars Penke, and 
Cornelia Wrzus. And of course, I do not want to forget the participants in my studies, who 
allowed me to analyze their responses to the many questions I asked them. Finally, I wish 
to thank my advisor Jens Asendorpf for his loyal support, his insightful comments on the 
products of my scholarship, and his inspiring guidance as a mentor. 
I dedicate this work to Claudia, who put up with my long working hours and acted 
as an inexhaustible source of emotional support whenever I needed some. 
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1 Understanding and Being Understood 
As stated in the introduction, the current dissertation focuses on the influence of 
intelligence traits and dispositional valuations on understanding and being understood. The 
first chapter has two objectives. The first section (1.1) provides a description and definition 
of mutual understanding. Because there has not been much past research specifically 
focusing on this construct, findings from neighboring fields are discussed to establish the 
discriminant validity of mutual understanding within a larger nomological network of 
related constructs. Second, Section 1.2 provides an analysis of the linguistic and social 
processes underlying mutual understanding. This will set up a framework for Chapter 2, in 
which the mechanisms by which intelligence and dispositional valuations influence these 
distinct mechanisms are discussed. 
 
1.1 Mutual Understanding 
1.1.1 Description and Definition 
 
In the experience of a conversation, a common ground constitutes itself 
between the other one and myself, my thought and his make up a single 
tissue, my words and his are called out by the phase of the discussion, they 
insert themselves in a common operation of which neither one of us is the 
sole creator. 
 
This quote by the French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1945, cited in Bernieri, Gillis, 
Davis, & Grahe, 1996, p. 114) describes the very distinct experience of conversational 
harmony: the finding of „common ground”. The current dissertation focuses on this 
process of mutual understanding (MU) between two persons. MU is defined here as the 
successful communication of personally relevant thoughts and feelings between interacting 
individuals. Thus, MU requires both interaction partners to understand each other and this 
understanding needs to pertain to personally important thoughts and feelings.  
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The current study focuses on mutual understanding within pairs of individuals 
(dyads). Such dyadic relationships seem to have a high potential for mutual understanding. 
In fact, many distinctive, „personal” relationships, such as romantic couples or close 
friendships, are defined by a dyadic focus. By focusing on dyads, the current approach 
precludes social support processes in groups or communities (for an analysis of intimacy 
processes in small groups, see Barker, 1991). 
 
1.1.2 Concepts Related to Mutual Understanding 
Despite its intuitive appeal, very little research explicitly focuses on MU as a 
psychological construct. Partly, this is due to the separateness of the disciplines of 
psychology and communication research in academic curricula and research. Nevertheless, 
research addressed several constructs that are related (though not identical) to MU. In the 
following section, research regarding four such constructs is reviewed: empathy, social 
support, rapport, and intimacy. This research can serve to clarify the theoretical 
background and discriminant validity of MU as a psychological variable. 
 
1.1.2.1 Empathy 
Empathy is often described as the ability to put oneself into another’s “shoes”. 
According to Neyer, Banse, & Asendorpf (1999, p. 419-420), this is defined by such 
processes as taking the situational perspective of the other, recognizing what the other is 
thinking, detecting the intentions and motivations of the other, and intuitively 
understanding the emotions of the other. Because of this focus on the recognition and 
understanding of other people’s emotions and feelings, empathy is closely related to MU. 
Research on empathy has found that people are not very good at evaluating their 
own level of empathic skills (Davis & Kraus, 1997; Realo et al. 2003). For this reason, 
researchers have shifted their emphasis on assessing empathy as an observable 
phenomenon within the context of social relationships (Neyer et al., 1999). For example, 
Ickes (1993) has established a paradigm that focuses on people’s ability to predict what 
their interaction partners are thinking or feeling (i.e., mind reading). When applied to a 
conversation between two people, this ability should facilitate the understanding of the 
intentions behind verbal utterances. Accordingly, empathic accuracy should be positively 
related to MU. 
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In spite of these communalities, there exists an important difference between MU 
and empathy. Most studies on empathic accuracy have used individualistic designs. For 
example, they have looked at the association between participants’ personality traits and 
their empathic accuracy scores to identify features of “the good judge” (Davis & Kraus, 
1997). Alternatively, studies have looked at features of target persons that are associated 
with a greater ease for others to “read their minds” (e.g., Thomas & Fletcher, 2003). In 
contrast, MU is a phenomenon that is neither limited to the abilities of the judge, nor to the 
understanding of the target. Rather, MU is an emergent phenomenon that it requires both 
members of a dyad to understand each other: It is both about understanding and being 
understood. As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, this is important because it can be 
hypothesized that intelligence enhances the ability to understand other people yet at the 
same time limit the possibility to be understood by others. 
 
1.1.2.2 Social Support 
People differ in the quality and quantity of their social relationships. Some 
individuals have a very large number of acquaintances and friends, whereas others 
concentrate their energy on a selected few. Moreover, the quality of relationships varies 
from loving, reciprocal, and caring to envious, disrespectful, and abusive. There exist a 
number of different definitions of social support. For example, Albrecht and Adelman 
(1987, p. 19) define social support as: 
 
verbal and nonverbal communication between recipients and providers that 
reduces uncertainty about the situation, the self, the other, or the 
relationship, and functions to enhance a perception of personal control in 
one’s life experience. 
 
When people feel understood by each other, this may act as a validation of their 
worldviews (Byrne, 1971), reduce their existential uncertainty, and enhance their 
perceptions of personal control (Mikulincer, Florian, & Hirschberger, 2004). For this 
reason, MU could be regarded as a specific form of social support (Keeley & Hart, 1994). 
However, social support is a much broader construct that includes behaviors such as 
practical advice, financial assistance, and comforting people (for a categorization of social 
support behaviors, see Cohen, Underwood, & Gottlieb, 2000; Vaux, 1992). In contrast to 
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social support, which can involve broad array of behaviors, MU is more specific since it 
requires that two individuals are able to accurately communicate their thoughts and 
feelings. In the words of Duck (1994, p. 5), 
 
[…] understanding (of what is meant) and sharing of meaning […] are essential 
elements of relating and […] everyday talk is part of the system of communication 
that creates them both. 
 
1.1.2.3 Rapport 
Rapport is described by Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983, cited in 
Bernieri et al., 1996) as a relational quality „marked by harmony, conformity, accord, and 
affinity.” Because rapport does not reside within individuals, it is essentially a dyadic 
phenomenon (i.e., the product of social interactions). According to Tickle-Degnen and 
Rosenthal (1990), rapport consists of three qualities: coordination, mutual attentiveness, 
and positivity. Coordination refers to a responsive pattern of behavioral give and take, 
which is associated with behavioral synchrony (the coupling of interpersonal behavior 
patterns). Attentiveness refers to a joint focus of attention; without mutual attention, there 
can be no meaningful contact. Finally, positivity refers to an interpersonal atmosphere 
characterized by positive emotions, such as joy and happiness. 
Although rapport is a useful construct to describe harmonious interactions, the 
causal relations between the construct and its constitutive components are far from clear. 
There are three possibilities. First, coordinated, mutually attentive and positive behavior 
may automatically lead to rapport. If so, then rapport would also result if an individual 
engages in slavish yes-nodding to everything his or her interaction partner says. Second, 
reversing the causal chain, it may be that rapport causes coordinated, mutually attentive 
and positive behavioral interactions. Third, it might be that rapport is simply a cognitive-
representational correlate of a broader sensation of „being in tune”. 
Niederhoffer and Pennebaker (2002) recently argued that coordination and mutual 
attentiveness might not be essential characteristics of rapport, since they also occur in 
highly negative interactions (e.g., people focusing and reacting to each other during a fight; 
see Cairns & Cairns, 2000, p. 413, for similar arguments). In addition, people may share 
negative or sad information but still establish a sense of rapport when there is an 
atmosphere of acceptance and respect. Because most laboratory studies (for obvious ethical 
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reasons) focus on neutral or positive interactions, the role of coordination and attentiveness 
in negative interactions is unclear. 
Rapport is similar to MU in that both refer to a positive, dyadic quality of social 
interaction. Indeed, the coordinated and mutually attentive rapport behaviors are likely 
correlated with the conversational harmony implied in the process of MU. In terms of their 
causal primacy, however, it seems more plausible that rapport is a result of MU rather than 
the other way around. Specifically, being understood by another individual likely validates 
one’s world-view and should lead to positive emotions of rapport (Byrne, 1971). However, 
the reverse is not necessary the case: Whereas rapport seems to pertain to all positive, 
coordinated and mutually attentive social interaction, MU refers only to interactions that 
involve the successful communication of personally significant thoughts and feelings. 
 
1.1.2.4 Intimacy 
A fourth possible correlate of MU is intimacy. Reis (1990) defined intimacy as a 
process that begins when a person expresses personally revealing feelings or thoughts to 
another person. For the intimacy process to continue, it is required that the listener 
responds supportively and emphatically. Ideally, this leads the discloser to feel understood, 
validated and cared for. Intimacy can be an important source of social support (Reis, 1990; 
Johnson, Hobfoll, & Zalcberg-Linetzy, 1993). It has also been shown to be a highly valued 
characteristic of friendships. For example, Caldwell and Peplau (1982) asked respondents 
whether they would prefer having a limited number of very intimate friends over having 
many good but less intimate friends. Confronted with this dilemma, no less than 73% of 
the men and 83% of the women preferred having a limited number of intimate friends. 
The behaviors that are associated with intimacy vary according to gender and 
culture. In Western, individualistic societies, self-disclosure seems to be central to 
intimacy, but in many non-Western, collectivistic societies, caring, intimate relationships 
with members of the social group may so normative that they do not require the sharing of 
personal thoughts and feelings (Adams, Anderson, & Adonu, 2004). Furthermore, it has 
been established that women engage in intimate behaviors more than men do, even though 
both sexes have similar representations of what constitutes intimacy (Fehr, 2004). 
MU and intimacy are conceptually similar. For example, Fehr (2004) asked 
respondents to rate how prototypical several behaviors are for the construct of intimacy in 
friendships. Items that received the highest ratings mostly pertained to the sharing of 
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cognitive and emotional content. Indeed, the most prototypical item was: „If I need to talk, 
my friend will listen.“ This focus on disclosing personally relevant information and its 
understanding and validation by the interaction partner closely matches the construct of 
MU. 
In spite of much communality, there is also an important difference between MU 
and intimacy. The concept of intimacy is closely associated with the notion of caring, 
loving relationships. In contrast, it is possible to experience MU in the absence of such 
emotions. Indeed, sometimes, very powerful experiences involve meaningful conversations 
with strangers encountered during a walk through the park, on vacation, etc. At the end of 
such meetings, one is left with the feeling of „having so much in common”. Although such 
interactions involve a high degree of MU and validation, they do not necessarily imply a 
caring for the other person. 
A case can be made that MU is a central first step in establishing intimacy. 
According to this logic, meeting a person who is truly understanding of one’s deepest 
thoughts suggests the existence of a parallel worldview in the other individual: It affirms 
the validity of one’s own thoughts and feelings (Byrne, 1971). When both persons share 
this sense of being understood, a feeling of MU has set in, which may then motivate them 
to establish more regular contact and continue to explore the compatibility of each other’s 
worldviews. After some time, amicable feelings and/or romantic emotions might evolve 
that give rise to the „caring” component of intimacy. 
The hypothesized associations between MU, worldview validation, and 
interpersonal care are supported by empirical research. In a diary study, Reis, Sheldon, 
Gable, Roscoe, and Ryan (2000) followed 67 participants for 2 weeks. Each day, 
participants compiled a list of their three most time-consuming social activities. They rated 
whether these activities involved talking about meaningful matters, a feeling of being 
understood, and the amount of relatedness experienced in them. As predicted, talking about 
meaningful matters and feelings of being understood were strongly related to well-being. 
Similarly, Murray, Bellavia, Dolderman, Holmes, and Griffin (2002) showed that the 
feeling of being understood in a relationship is closely related to relationship satisfaction, 
and Snyder (1979) found that measures of communication quality were the best single 
predictors of global marital satisfaction. Thus, there is some evidence that MU is a crucial 
element in the establishment of satisfying, caring relationships. 
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1.2 Communicating Meaning 
As stated above, the current dissertation focuses on MU in verbal interactions 
between two individuals. Recalling the definition given above, this requires the successful 
communication of personally relevant thoughts and feelings. However, although this 
definition may be useful for descriptive purposes, it does not specify the mechanisms by 
which people achieve this successful communication. How are people able to accurately 
share their thoughts and feelings? Only if this question is answered can theoretical 
predictions regarding the impact of intelligence and dispositional valuations be derived. 
Experience sampling research has found that students spend about 6 hours per day 
(or about 40%) in conversations with other people (Reis & Wheeler, 1991). Thus, language 
plays a major role in social life. Surely, individuals can also develop a sense of „wordless” 
understanding of each others’ thoughts and emotions. For example, nonverbal behavior has 
been demonstrated to be a rich source of interpersonal information and sometimes 
outperforms spoken language in its level of directness (Ekman, 2003). However, nonverbal 
behavior also seems somewhat limited in its potential to communicate more complex 
thoughts and feelings. Indeed, the impact of verbal and nonverbal behavior on 
communication effectiveness has been shown to be additive and complementary (Jones & 
Guerrero, 2001). 
In a very general sense, language is a system of signs. For a better understanding of 
the mechanism by which verbal communication acquires its meaning, it is helpful to 
investigate some basic features of signs. Semiotics is the philosophical tradition that 
studies the way in which signs acquire their meaning. According to the semiotician 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1916), a sign consists of two elements (see Figure 1). The signifier 
refers to the form of the sign, which in the context of conversations is the acoustic pattern 
of an utterance (e.g., the sentence „watch out for that dog”). In turn, the signified implies 
that the sign must refer to some material or conceptual reality. In the dissertation, this 
referential reality is mainly is mostly thought of as people’s life experiences (e.g., seeing 
and hearing a barking dog). 
These two sign elements are connected by semiotic codes (depicted by a double-
headed arrow in Figure 1). Codes can be defined as procedural systems of related 
conventions for relating signifieds to signifiers. The fact that codes are conventions implies 
they are socially constructed: In language, there is no „objective meaning” of an utterance. 
According to Jakobson and Halle (1956, p. 72), „the efficiency of a speech event demands 
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the use of a common code by its participants.” For example, in southern Germany, people 
greet each other with the words „Grüß Gott”, which literally means „greet God”. By means 
of a shared code, people from this region know that this is just a common way to say 
„hello”. The next section tries to elucidate some of the mechanisms used to achieve this 
agreement. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic Depiction of Sign Elements According to de Saussure (1916). 
Note. A sign is constituted of a signified (a reference to some experiential reality) and a 
signifier (a material form, such as the sound pattern in spoken language). Interpretative 
codes are conventions that govern the association between these two elements. 
 
1.2.1 A Model of Dyadic Communication 
To further clarify the MU process and its different constituents, I created a dyadic 
communication model based on de Saussure’s (1916) semiotic principles. Figure 2 depicts 
five crucial steps in the application of this model to the interaction between two persons, 
Person A and B. The model is based on the assumption that both persons have their own 
unique experiences. For example, A might have experienced a dangerous situation while 
driving on the highway, whereas B has not. These differing experiences are associated with 
differences in the content of thoughts and feelings (the different signifieds in the upper and 
lower layer of the figure). 
In the figure, Person A starts with a thought or feeling X he or she wants to 
communicate with B (e.g., the opinion that highways are unsafe nowadays). In order to do 
this, he or she needs to encode X into a verbal utterance (step 1) that is left for B to decode 
(step 2). For example, A might state „I can’t believe how dangerous highways have 
Understanding and Being Understood  15 
become these days”. When both persons share the same linguistic code (S), this process 
leads to the creation of a comparable thought or feeling (X’)1 in Person B. 
Sometimes A and B will use idiosyncratic codes that are not shared between them. 
Such codes are called idiolects (iA and iB). When communication between A and B 
involves idiolects, Person B’s interpretation of the message does not match the intentions 
of Person A (e.g., B might think that Person A does not actually believe the fact that traffic 
is unsafe). This is referred to by Umberto Eco (1965) as „aberrant decoding”, which may 
give rise to serious interpretational difficulties, especially when the differences in code use 
are not made transparent. 
Single-utterance interactions are the exception in human communication. In most 
cases, a decoded meaning (in the current example: X’) will lead to the activation of another 
thought or feeling (Y). This probably takes place by an associative mechanism (step 3). For 
example, the construct „highway” might activate a thought or feeling related to the 
construct „road”. Although this process is dependent on deterministic brain activity, the 
effect of subtle situational influences and the interaction of numerous neurophysiological 
parameters make its outcome highly chance-dependent. For example, if B had previously 
talked to his or her neighbor who drives a Mercedes-Benz, it becomes more likely that a 
corresponding image is activated. 
When B has acquired a sense of what to reply, the cycle of encoding the thought 
into a sound pattern continues (step 4). For example, Person B might reply: „Some people 
think the road belongs to them; like my neighbor C.” After this, Person A must decode the 
message (step 5) and come up with a relevant association to continue the interaction 
(provided the motivation to continue communicating is still high enough). Such a reaction 
might consist of questioning aspects of the previous utterance in order to gain a clearer 
sense of its meaning (e.g., „Did your neighbor ever have an accident?”), leading to a 
clarification phase of the conversation. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Because it is unlikely that every aspect of the interpretative code is identical between the two 
persons, the signified X of Person B will always differ somewhat from that of Person A (hence the added 
apostrophe). 
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Figure 2. Schematic Depiction of the Dyadic Communication Process 
Note. Dyadic communication is seen as a process involving five steps. When Person A 
wants to communicate a thought or feeling X to Person B, he or she must encode it into a 
verbal utterance (step 1). Following this, B must interpret this utterance (step 2). When 
Person A and B use idiolects that are not shared (iA and iB), this process is hampered. 
Instead, when both persons use the same linguistic code (S), this leads to the creation of a 
comparable thought or feeling X’ in Person B. When B wants to continue the 
communication, he or she must produce a related thought or feeling Y through an 
associative process (step 3). After this, Person B must decode it into a verbal utterance 
(step 4) that Person A needs to decode (step 5), and so forth. 
 
1.2.2 Social Construction of Shared Codes 
Speaking the same language is one prerequisite for effective communication 
because it provides people with fixed rules for the interpretation of syntactic structures and 
the meaning of words and proverbs. However, because of the generativity of language, 
such an a priory, culturally universal code does not exist for the interpretation of more 
complex utterances. For the interpretation of more complex utterances, interacting 
individuals often have to actively construct shared codes. 
In the following section, four techniques for the social construction of shared codes 
are discussed: audience design, perspective taking, reference to shared experiences, and 
metaphors (see Table 1 for a summary and description). It is important to note that these 
codes are not independent of each other. Rather, they serve as an interrelated whole in 
which the different elements may facilitate or compensate each other. For example, 
perspective taking is a necessary requirement for effective audience design. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Four Techniques for the Social Construction of Shared Codes 
Technique Working ingredient Example 
Audience 
design 
Adjusting communication 
according to the observed 
reactions of the interaction 
partner 
[A:] „The earthquake measured nine on 
the Richter scale.” 
[B, silence, looking confused] 
[A, sensing B doesn’t know the Richter 
scale:] „It was a very heavy earthquake.” 
Perspective 
taking 
Using the presumed mental state 
of the interaction partner to 
communicate and infer meaning 
[A:] „How are you doing?” 
[B, looking sad:] „I’m OK”. 
[A:] „Is something the matter?” 
Shared 
experiences 
Drawing on past experiences with 
the interaction partner to 
communicate and infer meaning 
[A:] „Hush, you know how angry dad 
can get when we wake him up.” 
[B:] „You’re right, I’m sorry.” 
Metaphors Using shared concepts to describe 
nonshared concepts 
[A:] „Have you ever tasted Tabasco 
sauce?” 
[B:] „No.” 
[A:] „It’s like an extremely hot kind of 
salsa sauce”. 
 
1.2.2.1 Audience Design 
Central to the notion of audience design is the idea that people are different from 
each other. An utterance such as „The ANOVA did not result in a significant interaction 
effect” might be perfectly understandable for a research psychologist but completely 
obscure to the average layperson. Because of this, speakers need to tailor their message to 
the needs of their audiences (Krauss & Fussell, 1991). If the audience lacks the necessary 
code to interpret a specific utterance, then the speaker needs to explain a construct in more 
detail (e.g., by pointing out that an ANOVA is a statistical technique to find out if an effect 
is meaningful). 
Adjusting a message according to the perceived knowledge of the interaction 
partner is called audience design. According to Clark (1992), audience design depends on 
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an effective „grounding process”: the initial phase of a conversation in which individuals 
establish a shared set of codes (common ground). Clark and colleagues (Clark, 1992; 
Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992) state that the grounding phase is a collaborative process in 
which both participants work together to understand the meaning of each other’s 
utterances. According to their collaborative model, common ground is established when an 
interaction partner presents some information to the other person (presentation phase), and 
the partner provides some evidence of his or her understanding of this information 
(acceptance phase). When mutual understanding of the information is thus demonstrated, it 
becomes part of the interaction partners’ shared knowledge. 
Indirect evidence for the notion of audience design comes from research on so-
called referential communication tasks, in which people need to describe referential objects 
to another person. For example, it has been consistently shown that across time, speakers 
reduce the number of turns and words used to identify these referential targets to others 
(e.g., Fussell & Krauss, 1992; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992). Probably, the establishment 
of common ground during the conversation reduces the need for additional clarifying 
information to comprehend its meaning.2 For example, Nohara-LeClair (2001) found that 
individuals who know the meaning of a set of stimuli share this knowledge with each other 
and became more accurate at estimating how much their partners knew about the stimuli 
during the course of an interaction.3 
 
1.2.2.2 Perspective Taking 
An important technique in encoding and decoding verbal communication is 
perspective taking (Krauss & Fussell, 1991). Consider the sentence „Can you open the 
door?” This sentence can refer to properties of the door (can it be opened?), properties of 
the person that is spoken to (is the person physically able to open the door?) or contain a 
request to that person („please open the door”). The receiver is left with a knowledge gap 
                                                 
2
 According to Clark and colleagues’ principle of least collaborative effort, people reduce their 
language output because they want to minimize „the work both speakers and addressees do from the 
initiation of the referential process to its completion” (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986, p. 26). 
3
 In spite of this accuracy, there is also a persistent tendency to overestimate the amount of shared 
knowledge (see Fussell & Krauss, 1992; Nohara-LeClair, 2001). 
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that poses a hindrance in the interpretation of the message. One of the ways this knowledge 
gap can be bridged is by taking the intention of the speaker into account. 
According to Tomasello (2000), humans differ from other primates by their highly 
developed understanding of other individuals as intentional beings. After 9-12 months of 
age, human infants begin to engage in joint attentional schemes with adults, which 
gradually enable them to take the perspective of others into account. From this 
understanding of other individuals as intentional agents follows a gradual awareness of 
others-as-mental-agents, that is, as beings with distinct psychological states and motives 
(Wellman, 1990). 
As stated above, perspective taking can be an important tool in the grounding 
process of audience design. When individuals know what kind of knowledge their 
interaction partners probably possess, they can more effectively tailor the content of their 
utterances. According to Clark and Marshall (1992), people use information from three 
sources to infer the amount of shared knowledge. First, they can rely on cues that are 
located in the shared perceptual/physical environment of the conversation partners (e.g., 
talking about „that car over there“ while pointing at it). Second, they can use linguistic 
cues derived from the past and present conversations between the interaction partners. 
Finally, people can infer shared knowledge from community membership information by 
relying on assumptions about the things known to members of certain social groups (see 
the example above about the use of the term „ANOVA” and „interaction effect” in a 
discussion between two psychologists). 
Empirical support that people use their assessment of other persons’ perspectives 
when adjusting their communication comes from multiple experimental studies. For 
example, Fussell and Krauss (1992, experiments 2 and 4) let participants judge the 
recognizability of diverse stimuli and then used these stimuli in a referential 
communication task. Consistent with the idea that people take their interaction partner’s 
perspective into account, participants used significantly more words and conversation turns 
when the stimulus in question was less familiar.4 
                                                 
4
 This is not to say that perspective taking was always perfectly successful. When participants 
themselves were familiar with a certain stimulus, they systematically overestimated the probability that their 
partners would also be familiar with the stimulus. Such egocentric tendencies likely reduce the effectiveness 
of interpersonal communication.  
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1.2.2.3 Shared Experiences 
A third mechanism that can serve to create a shared communicative code is reliance 
on shared experiences.5 According to psychologist Steven Duck (1994), human beings 
generate meaning by „anticipating how things will repeat themselves” (p. 65; also see 
Kelly, 1955). According to Duck, it is necessary to grasp the nature of these anticipations 
to really understand another person. However, the communication of meaning is 
complicated by the fact that persons often see the world in a highly idiosyncratic way. 
Because individuals’ anticipations are not observable to the interaction partner, the degree 
to which they are understood depends on the listener’s ability to interpret utterances and 
fill in knowledge gaps. 
In Duck’s theory, people discover similarity in their anticipations of events through 
everyday talk, in which „the framework of a person’s thought is presented to others 
symbolically so that the two partners may, if they are able, detect, recognize, create, and 
respond to similarities of interpretation of the world” (p. 14). Similarity on a particular 
topic is one way to establish a common ground on which people are more able to 
comprehend and communicate with each other. Moreover, similarity in the evaluations of 
these experiences may act as a reassurance that one’s personal worldview is shared by 
others and thus strengthen the person’s belief in its accuracy and validity. 
One way in which shared experiences foster effective communication is that similar 
persons can effectively use information on their own states and personality to make valid 
inferences about the other person (Neyer et al., 1999). In a way, such shared experiences 
may be seen as a specific instance of perspective taking: When people share a large 
number of experiences, it is easier to take the other person’s perspective.6 An example of 
the process of meaning sharing is depicted in Figure 3. In phase I, persons A and B have 
both experienced event X, which has been incorporated in their respective personal 
                                                 
5
 Indeed, the very meaning of the word communication is derived from the Latin communicare, 
which means „to make common or shared“. 
6
 Another source of accurate inferences is relationship-specific „theories”: mental models containing 
interaction-specific knowledge (Baldwin, 1992). Such mental models are hypothesized to serve as a basis for 
the interpretation of other persons’ behavior and might be created through mutual self-disclosure (Colvin, 
Vogt, & Ickes, 1997; Thomas & Fletcher, 2003). 
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construct systems (vertical lines from A and B to X). However, in this first phase, they are 
not yet aware of this similarity. In the second phase, A and B disclose their mutual 
experience of X but do not yet talk about the meaning of this particular experience 
(horizontal arrow between the X of A to the X of B). In the third phase, they start to talk 
about their evaluation of X and discover that this event has approximately the same 
meaning for them (shared access of A and B to X’s meaning). This motivates them to 
further engage in conversation about the meaning complexes associated with X, such as N 
or Z. In Figure 3, these associated meanings are also shared, which is likely to stimulate 
their conversation and promote mutual feelings of being understood. 
 
 
Figure 3. Model of the Serial Construction of Meaning According to Duck (1994) 
Note. According to Duck (1994, slight modifications added), individuals relationships 
between two persons (represented as A and B) are facilitated by shared experiences. In 
everyday talk, people may become aware of (1) mutuality in experience (2) and 
equivalence of evaluation of this experience (3). Eventually, this may promote the sharing 
of related meaning complexes (4). 
 
Duck refers to such recognitions and acknowledgement of experience 
commonalities (usually in talk) as „relational force”. Thus, the more experiences two 
persons share, the larger is their potential for a deep and meaningful relationship.7 
Empirical evidence for this notion was provided by Fraley and Aron (2004), who found 
                                                 
7
 According to Duck, even illusory similarities can have such effects because they „promote interest 
in continuing a relationship with another person in order to diversify and contextualize knowledge of that 
person” (1994, p. 112). 
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that experimental exposure to a shared humorous experience increased interpersonal 
closeness in encounters between 96 same-sex strangers. 
 
1.2.2.4 Metaphors 
While Duck’s model is highly intuitive and explains the powerful role of shared 
experiences in human communication, it does not address a fundamental problem in 
human interaction. That is, because all experience is idiosyncratic to some degree, how are 
humans ever able to understand nonshared and differentially coded experiences? 
Especially when confronted with an interaction partner that does not share personally 
significant thoughts and feelings, the creative use of language becomes necessary. 
According to Roman Jakobson (1960), metaphors are a central vehicle in the 
communication of meaning because they can describe unfamiliar concepts with familiar 
ones (e.g., by comparing love to a rollercoaster). As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue, 
metaphors are derived from physical, social and cultural experience.8 Because the elements 
of metaphors are typically unrelated in life, they require an „imaginative leap to recognize 
the resemblance to which a fresh metaphor alludes” (Chandler, 1994, chapter 8). 
In the process of MU, the metaphor is especially important as a potential vehicle to 
communicate a sense in the absence of shared experiences. In an example from popular 
culture, Mark Renton, the hero in the film Trainspotting, describes the experience of taking 
heroin for somebody who has never used it: „Take the best orgasm you ever had, multiply 
it by a thousand and you’re still nowhere near it.” This quote exemplifies the utilization of 
shared experiences (sexual experiences) to communicate the sense of a non-shared 
experience (using drugs). 
 
Summary.  
To sum up Chapter 1, the current dissertation studies the process of mutual 
understanding of personally relevant thoughts and feelings in verbal communication 
                                                 
8
 Since all human individuals are familiar with body sensations, many metaphors refer to direct 
physical experience (e.g., the head of government). In 1744, Renaissance philosopher Giambattista Vico 
argued: „It is noteworthy that in all languages the greater part of the expressions relating to inanimate things 
are formed by metaphor from the human body and its parts and from the human senses and passions” (Vico, 
1744/1968, cited in Chandler, 1994). 
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between dyadic partners. MU is related to empathy, social support, interpersonal rapport, 
and intimacy, yet it is also more specific and less dependent on the existence of close 
emotional ties. Instead, MU is conceived as an important first step in the establishment of 
supporting and intimate relationships. On the process level, MU requires individuals to 
encode thoughts and feelings into verbal utterances, which are then communicated to the 
interaction partner. The partner then decodes the message and (through an associative 
mechanism) produces a subsequent thought or feeling that can be communicated. 
Communication partners must often take each other’s perspective to grasp the meaning of 
often idiosyncratic communions. This interpretation process is facilitated by reference to 
shared experiences. However, language may also enable communication of nonshared 
experiences through the use of metaphors, which require „imaginary leaps”. 
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2 The Impact of Intelligence and Dispositional Valuations on 
Mutual Understanding 
In the previous chapter, the linguistic and social mechanisms behind mutual 
understanding were discussed. In the current chapter, this background information is used 
to highlight the role of intelligence and dispositional valuations in the MU process. In 
Section 2.1, the intelligence and dispositional valuations, which are the independent 
variables of the current research, are described and relevant empirical evidence is 
reviewed. Section 2.2 covers main effects of intelligence and dispositional valuations, 
which are independent on the personality of the interaction partner. Section 2.3 reviews 
research regarding assortative patterns in relationship formation (i.e., the tendency for 
people to establish relationships with similar individuals). The existence of such patterns is 
interpreted as indirect evidence for dyadic effects of intelligence. Section 2.4 discusses 
dyadic effects, which are dependent on the interaction between the personalities of both 
interaction partners. Finally, the combined effects of main and dyadic influences and their 
implications for intellectually gifted individuals are covered in Section 2.5. 
 
2.1 Review of Independent Variables 
In studying the effect of intelligence and dispositional valuations on MU, the 
current dissertation focuses on three broad construct categories. Two out of three 
categories belong to the overarching category of intelligence. Although the exact definition 
of intelligence is still contested (Sternberg, 2000), most researchers would agree with 
David Wechsler’s (1958, p. 7) global description that it is involved in “the global capacity 
of individuals to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with their 
environment.” As stated above, intelligence is further divided into two subcategories. 
Following many intelligence researchers (e.g., Ackerman, 1996; Baltes, 1997; Cattell, 
1963), a distinction is made between fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence. Fluid 
intelligence as a context-independent resource needed to adapt to the environment, whereas 
crystallized intelligence represents the outcome of investment of fluid intelligence in 
specific domains, such as knowledge or expertise. The third broad category studied here is 
labeled dispositional valuations, which are defined as a set of constructs that involve the 
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differential value attached to actions and end goals. In the current framework, traits in this 
category include openness to experience, interests, and values. In the following, relevant 
research pertaining to intelligence and dispositional valuations is reviewed. 
 
2.1.1 Fluid Intelligence 
Belsky (1990, p. 125) defined fluid intellectual ability as „on-the-spot reasoning 
ability, a skill not basically dependant on our experience.” Similarly, Cattell (1971, p. 99) 
defined it as “an expression of the level of complexity of relationships that an individual 
can perceive and act upon when he does not have recourse to answers to such complex 
issues already stored in memory”. Both definitions stress the fact that fluid reasoning is 
involved in problems that are new to the person in question. Tests of fluid intelligence 
usually involve nonverbal materials that are not often encountered in everyday life. For 
example, the widely-used Raven’s (1960) Progressive Matrices requires subjects to learn 
rule-based regularities in the design of unfinished abstract figures and to apply these rules 
to complement the picture (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Sample Item of a Matrices Test of Fluid Intelligence  
Note. Item 175 of the IST-2001 (Amthauer, Brocke, Liepmann, & Beauducel, 2001) 
 
Fluid intelligence can be compared to Hebb’s (1949) Intelligence A, which is 
hypothesized to be rooted in physiological processes. Consistent with this equivalence, 
various studies have demonstrated that age-dependent physiological declines are associated 
with a sharp drop in fluid intelligence, beginning in young adulthood (e.g., Baltes, 
Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 1999). 
The relation between fluid intelligence and other intelligence factors is still unclear. 
For example, Gustafsson (1988) argues that fluid intelligence is identical to general 
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intelligence. Carroll’s (1993) meta-analysis on the structure of intelligence, the most 
extensive contribution to this issue thus far, identified eight main intelligence factors that 
are related to a higher-order general factor. His results show that fluid intelligence is the 
factor closest to general intelligence but he did not argue that the constructs are identical 
(for similar findings, see Bickley, Keith, & Wolfle, 1995). 
Unsatisfied with the supposedly „detached” nature of psychometric, fluid 
intelligence, a number of researchers have introduced the constructs of „emotional 
intelligence” and/or „social intelligence” to account for individual differences in relational 
skills. However, performance tests of social and emotional intelligence have often failed to 
demonstrate substantial independence from psychometric intelligence tests (for emotional 
intelligence, see Brody, 2004; Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Roberts, Zeidner, & 
Matthews, 2001; for social intelligence, see Keating, 1978; Shanley, Walker, & Foley, 
1971). Because of this, social and emotional skills are discussed here as particular 
instances of fluid intelligence applied in social contexts.9 
The current study includes a sample of gifted individuals because, for reasons 
elaborated below, they are expected to be especially affected by intelligence differences 
between persons. Intellectual giftedness is defined here as an IQ of at least 130, so that the 
most intelligent 2% of the population can be described as intellectually gifted. Of course, 
the cutoff of 130 is somewhat arbitrary, yet it most closely reflects the consensus in the 
scientific community (Rost, 2000). Some alternative models conceptualize giftedness as 
multidimensional. For example, Renzulli (1986) defined giftedness as the simultaneous 
presence of not just an above-average IQ but also a high level of creativity and task 
commitment (for other multidimensional models of giftedness see Gagné, 1991; Heller, 
2001). These models have been criticized for a lack of conceptual and empirical rigor (e.g., 
Rost, 2000). Since the present study is theoretically interested in the entire distributional 
range of intelligence, it is not necessary to dive into this discussion, since the assumption 
made in the current dissertation is that the mechanisms that are responsible for the effect of 
intelligence on MU are also at work at more moderate intelligence levels.  
                                                 
9
 Some researchers have proposed that tests of emotional/social skills are influenced by participants’ 
knowledge structures (e.g., Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2001), which are a form of crystallized 
intelligence. Because research on this issue is mostly lacking, social and emotional skills are discussed 
together with fluid intelligence. 
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2.1.2 Crystallized Intelligence  
In contrast to fluid intelligence, which is concerned with individual differences in 
reasoning ability in the face of novel stimuli, crystallized intelligence pertains to the 
products of the investment of fluid ability in specific environmental domains. These 
products are acquired over the life course instead of passively influenced by biological or 
environmental forces. Probably as a result, individual differences in crystallized 
intelligence are more resistant to age-related declines in neurophysiology (Baltes et al., 
1999). 
An important facet of crystallized intelligence is vocabulary, which refers to 
agreed-upon conventions regarding the meaning of words. Whereas some people only 
know a selected number of words, other people use highly differentiated terms and have 
detailed knowledge of synonyms, antonyms, and proverbs. Research has found that 
individual differences in vocabulary are an important source of differences in crystallized 
intelligence, yet tests of vocabulary also load high on the general factor of intelligence 
(Carroll, 1993; Ullstadius, Gustafsson, & Carlstedt, 2002). Consistent with the notion that 
crystallized intelligence may still increase while more fluid resources are already on the 
decline, a recent meta-analysis by Verhaeghen (2003) has demonstrated that vocabulary 
scores of older adults are higher than those of younger adults, with an average effect size 
of d = 0.80. 
 
2.1.3 Dispositional Valuations 
As stated previously, dispositional valuations involve the differential value attached 
to actions and end goals. In the current dissertation, the most important constructs in this 
category in terms of their impact on the MU process are openness to experience, interests, 
and values. As a dispositional valuation, openness to experience is conceptualized as 
influencing the value that people attach to structural features of cognition. Interests 
concern the differential valuation of certain activities. Finally, values involve the valuation 
of broad end goals. In the following subsections, a description as well as a brief summary 
of relevant evidence regarding these variables is provided. 
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2.1.3.1 Openness to Experience 
Openness to experience is the fifth factor of the „Big Five” model of personality 
description (John & Srivastava, 1999). It is usually treated as an intrapsychic dimension, 
describing individual differences in the structure and functioning of the mind. For example, 
McCrae and Costa (1997) link openness to differences in the „breadth, depth and 
permeability of consciousness and in the recurrent need to enlarge and examine 
experience” (p. 826).10 
Open individuals seek out and reflect upon new experiences. This feature has some 
resemblance to Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC), which has been defined as the 
preference for a definite answer on some topic and an avoidance of confusion and 
ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1990). In fact, it is quite difficult to think of a highly open person 
that is intolerant of complexity and ambiguity, and vice versa. Consistent with this 
argument, a study by Webster and Kruglanski (1994) found significantly negative 
correlations between NCC and dogmatism and authoritarianism, which are aspects of low 
openness (rs  .30). 
 
2.1.3.2 Interests and Values 
Asendorpf (2003) conceptualized interests as tendencies to attribute pleasure and 
curiosity to some activities but not to others. Interests have been most extensively studied 
within the context of vocational aspirations. Numerous interest taxonomies have been 
proposed, such as Holland’s (1959) hexagonal model, which proposes six basic interests. 
Realistic interests involve concrete objects and things; investigative interests involve 
intellectual pursuits; artistic interests are concerned with art and creativity; social interests 
concentrate on working with people; enterprising interests involve projects and commercial 
enterprise; and conventional interests are focused on clerical and computational tasks. 
Rokeach (1973) defined a value as „an enduring belief that a specific mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or 
converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence” (p. 5). In the current framework, 
                                                 
10
 McCrae and Costa (1997, p. 838) also speculated that open individuals have access to more 
thoughts, feelings, and impulses in awareness and are able to maintain more of these mental elements 
simultaneously in consciousness. These features of openness, however, correspond more to the categories of 
fluid intelligence (working memory) and crystallized intelligence (knowledge), respectively. 
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values can be conceptualized as the value attached to behavior (mode of conduct) and 
goals (end-state of existence). Because they can be important motivators for behaviors and 
have great emotional significance, values potentially affect MU. 
 
2.2 Main Effects of Intelligence and Dispositional Valuations 
Now that the most important categories of intelligence and dispositional valuations 
have been reviewed, the following section focuses on the main effects of these variables on 
the MU process. Such effects are at work when an individual’s personality has a direct 
influence on the MU process, regardless of the personality of the interaction partner. 
 
2.2.1 Fluid Intelligence 
According to Chandler (1994), signs have both denotative and connotative 
meaning. Whereas denotation refers the literal and commonsense meaning of a sign (i.e., 
the meaning of a word in a dictionary), connotation refers to its socio-cultural and 
idiosyncratic associations. The ability to decode denotative meaning is more closely related 
to vocabulary (i.e., crystallized intelligence). In contrast, decoding personal connotative 
meaning requires the use of contextual cues. Because fluid intelligence is involved in the 
ability to integrate new information and make inferences, more intelligent people should be 
more adept in decoding the connotative meaning of an utterance.  
As stated previously, fluid intelligence is closely related to social intelligence. 
Because of the relatively undeveloped state of research regarding emotional intelligence 
(Zeidner, Roberts, & Matthews, 2004), the following discussion mainly focuses on social 
intelligence. Social intelligence was defined by O’Sulivan, Guilford, and deMille (1965) as 
„ability to judge people” (p. 5) with respect to „feelings, motives, thoughts, intentions, 
attitudes, or other psychological dispositions which might affect an individual’s social 
behavior” (p. 4). O’Sullivan et al. (1965) constructed tests for the measurement of social 
intelligence, starting from the assumption that „expressive behavior, more particularly 
facial expressions, vocal inflections, postures, and gestures, are the cues from which 
intentional states are inferred” (p. 6). 
Expressive cues can be used to decode the connotation of verbal messages. Imagine 
a man and a woman who are driving in their car towards some destination. The woman is 
behind the steering wheel and has stopped at a red traffic light. After a while, the man 
The Role of Intelligence and Dispositional Valuations in Mutual Understanding 30 
comments that „The light has turned green.” When the man is very cynical in his tone, the 
sentence might be interpreted to mean something as „You are so stupid that I have to tell 
you what to do all of the time”. Equally possible, the sentence might communicate a more 
collaborative attitude of wanting to help the partner in attending to the traffic. In this 
example, a person with high (social/emotional) intelligence would be able to correctly 
identify the underlying message. 
Because of the generative nature of language, words have to be combined in novel, 
creative ways to communicate meaning. Intelligence is associated with a higher level of 
word fluency, so intelligent individuals can also be expected to be more skilled at encoding 
their own thoughts and feelings into linguistic utterances. Indeed, a study by Quay, Hough, 
Mathews, and Jarrett (1981) demonstrated that general cognitive ability is positively 
associated with communicative encoding. Furthermore, a meta-analysis by Davis and 
Kraus (1997) reported that cognitive ability is associated with superior empathic skills. The 
hypothesized superior ability of intelligent individuals to encode and decode verbal 
utterances gives rise to the first main effect hypothesis: 
 
Main Effect Hypothesis 1: Fluid intelligence is positively related to MU. [Hm-1] 
 
2.2.2 Crystallized Intelligence 
The relation between vocabulary and the ability to encode and decode verbal 
material is close and obvious. To understand an utterance, it is necessary to understand the 
meaning of its constituting words. Consistent with this, a meta-analysis of 52 studies by 
Stahl and Fairbanks (1986) showed that teaching children the meaning of words improves 
their general reading comprehension, even of texts that do not contain the words that were 
taught (d = .30). Although the relative contribution of fluid intelligence and vocabulary is 
still debated, some empirical evidence exists that vocabulary has a direct effect on 
language comprehension (Cain, Oakhill, & Lemmon, 2004). 
When a person wants to express an idea or thought, the first step in this process is 
the selection of the word(s) that are most appropriate captures its meaning (Cleland & 
Pickering, 2003). Richer vocabularies are associated with a larger pool of words and 
concepts to express ideas (Lohman, 2000). Consistent with this, research on cognitive 
differentiation has found that the number of constructs a person uses to describe events is 
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positively associated with communication effectiveness (for a review see O’Keefe & 
Sypher, 1981). In addition, a study by Applegate, Kline, and Delia (1991) found that 
cognitively differentiated individuals communicate in a more person centered manner, 
which has been shown to promote interpersonal comfort (Jones & Guerrero, 2001). As a 
result, these factors should be related to increased levels of MU. This gives rise to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Main Effect Hypothesis 2: Crystallized intelligence is positively related to MU. 
[Hm-2] 
 
2.2.3 Dispositional Valuations 
Because interests and values are not expected to exert a main effect on MU, the 
following section on main effects of dispositional valuations focuses only on openness to 
experience. 
 
2.2.3.1 Openness to Experience 
When people adjust communicative message to the background knowledge of their 
conversation partners, they have to be sensitive to the other person’s perspective instead of 
assuming shared knowledge. Because people who are low in openness are thought to 
dislike unstructured, ambiguous situations, they may be less effective during the process of 
audience design than people high in openness (for a similar argument, see Gagne & Lydon, 
2004, p. 333).  
There is some evidence that this is indeed the case. Richter and Kruglanski (1999) 
let 99 college students provide descriptions of various abstract figures. Prior to the task, 
participants were told that either they themselves or a previously unknown participant were 
to use these descriptions in a referential communication task (see Section 1.2.2.1, for a 
description) scheduled several weeks later. Results showed that descriptions written by 
participants high in need for closure (i.e., low in openness) were shorter and contained 
more idiosyncratic references. Consistent with the idea that such messages contain a lower 
amount of socially shared information needed for effective communication, they were less 
likely to be successfully identified by others. 
The following considerations give rise to the following hypothesis: 
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Main Effect Hypothesis 3: Openness to experience is positively related to MU. 
[Hm-3] 
 
2.3 Between-Person Differences in Intelligence and Dispositional 
Valuations 
A central organizing hypothesis of the current dissertation is that between-person 
differences in intelligence and dispositional valuations are negatively related to MU. When 
between-person differences are detrimental in social relationships, then people should be 
motivated to seek out peers with similar personality structures (because of the fundamental 
human drive for intimate, close relationships; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; McAdams, 1989; 
Reis, 1990). Accordingly, assortative patterns are an indirect argument for the detrimental 
influence of between-person differences in intelligence and dispositional valuations (the 
hypothesized mechanisms behind this association are discussed in Section 2.4). In the 
following section, evidence for niche picking with regards to general intelligence, 
crystallized intelligence, and dispositional valuations is reviewed. Subsequently, some 
interpretations for these findings are discussed. 
 
2.3.1 General Intelligence 
A number of empirical studies have focused on the similarity between marriage 
partners (assortative mating) in general intelligence. Table 2 summarizes the results of 
some representative studies. As can be seen, an average spousal correlation of .34 (after 
Fisher r-to-z transformation and back-transformation) is obtained across studies. This 
figure is almost identical to the weighted spousal correlation of .33 as reported by 
Bouchard and McGue (1981) in a review of 16 studies. Thus, it can be concluded that there 
is a moderate degree of spousal similarity in terms of general intelligence levels. 
There is little research on assortative similarity in friends. Only some indirect 
evidence points in this direction. For example, it has often been documented that gifted 
children prefer older friends (Janos & Robinson, 1985). It could be speculated that this 
represents an effort to affiliate with persons of a comparable mental age. However, this 
interpretation needs to be backed up by more future research. 
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2.3.2 Crystallized Intelligence 
Compared to the findings on assortative mating for general intelligence, less is 
known about spousal similarities in crystallized intelligence. Some of the studies reviewed 
in Table 2 report separate spousal correlations for verbal IQ (which is related to 
crystallized intelligence and vocabulary) or knowledge. For example, Tambs et al. (1993) 
found a correlation of .34 for the Information subtest of the WAIS, which measures general 
knowledge. Nagoshi et al. (1987) found a similarity correlation of .10 for verbal IQ, 
whereas Willoughby (1927, 1928; cited in Vandenberg, 1971) found a correlation of .44. 
When these coefficients are averaged, a similarity coefficient of .30 is found, which is very 
similar to the findings for general intelligence. 
Because educational systems are designed to transfer knowledge, a person’s 
educational level may be taken as a proxy for the sophistication of his or her knowledge 
structures. As can be seen in Table 2, the correlation between spouses’ educational status is 
higher than found for fluid or crystallized intelligence. For example, Phillips et al. (1987) 
found an average spousal correlation of .41, Nagoshi et al. (1987) of .47, and Reynolds et 
al. (2000) of .54 (latent path correlation). Note, however, that these high correlations may 
partly be a result of similarities in fluid intelligence or a function of social stratification 
(see discussion below). 
 
Table 2 
Spousal Correlations for General Intelligence, Crystallized Intelligence, and Education 
Sample N G Gc Edu 
Phillips et al. (1987) 1,499 .18  .41 
Tambs et al. (1993) 232 .32 .34  
Nagoshi et al. (1987) 82 -.03 .10 .47 
Mascie-Taylor & Vandenberg (1988) 193 .40   
Willoughby (1927, 1928) ab 90 .44 .44  
Jones (1928) b 105 .60   
Burks (1928) b 274 .47   
Reynolds et al. (2000) 116 .23  .54 
Average  .34 .30 .48 
Note. G = General intelligence, Gc = Crystallized intelligence, Edu = Education. 
a
 nonverbal intelligence 
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b
 cited in Vandenberg (1971) 
 
2.3.3 Dispositional Valuations 
There exist indications for assortative mating in terms of dispositional valuations, 
especially for openness to experience. McCrae (1996, his Table 5) summarized spousal 
similarities for 14 openness-related traits and found an average cross-spouse (assortative) 
correlation of .41 (based on 19 coefficients; range .19-.74). Lykken and Tellegen (1993) 
reported that spousal personality correlations are mainly restricted to traits such as 
religiosity, conservatism, authoritarianism, and the endorsement of traditional values (rs 
.33 - .57; see also Feng & Baker, 1994), which are all facets of low openness. 
Results from a number of studies suggest the degree of spousal similarity is higher 
for openness than for other personality traits. For example, McCrae (1996) reported 
spousal correlations for 103 couples and the strongest effect for openness (r = .33), 
whereas the only other significant effect was found for conscientiousness (r = .21). Botwin, 
Buss, and Shackelford (1997) found significant assortment effects for agreeableness and 
conscientiousness (rs = .22 to -.33), but more so for openness (rs = .38-.51). Finally, 
Waller (1999) studied personality similarity in 149 spouse pairs and found only one 
significant correlation for conventionality (r = .41), which is related to (low) openness. 
Between-person differences in dispositional valuations might affect the formation 
of friendships. Consistent with this notion, Cheng, Bond, and Chan (1995) asked 434 
Chinese adolescents (aged 17-20) about their own and an „ideal friend’s” personality and 
found a high similarity correlation (r = .56) for openness to experience. Johnson (1989) 
sampled 56 pairs of close friends and 50 pairs of acquaintances from a residential, white, 
U.S. mid-western city (average age 37) and asked them what attracted them to the other 
person. An average of 76% of the close friends and 66% of the acquaintances named the 
similarity of values and interests, which made it the single most important self-rated 
predictor. These findings suggest that people prefer friends that are similar in their 
dispositional valuations. 
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2.3.4 Interpretation of Assortative Patterns Regarding Intelligence 
2.3.4.1 Empirical Evidence 
It is often assumed that assortative patterns regarding intelligence are the results of 
active phenotypic assortment. That is, people are hypothesized to actively seek out 
cognitive peers. In the current study, it is hypothesized that they do this because cognitive 
peers have less difficulty in communicating personally relevant thoughts and feelings. As a 
result, feelings of MU in particular and relationship satisfaction in general should be 
maximal when between-person intelligence differences are small. 
To the best of the present author’s knowledge, there exists only one empirical study 
that directly analyzed the relation between relationship quality and between-person 
intelligence differences. Lewak, Wakefield, and Briggs (1985) studied a sample of couples 
from the general population (N = 81), half of which underwent marital therapy. 
Correlations between marital satisfaction and spousal IQ differences (assessed with the 
WAIS-R) were non-significant for simple difference scores (rs ranging between -.04 and 
.10) and small but negative for squared difference scores. Only in the case of verbal 
intelligence, a somewhat larger correlation of -.21 was found, but this association did not 
reach statistical significance.  
Lewak et al. (1985) concluded from their findings that marital satisfaction is 
independent from similarity in intelligence. However, the validity of these conclusions is 
threatened by methodological flaws. Most importantly, the community and marital therapy 
sample differed markedly in the level and range of marital satisfaction (d = .91, p < .01), 
but not in the level of intelligence. Because it is not known whether the two samples also 
differed in their level of assortative mating on intelligence, marital satisfaction differences 
between samples may have canceled out differences between partners within the same 
sample. Thus, it is premature to take the Lewak et al. (1985) study as evidence against 
dyadic effects of fluid intelligence. 
 
2.3.4.2 Alternative Explanations 
As stated above, findings on spousal and friendship similarity suggest that people 
actively seek out cognitive peers as their friends or romantic partners. This might be the 
case because intelligence differences impair MU and thus conflict with the fundamental 
human need to establish close and intimate relationships. However, as is the case for all 
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conclusions based on correlational data, the causal factors behind this assortment are very 
difficult to study empirically.  
One alternative explanation for assortative correlations such as the ones reviewed 
above is that modern societies are stratified according to intelligence levels. As a result, 
individuals will have more contact with peers of comparable intelligence (social 
homogamy). Therefore, assortative correlations regarding intelligence or any other 
education-related trait may be caused by passive availability instead of active selection (for 
empirical evidence, see Nagoshi et al., 1987; Reynolds et al., 2000; Tambs et al., 1993). 
 
2.3.4.3 Illusory Similarity 
When personality similarity is assessed by taking only the perspective of a single 
individual into account, it may be influenced by a tendency to „project” one’s own 
personality traits into the other person. In an exemplary study, Murray et al. (2002) asked 
105 married/cohabiting couples and 86 dating couples about their own and their partner’s 
personality. Illusory similarity was operationalized as the degree to which individuals rated 
their partners as more similar than they really were. Results showed that illusory similarity 
was positively related to relationship satisfaction in the married sample. In addition, 
illusory similarity in women predicted a higher stability of relationships in the dating 
sample. These results suggest that people in satisfying and stable relationships perceive 
similarities in their partners that are not evident in reality.11 
Murray et al.’s (2002) findings have important implications for the current 
dissertation, as Study 1, 2, and 3 use the same informants to rate a) their own personality, 
b) the personality of their relationship partners, and c) the quality of the relationships with 
these partners. As a result, associations between perceived similarity and relationship 
quality are potentially confounded by an ego-centric tendency to project one’s own 
personality on partners in satisfying relationships. This should be taken into account when 
interpreting the corresponding results. 
 
                                                 
11
 In spite of strong evidence for bias, empathic accuracy has been shown to increase with 
relationship length, at least under some circumstances (Neff & Karney, 2002; Thomas & Fletcher, 2003). 
Social judgment in close relationships is driven by both accuracy and bias, depending on the goals and 
motivation of the perceiver (Gagné & Lydon, 2004). 
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2.4 Dyadic Effects of Intelligence and Dispositional Valuations 
In the previous section, the literature regarding between-person differences in 
intelligence and dispositional valuations was reviewed. It was concluded that there is a 
tendency for people to affiliate with cognitive peers. One of the main hypotheses of the 
current dissertation is that between-person differences in intelligence and dispositional 
valuations are detrimental to establishing a sense of MU in social relationships. However, 
the data on which this conclusion is based are indirect, and there are several possible 
alternative interpretations. In the current section, more direct evidence is presented. 
 
2.4.1 Fluid Intelligence 
In the following, dyadic effects of fluid intelligence are discussed. This discussion 
is divided in two subsections. First, intelligence plays a role in shaping differences in the 
kinds experiences people make in life, which may be related to MU. Second, differences in 
the generation of insight and ideas related to intelligence and their impact on the 
associative phase of the MU process are discussed. 
 
2.4.1.1 Shared Experiences and Evaluations 
Because of its profound social consequences, intelligence can be an important 
determinant of the kind of experiences people make (Gordon, 1997). One of the principal 
reasons for this lies in the educational and vocational segregation according to intelligence. 
For example, university students are exposed to a very specific intellectual climate 
(consisting of reading books, discussing theories, etc.) that differs from that of their peers 
who directly enter the labor market after high school (Arnett, 2000). Accordingly, people 
with different intelligence levels are more likely to experience nonshared associations 
during a conversation, which may hamper MU. 
 
2.4.1.2 Insight and Ideas 
As reviewed in Section 2.1.1., fluid intelligence manifests itself in reasoning about 
novel phenomena. Moreover, more intelligent individuals have been found to be more 
creative in solving divergent problems (Harris, 2004). Therefore, they may be more likely 
to produce insightful and creative associations during a conversation. For example, while 
discussing the long waiting lines in front of a museum, the idea might come up to send text 
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messages to potential visitors when the queue is shorter than usual (as was done during the 
Museum of Modern Art exhibition in Berlin, 2004). 
The generation of new insightful and creative associations poses a challenge to the 
MU process, since such associations are not likely to be shared between interaction 
partners. First, the creative person is faced with the task of establishing a link between the 
interaction context and the creative or insightful idea. For example, the person in question 
might remark: „Looking at the long queue, I was wondering whether it would be possible 
to reduce the waiting time with some technical device.”  
Second, when the context of the new idea has been made transparent, the 
interaction partner needs to be convinced of its validity (e.g., would sending SMS text 
messages work?). In case of marked individual differences in intelligence levels, less 
intelligent people will not necessarily be able to understand the logic behind the novel 
ideas of very intelligent people. Especially when the person in question is very excited 
about the idea and wants to share it with other persons, MU will be hampered. This leads 
to the following prediction: 
 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 1: Between-person differences in fluid 
intelligence are negatively related to MU. [Hd-1] 
 
2.4.2 Crystallized Intelligence 
Interpersonal differences in vocabulary size should be related to dyadic effects in 
the MU process because persons with a very large vocabulary size are more likely to use 
words that are not shared by their interaction partners. When this is the case, subsequent 
decoding of the utterance by their interaction partners will be hampered, leading to 
interruptions in the MU process. Such „complicated” use of language is a potential 
hindrance to the sharing of meaning because it makes the discovery of shared experiences 
(Duck, 1994) more difficult. For this reason, between-person differences in vocabulary 
might even be consciously maximized to create interpersonal distance (e.g., when a person 
uses difficult „upper class” words). 
The above considerations give rise to the following hypothesis: 
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Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 2: Between-person differences in crystallized 
intelligence are negatively related to MU. [Hd-2] 
 
2.4.3 Dispositional Valuations 
According to Duck’s (1994) theory, individuals with more shared experiences have 
a larger potential to develop a deep and meaningful relationship. A crucial prerequisite in 
his four-phase model is that both individuals agree in the evaluation of these experiences 
(see Figure 3). Also, recall that a crucial step in the formation of intimacy is that 
individuals feel valued by their interaction partners. Because dispositional valuations are 
directly involved in evaluations of other persons (e.g., Heaven & Oxman, 1999), they are 
hypothesized to be an important source of dyadic effects on the MU process. In the 
following, the effect of openness to experience, interests, and values is discussed. 
 
2.2.3.1 Openness to Experience 
As described above, openness to experience is closely related to interpersonal 
differences in tolerance for ambiguity. According to McCrae (1996), between-person 
differences in the thinking style of open vs. closed individuals can be a serious interaction 
problem and lead to mutual avoidance. For example, a study by Kirton (1976) classified 
managers as either „innovators” (high openness) or „adaptors” (low openness). It was 
found that adaptors regarded innovators as neurotic and insensitive to others, whereas 
innovators saw adaptors as dogmatic, inflexible, and conservative (for related evidence, see 
de Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999). Consistent with this, a large-scale survey by Gurtman 
(1995) showed that individuals low on openness complain more about being too easily 
swayed by others12, which might be the underlying reason for their „defensive” and rigid 
thinking style. Indeed, according to McCrae (1996, p. 331): 
 
Open people are bored by the predictable and intellectually undemanding 
amusements of closed people; closed people are bored by what they 
perceive to be the difficult and pretentious culture of the open. 
                                                 
12
 Of course, the fact that close-minded people are more easily persuaded by the opinions of other 
people makes the label „openness” somewhat problematic. 
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This gives rise to the following hypothesis: 
 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 3: Between-person differences in openness to experience 
are negatively related to MU. [Hd-3] 
 
2.2.3.2 Interests and Values 
Differing valuations of activities and goals are another potential source of 
nonshared evaluations of experience. For example, in countries with a military draft, all 
healthy men of a certain age are called to arms for a period of one to three years. Although 
they share a mutual experience, they might disagree on the meaning of this experience. For 
example, some persons enjoy military service as a time of male bonding and serving their 
country, whereas other individuals develop an aversion to the strict discipline and 
unquestioning patriotism (Goldstein, 1943).  
Research in the so-called attraction paradigm (Byrne, 1971) has established that 
individuals are attracted to others with similar attitudes. Most studies carried out in this 
paradigm have relied on the so-called bogus stranger method. In this method, individuals 
are given a description of an imaginary person, who is displayed as either similar or 
dissimilar to the self. Results from a large number of studies using this paradigm are 
consistent with the notion that people are attracted to others with similar attitudes (Byrne, 
1997). 
The findings carried out within the attraction paradigm are easily reconciled with 
Duck’s (1994) notion that MU is dependent on the exchange of similarly evaluated 
experiences. There have been concerns, however, that the bogus stranger methodology 
may not be ecologically valid. Indeed, in the absence of any other information about a 
person, it makes sense for individuals to base their evaluations entirely on attitude 
similarity. Employing more naturalistic designs, however, Sunnafrank (1983; 1984; 1992) 
demonstrated that the influence of perceived similarity on attraction fades away when 
subjects are allow to interact with each other. Because these results are only based on a few 
experiments and some research has provided contradicting evidence (Cappella & Palmer, 
1990), the more conservative prediction is that similarity in interests and values is 
positively related to MU: 
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Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 4: Between-person differences in interests and 
values are negatively related to MU. [Hd-4] 
 
2.5 Combining Main and Dyadic Effects 
In the following section, some implications of the combined influence of main and 
dyadic effects are discussed. As will be seen, most research in this domain has focused on 
the social effects of (fluid) intelligence. The following section focuses on two domains. 
First, Simonton’s (1985) model of the impact of intelligence on group influence is 
discussed. After this, research on the social adjustment of intellectually gifted individuals 
is reviewed, much of which assumes a dyadic effect of intelligence on social relationships 
(though the theory behind this assumption often remains implicit). This section finishes 
with an hypothesis regarding the combined impact of main and dyadic effects in 
cognitively gifted individuals.  
 
2.5.1 Simonton’s (1985) Model of Intelligence and Group Influence 
2.5.1.1 Description of the Model 
As stated above, intelligence is hypothesized to exert a positively main effect on 
MU, yet at the same time, large dyadic differences in intelligence may be detrimental to 
effective communication. Simonton (1985) used a similar logic to predict the optimal 
intelligence level for influence in groups. On the one hand, more intelligent subjects are 
assumed to generate higher quality contributions (consistent with Main Effect Hypothesis 
1). This can be an important advantage because the contribution of each group member 
must „survive” the criticism of more intelligent members in order to become accepted. 
When only this Criticism factor would be at work, the most intelligent group member 
should eventually win over the group and become its leader. 
This prediction might sound plausible at first, but it does not coincide with 
everyday experience, where it is often the case that political and economic leaders are not 
the most intelligent members of the population. For example, it is contended that John F. 
Kennedy had an IQ of 119, which would place him „only” one SD above the mean.  
To explain this observation, Simonton hypothesized that highly intelligent 
individuals’ ideas are too complicated to be communicated to most other people 
(Comprehension factor). Because less intelligent individuals are not able to comprehend 
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more intelligent persons’ remarks, they are not likely to be influenced. Formalized in 
mathematical terms, Simonton assumed that an intelligence difference of more than one 
SD is enough to hamper interpersonal communication. When only the Comprehension 
factor is at work, people with an intelligence level of 108 should have the largest potential 
to influence others. 
 
 
Figure 5. Model of the Relation Between Intelligence and Group Influence According to 
Simonton (1985). 
Note. According to Simonton (1985), the effect of intelligence on group influence is 
dependent on the additive effect of two factors. First, more intelligent people face less 
criticism from other group members (depicted by the asymptotically decreasing curve). 
Second, however, interpersonal comprehension is highest at more moderate levels of 
intelligence (depicted by the bell-shaped curve). When the Comprehension and Criticism 
factors are combined (via subtraction), a function of the predicted association between 
intelligence and group influence is obtained that peaks around an optimal IQ level of 119. 
 
As stated above, extremely intelligent people are more likely to produce effective 
solutions to problems. Because most members of normal social groups have more limited 
cognitive abilities, however, these ideas may be too complicated to be able to influence 
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others. When the Comprehension and Criticism factors are combined (by means of 
subtraction), a curvilinear (inverted U) relation between IQ and interpersonal influence is 
obtained that peaks around an IQ of 11913 (see Figure 5). This new optimum lies in 
between the extremely high IQ level predicted by the Criticism factor and the moderate IQ 
level predicted by the Comprehension factor. 
Although this prediction of a curvilinear, inverted-U relation between intelligence 
and group influence is relatively clear-cut, the model and the exact form of the intelligence 
x group influence function depend on a number of assumptions: 
• Intelligent group members are expected to resist adjusting their level of complexity towards the 
mean group level. According to Simonton, it is likely that they do so because artificially lowering 
the complexity of one’s speech would sound insincere. Moreover, intellectual peers and 
superiors exert pressures to display one’s maximum level of intellectual sophistication. 
• If the group is formed to solve a certain problem, then the Criticism factor may be more 
important than the Comprehension factor. Under these circumstances, the group will focus on 
its most intelligent members („experts”) in order to arrive at the best solution. In contrast, in an 
emotion-focused group, the Comprehension factor should become more important. 
• The optimal intelligence level for group influence is dependent on the average intelligence of its 
members. In groups of highly intelligent people, the model still predicts an inverted U, but the 
optimum intelligence level shifts towards higher levels. 
 
2.5.1.2 Empirical evidence 
In spite of the plausibility of its theoretical predictions, Simonton’s model is not yet 
well-established and direct empirical evidence is mostly lacking. Only some indirect 
evidence is consistent with its predictions. Specifically, there are scattered findings that 
group leaders are indeed moderately above-average in intelligence (i.e., about 1.2 SDs 
above the population mean). For example, Gibb (1947) found that military officer 
candidates were 1.2 to 1.5 SDs more intelligent than the group they were to lead. In 
addition, Ghiselli (1963) tested the success rate of middle managers and found that optimal 
levels were achieved by those scoring between 1.2 and 1.5 SDs above the mean. Because 
direct support for the model is mostly lacking, the current study tries to test the Simonton 
model in the context of close interpersonal relationships.  
                                                 
13
 This corresponds to a deviation of 1.2 SDs above the mean; note that this is exactly the score 
Kennedy is supposed to have reached. 
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2.5.2 Application of the Simonton (1985) Model to the Adjustment and 
Social Relationships of Gifted Individuals 
The hypothesized negative dyadic effect of intelligence discrepancies on MU has 
clear implications for gifted individuals. Because the percentage of individuals at both 
extreme ends of the normal distribution is very small, the Simonton model predicts that 
gifted individuals, who are more than two SDs above the mean, can only communicate 
with about 16% of the population (i.e., applying the 1 SD criterion). By comparison, a 
perfectly average individual with an IQ of 100 could communicate with about 68% of the 
population. For extremely gifted individuals, the Simonton (1985) hypothesis predicts even 
greater problems. For example, the pool of communication partners of a person with an IQ 
of 145 is predicted to be restricted to only 2% of the population. As a result, these 
individuals may have more difficulty in finding friends or romantic partners with whom 
they can communicate at a satisfactory intellectual level. This should be associated with 
reduced feelings of being understood. 
There exist few well-designed studies on the adjustment of gifted individuals. This 
is true despite an increased interest in the topic of giftedness in recent years (Rost, 2000, p. 
7). Many studies use self-selected or clinical samples (e.g., participants of a summer camp 
for the gifted or psychiatric patients), which are not representative of the broader 
population. As a result, only findings from a small number of selected studies are reviewed 
here. As will be seen, empirical findings are mixed, with some studies showing superior 
adjustment, whereas others suggest adjustment problems, depending on the type of 
outcome and the level of giftedness that is considered. 
 
2.5.2.1 Studies Showing Superior Adjustment of Gifted Individuals 
Terman (1925; Terman & Oden, 1959) compared teachers ratings of 532 gifted 
subjects (aged 7-14 years; mean IQ = 151) and 533 classmates (aged 10-14 years; mean IQ 
unknown) with regard to a number of social characteristics. This classic study has provided 
a wealth of information regarding the social adjustment of gifted children. In contrast to 
the stereotype of the sickly, socially awkward gifted child, his results demonstrated that 
70% of these children were judged to outperform their peers in terms of leadership, 
whereas ratings of popularity ratings were slightly above-average (56%). 
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Terman’s results suggest an above-average adjustment of gifted children. Note, 
however, that his gifted sample was identified through teacher nominations. Because 
teachers (often implicitly) associate giftedness with well-adjusted behavior, it cannot be 
ruled out that the higher reported adjustment level of gifted children was partly caused by a 
so-called halo effect: the tendency of positive evaluations in one domain to affect more 
generalized impressions of a person. That is, it is possible that the Terman teachers were 
particularly fond of well-behaving and adjusted pupils and generalized these impressions 
to the cognitive abilities of these children (Rost, 2000). Accordingly, such children may 
have been more likely to be included in Terman’s gifted sample.  
Janos and Robinson (1985) reviewed several studies on giftedness and adjustment 
and found that in the majority of studies, moderate levels of giftedness were related to 
better adjustment. Their conclusion corroborates Terman’s results that gifted individuals 
have better social reasoning and perspective taking skills. It is also consistent with a meta-
analysis of 20 studies by Hoge and Renzulli (1993), who found that gifted children have 
higher levels of general self-esteem (average effect size d = .20; see Roznowski, Reith, & 
Hong, 2000, for similar findings). 
 
2.5.2.2 Studies Showing Some Adjustment Problems of Gifted Individuals 
The studies reviewed above point to superior adjustment for gifted individuals. In 
the following, evidence for adjustment problems is discussed. 
In Germany, Rost (2000) followed 107 gifted children and adolescents (mean age 
15 years) drawn from a community sample (mean IQ = 136) and 118 highly achieving age 
mates (mean IQ = 102) and compared them to a control group of comparable size. 
Although both gifted and the highly achieving individuals had higher levels of academic 
self-esteem and their classroom behavior was rated more positively by their teachers, they 
had more negative self-perceptions of peer popularity. The highly achieving group also had 
a somewhat more negative self-concept of relationships with peers of the other sex, 
whereas the male subjects of this sample also perceived same-sex relationships as more 
problematic. Finally, both gifted and highly achieving individuals reported a lower 
frequency of meeting friends than controls. 
Hollingworth’s (1942) classic study followed a sample of 12 extremely gifted 
children (IQ = 180, initial age = 12) from New York until they were in their early twenties. 
According to Hollingworth, these children experienced great difficulties in relating 
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satisfyingly to their normal intelligence peers. In her words, they were „too intelligent to be 
understood by the general run of persons with whom they make contact”, leading to a state 
of „loneliness and personal isolation from their contemporaries” (p. 264). She saw the 
reason for this lack of understanding in the fact that „other children [did] not share their 
interests [and] their vocabulary” (p. 262).14 
From her observations, Hollingworth concluded that extreme levels of giftedness 
are related to serious communication problems. Note, however, that her results are limited 
by several methodological weaknesses. First, her extremely small sample makes it difficult 
to generalize to broader populations. Second, it can be questioned whether her subjects 
really had an IQ above 180, since most intelligence tests do not reliably differentiate at 
such a high level. Third, Hollingworth herself contented that „as persons become adult, 
they naturally seek and find on their own initiative groups who are like-minded, such as 
learned societies” (p. 264). Thus, it could be that the adjustment difficulties she found in 
children can be compensated for in older age (but see Janos and Robinson, 1985, who 
speculated that adjustment problems might increase with age). 
An analysis of the extremely gifted individuals from the Terman sample is 
consistent with the notion that extreme levels of giftedness are associated with problems. 
When his sample was 41 years old, 71% of the men (n = 551) and 67% of the women (n = 
453) were rated as well-adjusted. The mean IQ score in this well-adjusted group was 136 
and 131 for the men and women, respectively (Terman and Oden, 1959). In contrast, the 
combined groups of subjects with „some maladjustment” and „serious maladjustment” had 
an average IQ of 149 and 139. The differences between these two adjustment groups 
correspond to effect sizes of .42 and .28 for men and women, respectively (pooled SDs = 
26 and 28). 
 
                                                 
14
 The social difficulties of Hollingworth’s gifted children may be reminiscent of the Asperger 
syndrome, which is characterized by impairments in social interaction and repetitive patterns of behavior in 
absence of any delays in cognitive development. However, individuals with Asperger have been shown to 
have substantial language problems (Koning & Magill-Evans, 2001), whereas Hollingworth’s subjects had 
superior language skills. 
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2.5.2.3 Conclusion 
The review of the literature on the social adjustment of gifted individuals gives rise 
to some mixed conclusions. On the one hand, the classic Terman study and the literature 
reviews by Janos and Robinson (1985) and Hoge and Renzulli (1993) suggest superior 
generalized adjustment for gifted individuals. Somewhat in contrast, the findings of Rost 
(2000), Hollingworth (1942), and the re-analysis of the Terman sample suggest that gifted 
children could face some difficulties in their social relationships, especially at extremely 
high IQ levels.15 
The notion that only extreme levels of giftedness might be associated with 
problems in social relationships is consistent with the predictions of the Simonton model. 
As stated before, individuals with extremely high intelligence levels should indeed face the 
greatest trouble in communicating their thoughts and feelings, and these difficulties should 
translate into adjustment problems in the social domain. Even in modern-day educational 
and vocational systems that are stratified according to intelligence, extremely gifted 
individuals might face problems in finding cognitive peers. 
Further support for the notion that extreme levels of giftedness cancel out the 
positive social effects of intelligence comes from a large-scale study by Schneider, Clegg, 
Byrne, Ledingham, and Crombie (1989). These authors tested 150 gifted children (Grades 
5, 8 and 10, mean IQ  129) who were educated in special classes, 204 integrated gifted 
individuals (not enrolled in special gifted classes), and 193 controls (mean IQ  112). They 
found the correlations between IQ and social competence (measured by self-nominations) 
were mostly positive in the control group (r = .52 in Grade 5, r = .20 in Grade 8), non-
significant in the self-contained (special education) gifted sample, and negative in the 
integrated gifted sample (r = -.22 in Grade 5, r = -.23 in Grade 8). In addition, the 
intelligence difference between integrated gifted individuals and the average of the control 
children in the same class was negatively related to its peer acceptance in Grade 5 (r = -
.33). 
                                                 
15
 Social difficulties may co-exist with average or even superior levels of „generalized” adjustment. 
First, it is possible that some gifted individuals compensate problems in the social domain with the self-
esteem gained by superior academic achievements. Second, the reviews of Janos and Robinson (1985) and 
Hoge and Renzulli (1993) are based on generalized adjustment measures that might be only weakly related to 
adjustment in specific social settings. 
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The above considerations give rise to the following hypothesis: 
 
Extreme Group hypothesis: Intellectually gifted individuals experience a lower 
level of MU in their social relationships. 
 
2.6 Summary of Main and Dyadic Hypotheses 
To summarize, the current study addresses a number of hypotheses about main and 
emergent effects of intelligence and dispositional valuations. Factors that exert a main 
effect influence the MU process independent of the personality of the relationship partner. 
The following three main effect hypotheses are addressed: 
 
Main Effect Hypothesis 1: Fluid intelligence is positively related to MU. 
 
Main Effect Hypothesis 2: Crystallized intelligence is positively related to 
MU.  
 
Main Effect Hypothesis 3: Openness to experience is positively related to 
MU.  
 
Besides focusing on main effects, the current study also focuses on dyadic effects 
that result from the dynamic interaction of both communication partners. A total of four 
dyadic hypotheses are addressed: 
 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 1: Between-person differences in fluid 
intelligence are negatively related to MU.  
 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 2: Between-person differences in crystallized 
intelligence are negatively related to MU. 
 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 3: Between-person differences in openness to 
experience are negatively related to MU.  
 
The Role of Intelligence and Dispositional Valuations in Mutual Understanding 49 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 4: Between-person differences in interests and 
values are negatively related to MU.  
 
Combining main and dyadic effects, the following hypothesis regarding the quality 
of social relationships of gifted individuals is tested: 
 
Extreme Group Hypothesis: Intellectually gifted individuals experience a 
lower level of MU in their social relationships. 
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3 Chapter 3: Method 
Chapters 1 and 2 presented empirical findings and conceptual arguments that 
provided a theoretical background regarding the MU process and how it is influenced by 
intelligence and dispositional valuations. These theoretical chapters culminated in a 
number of hypotheses. In the following chapter, the characteristics of the samples (3.1), 
procedures (3.2), and measures (3.3) that were used to test these hypotheses are discussed. 
 
3.1 Sample Characteristics 
3.1.1 Rationale for Sample Selection 
To address the study’s research questions, data from four samples of participants 
were collected. The first group consisted of intellectually gifted individuals who are 
members of Mensa, an organization for the gifted. The second sample consisted of high 
achieving and average achieving alumni from two major Berlin universities. The third 
group consisted of Internet users. Finally, the fourth group consisted of university students 
who took part in a lab experiment. The choice of samples and the accompanying study 
designs was guided by a number of considerations that are described briefly below. 
Samples 1.I and 2 were included to address the main and dyadic effect hypotheses 
using self-ratings of intelligence and ego-centered social networks in samples that differ in 
their cognitive level and the importance they attach to this domain. Mensa members have 
been tested with an intelligence test, so they are aware of their giftedness status and 
apparently attach a high importance to this fact. In contrast, the highly achieving alumni 
sample may also be regarded as gifted in terms of their academic achievements, but these 
individuals do not necessarily regard themselves as such. Finally, the averagely achieving 
alumni can be hypothesized to be more diverse in terms of their intelligence and the 
importance attached to this trait. 
To avoid sole reliance on self-reports, Samples 1.II and 3 were added. In Sample 
1.II, Mensa members’ reports were complemented with data from some of their network 
partners in order to identify possible bias in social judgment. This allowed a more stringent 
test of main and dyadic effects. Participants in Sample 3 took a psychometric vocabulary 
tests to investigate the main effects of crystallized intelligence on social network 
characteristics without relying on self-ratings. 
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The data collected in Sample 4 served to study the impact of intelligence and 
dispositional valuations on MU in the context of interactions between strangers in a more 
controlled, experimental setting. This allows an examination of the effects of personality 
differences on social relationships that are not self-selected. Moreover, the intelligence and 
dispositional valuations of each member of the dyad were measured independently with 
psychometric instruments as well as rated by both persons, which allowed for the 
disentanglement of the effects of „true” vs. „ego-centric” similarity on MU. Finally, the 
effect of similarity expectations was tested by an experimental manipulation that informed 
subjects that they were either very similar or very dissimilar to each other (compared to a 
control group receiving no information). In the following, descriptive information 
regarding the composition of each of the samples is provided. 
 
3.1.2 Sample 1 
With over 100,000 members worldwide, Mensa is the largest international 
organization for gifted individuals. As the sole criterion, members need to surpass the 98th 
percentile of the intelligence distribution (i.e., have an IQ higher than 130), of which proof 
in the form of an official intelligence test is required upon admission. In Germany, Mensa 
has about 4,500 members (Mind-Magazin, Nr. 39). Against a statistically possible member 
pool of well over 1 million Germans (using the 98th percentile criterion), powerful self-
selection mechanisms can be expected. 
Participants were recruited in two ways. First, a popular scientific article on the 
subject matter of the current study was written for the magazine „Mind”, the bimonthly 
periodical for Mensa Germany. Although every member receives the magazine, it is not 
known how many actually read it. Included in the article was a call for participation in the 
current study. Participants could either order a P&P version of the questionnaire or fill out 
an online version. To ensure the giftedness status of the participants, they were required to 
provide their Mensa membership number upon participation. This recruitment method 
resulted in a total of 273 Mensa members who completed either the paper & pencil (P&P) 
or the Internet version of the questionnaire. Eleven of these cases were excluded because 
they were either younger than 18 or older than 120. In addition, 24 persons were excluded 
who did not provide personality information AND at least four network persons, five 
persons because they did not provide any social network information, and one person 
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whose questionnaire responses lacked meaningful variance. This procedure resulted in a 
total of 232 cases with usable data. These participants will be referred to as Sample 1.I. 
Second, a call for participation were sent to the electronic mailing lists of the 
Mensa branches in Berlin, Hamburg, and to the division of Mensa members aged around 
thirty (U3SIG). This fully electronic procedure resulted in a total of 472 individuals 
accessing the emailed URL link. Of these, 39 individuals stated they were younger than 18 
or older than 120, 332 individuals failed to provide personality information AND at least 
four network persons, and two individuals did not show any variation in the ratings of their 
network partners’ intelligence. Accordingly, a total of 99 useable participants were 
collected (45 females, average age 30.9). Because the study procedure for these 
participants was different (in terms of the questionnaire that was used and the availability 
of dyadic information), they will be referred to as Sample 1.II. 
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the total sample MENSA sample. Of 331 
cases, 270 (82%) had used the Internet and 61 the P&P version of the questionnaire. The 
mean age in this group was 34.0 (SD 9.0), which corresponds closely to the mean age of all 
Mensa members (Mind-Magazin, Nr. 39). With 51% of the participants being female, the 
sample was fairly gender-balanced. However, because the MENSA member pool has more 
men than women (2:1; Alain May, personal communication, 2004), this implies a selection 
bias favoring women participation. The 273 Mensa members of Sample 1.I (who reacted to 
the call for participation in the Mensa magazine) provided data regarding their level of 
education. Of these, 14.5% reported the German gymnasium (college) as their highest 
education level, for 23.2% an apprenticeship (Ausbildung), 47.7% some form of university 
degree, and 8.7% a PhD. This represents quite a broad range of educational status for an 
intellectually gifted sample. 
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Table 3 
Description of Demographic Information and Study Procedure Across Samples 
Sample 2: 
University alumni 
 
Sample 1: 
MENSA 
members HA AA 
Sample 3: 
Internet users 
Sample 4: 
University 
students / alumni 
Assessment 
period 
02/03-02/04 03/03-02/04 03/04-12/04 02/04-06/04 
n 331 152 70 528 144 
Age  
(SD) 
34.0 (9.0) 27.1 
(2.3) 
27.8 
(3.4) 
27.9  
(8.3) 
24.1  
(3.9) 
% female 51% 56% 65% 78% 51% 
Dyadic data Yes a No No No Yes 
Intelligence SR + TEST b SR SR TEST SR + TEST 
Note. HA = High achievers, AA = Average achievers, SR = Self-ratings, TEST = 
Psychometric test 
a
 174 partner-reports for a subsample of n = 40. 
b
 Self-reported IQ test results for a subsample of n = 76. 
 
3.1.3 Sample 2 
3.1.3.1 High Achieving (HA) Alumni  
With the permission of the university’s privacy commissioner („Datenschutz-
beauftragter“), the examinations office of the Humboldt University Berlin was asked to 
provide the addresses of the university graduates whose final grade belonged to the top 
14% of their peers within the same faculty. This criterion includes all participants who 
were at least one SD higher in achievement than their peers; although arbitrary, this cutoff 
secured an adequate samples size without being overinclusive. 
Data collection was carried out in three waves between March 2003 and June 2003, 
when 322 former students of the Humboldt University Berlin and the Free University 
Berlin who had received their degrees during the past year were contacted. Because many 
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alumni move to another city upon their graduation, it was expected that not all 
questionnaires would reach their target. In the first16 wave, 13% of all questionnaires could 
not be delivered to the address and were returned to sender. Because some additional 
questionnaires may have successfully arrived at the specified address but the targeted 
person no longer lived there, the percentage of unsuccessfully contacted alumni was 
estimated at 15%. Because of the anonymous nature of the participant recruitment, it was 
not possible to send reminder letters, which might have raised the response rate. 
Between March 2003 and February 2004, the estimated 274 successfully delivered 
participation letters (85% of 322) sent to the high achieving graduates resulted in 174 
filled-out P&P or Internet questionnaires. By applying the same exclusion criteria as in 
Sample 1, 20 respondents were excluded, resulting in a total number of 154 participants. 
This corresponds to an enrollment rate of 56%, which is quite high given the absence of 
financial reward and the fact that the questionnaire took about 60 minutes to fill out. 
Moreover, the gender composition of the sample was quite balanced, with 56% females. 
The mean age was 27.1 years (SD 2.3). 
 
3.1.3.2 Average Achieving (AA) Alumni  
Parallel to contacting the top 16% achievers, university graduates who fell between 
the 42nd and 58th percentile in terms of academic achievement (average 16%) were 
contacted. Across all three waves, 317 former students were contacted. Against an 
estimated 269 effectively delivered questionnaires, a total of 89 people responded by 
contributing at least some data. Applying the criteria described above resulted in 18 
excluded cases, bringing the total number of participants in this group to 70. The low 
response rate of 26% suggests that selection biases were strong in this sample. This was 
reflected in the more biased gender ratio (65% women), though the average age (27.8, SD 
3.4) was very similar to that of the highly achieving group. 
Some differences between the highly achieving and the average achieving alumni’s 
may be due to differences in the invitation letter they received. In the highly achieving 
pool, subjects were praised for their high achievement and told that their responses were 
particularly interesting to study the relation between giftedness and social relationships. In 
                                                 
16
 For logistical reasons, the number of questionnaires mailed to invalid addresses could not be 
calculated for the other waves.  
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contrast, the average achieving subjects were told that the study was directed at gifted 
individuals but that academic achievement is not only determined by intellectual ability, so 
people with varying achievement levels were contacted. In hindsight, targeted individuals 
may have suspected that they had been assigned to the control group of less achieving 
subjects, which could have discouraged participation. 
 
3.1.4 Sample 3 
Because of the biased nature of Samples 1 and 2, an additional sample of Internet 
users was recruited. For this purpose, a description of the study together with a call for 
participation was published in a number of German-language sites dedicated to online 
psychological research, including the PSYTESTS portal of the Humboldt University Berlin 
(http://www.psytests.de). As an incentive for participation, feedback regarding the Big 
Five and the level of verbal intelligence was offered after completion of the questionnaire. 
A total number of 845 individuals aged 18 or older accessed the questionnaire site. 
As is usual in online research, some of these individuals only „glanced through” without 
providing any information. In the present case, a total of 301 individuals failed to fill out 
either the Big Five or verbal intelligence test (80 subjects in this subgroup also failed to 
provide information on at least four social relationships and 1 subject failed to provide 
gender information). Moreover, 16 individuals did not show any variability in the rated 
intelligence of their network partners. Thus, the final sample comprised 528 participants. 
Of these individuals, 78% were female and the average age of the sample was 27.9 (SD 
8.3). 
 
3.1.5 Sample 4 
The fourth sample consisted of university students or alumni who reacted to an 
article in the Humboldt University newspaper about the impact of personality on 
interpersonal communication or to flyers that were widely distributed in places frequented 
by Berlin students (university buildings, university restaurants, university bus stops, etc.) 
As an incentive to participate, a sum of 15 Euro (around $20) and a personal feedback 
profile were offered. The topic of the study was described as „interpersonal 
communication”. 
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Participants were required to apply for participation via an online questionnaire. A 
total of 433 people visited the corresponding website that also included a more detailed 
description of the study. Of these potentially interested individuals, a total of 200 
proceeded with filling out the pre-test questionnaire and left an email address or phone 
number where they could be contacted. To ensure a balanced sex ratio, the questionnaire 
for each gender was closed after 100 male/female participants took part (this took longer 
for the male participants). 
During the course of the study, 144 participants actually visited the laboratory and 
completed the full experiment. Of the remaining 56 individuals, 6 could not be contacted, 
34 cancelled their participation or did not show up for the scheduled meeting, 8 came to 
the lab but could not be videotaped because their scheduled partner did not show up, and 8 
were excluded because they were not German native speakers (this was a declared 
requirement for participation to avoid confounding of language skills and communication 
quality). 
The remaining individuals of the fourth sample consisted of 74 females and 70 
males and the mean age was 24.1 (SD 3.9). The participants had diverse backgrounds in 
terms of their university major, with 30 (21%) students/graduates from a language or 
philosophy department (mostly German language, foreign language, and philosophy 
students), 38 (26%) from the social sciences (including 15 psychologists17), 13 (9%) from 
law or economics, 44 from the natural sciences (31%) and the remaining 13% from other 
disciplines (medicine, agriculture, engineering, and art). 
 
3.2 Procedure 
3.2.1 Studies 1.I, 2, and 3 
Participants in Samples 1, 2, and 3 filled out the measures used in the present study 
at home without being monitored. To answer participants’ questions regarding the study’s 
procedure, a special email address and telephone hotline was created, but this option was 
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 Because psychologists were thought more likely to have some background knowledge regarding 
the constructs that were studied, it was chosen to avoid reliance on their participation as much as possible. 
Therefore, no flyers were distributed in places that are primarily visited by psychology students. 
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only rarely used. Apparently, participants had no trouble completing the current 
questionnaire. The order of the presentation of the scales was fixed, starting with the social 
relationships questionnaire, followed by the intelligence, self-concept, and Big Five self-
ratings. The only exception to this fixed order was Sample 3, where the psychometric 
vocabulary test replaced the self-concept scales. 
 
3.2.2 Study 1.II 
The 99 individuals from Sample 1 filled out a modified version of the social 
network instrument described in Section 3.3.1. After compiling a list of their network 
partners, participants had the option to invite each partner to take part in the current study. 
This option was chosen by 71 participants for at least one network partner. In total, 607 
relationship partners were contacted by the Psychological Institute via regular mail or 
email, or directly received a printed questionnaire from the participants themselves. 
The questionnaire for the contact persons was available in both an online and P&P 
version and required the contact persons to fill out the NEO-FFI questionnaire, rate the 
person that had invited them to participate in the study (i.e., the Mensa member) in terms 
of intelligence, and assess the quality of the relationship with that person ( = .75). A total 
number of 174 contact persons (94 females; response rate 29%) of 40 Mensa members 
contributed data, of which 51 used the P&P18 and 123 the Internet version. The mean age 
of these individuals was 32.9 years (SD = 12.4).  
 
3.2.3 Study 4 
At the end of the pretest questionnaire in Study 4, participants were invited to visit 
the Psychological Institute in Berlin Adlershof where they would discuss up to three 
personally important life domains19 with another person. They were told that this 
conversation would be videotaped. 
 
                                                 
18
 Contact persons returned the questionnaires directly to the Psychological Institute, without further 
mediation by the primary participants. 
19
 Participants were instructed that these life domains did not need to be identical with the list of 
values of the Rokeach Value Survey. 
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3.2.3.1 Creation of Dyads 
To create dyads with a maximum variance in psychometric intelligence levels, an 
experimental manipulation was performed. For this purpose, a composite intelligence score 
was calculated from the results of the available pretest information. As can be seen in 
Table 4, the vocabulary test was characterized by a marked range restriction (i.e., the SD 
was much smaller than the typical 15 points), which prohibited the usual procedure to z-
standardize results. Instead, both the numerical and the vocabulary results were scored 
according to available norm data. For the numerical test, comparison data from a sample of 
279 Gymnasium students were used, whereas the vocabulary test was normed according to 
data from 159 representative adults from the German ALLEE study (aging and life 
experience; Lang, Lüdtke, & Asendorpf, 2001). 
As can be seen in Table 4, the norming procedure resulted in somewhat different 
mean IQ scores, with participants scoring higher on the numerical than on the vocabulary 
test. In light of the somewhat younger comparison group for the numerical test and the 
high proportion of participants from the natural sciences, this was not unexpected. The 
mean vocabulary IQ was about 10 points lower than the numerical IQ and the SD was 
markedly different from the 15 points that would be expected in a perfectly representative 
sample. Nevertheless, the composite mean value of 115.7 seemed a reasonable estimate of 
the average IQ of university students. 
Unexpectedly, the numerical test was only weakly correlated with the vocabulary 
test (r = .13, p = .07). Because reliabilities for these tests were adequate, this does not seem 
to result from a psychometric artifact. Also, a method bias resulting from the Internet 
testing does not seem likely, since this would have created an artificial but systematic 
source of variance resulting in higher correlations. First, the truncated the size of the 
correlation could have been due to a restriction of range. Second the lack of association 
between the two tests may be due to an advanced level of cognitive specialization 
(Lubinski, Webb, Morelock, & Benbow, 2001) in Sample 4. For example, the average 
numerical IQ of mathematics students was 123.8 (SD = 12.3) vs. 117.6 (SD = 12.6) for 
language/arts students, which is a significant difference, F(2, 74) = 4.42, p = .04. In 
contrast, language students had a higher vocabulary IQ than mathematics students (M = 
114.7 vs. 108.6, SD = 8.5 vs. 8.3, respectively), F(2, 74) = 9.52, p = .01.  
After a sufficient number of participants (n  20) had completed the pretest 
questionnaire, same-sex dyads of minimum and maximum IQ differences were created 
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alternately. When a participant was assigned to the minimum difference group, a partner 
was selected whose IQ differed less than two IQ points. In the maximum difference group, 
a partner with more than 10 points difference was selected. This resulted in 38 similar and 
34 dissimilar dyads, with a mean IQ difference of .6 and 18.1 IQ points, respectively (p < 
.01). It should be noted, however, that the experimental manipulation assumes a general 
intelligence factor. Because of the lack of significant association between numerical 
intelligence and vocabulary, effects of the manipulation cannot be interpreted in this way. 
 
Table 4 
Normed Results and Psychometric Properties of Intelligence Tests Used in Sample 4 
Measure 
Norm score 
(SD) Comparison group 
Alpha 
reliability  
Numerical test 121.3 (14.3) 279 Gymnasium students (average age 
17.7 years) a 
.77 
Figural test (IST) 104.3 (8.8) 415 German young adults (age 26-30 
years) b 
.65 
Vocabulary test (MWT) 110.0 (8.8) 159 German young adults (age 20-40 
years) c 
.71 
a
 See Wilhelm (2000) 
b
 See Amthauer et al. (2001) 
c
 Norm data provided by F. R. Lang (see also Lang et al. 2001) 
 
3.2.3.2 Experimental Setting and Instructions 
After both partners had completed the figural test, they were brought together into a 
comfortably furnished experimental room. In the middle of the room, a round table with 
two glasses and a water carafe was placed (see Appendix 7.1). The interaction evaluation 
questionnaires were also placed on this table. Each participant was randomly assigned to a 
seat that was fixed to a place to the left or right of the table. At the other side of the room, 
an unobtrusive camera was attached to the wall and filmed the interaction that followed. 
After the participants were seated, a second manipulation was performed. In 
approximately half of the dyads (39), participants were given feedback regarding the 
relative similarity of their IQ results. In 19 dyads of the similarity condition, this feedback 
informed them that both participants had achieved highly comparable IQ scores. In 20 
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dissimilar dyads, the feedback stated that IQ results had been very different. No 
information regarding a single individual’s absolute intelligence level was given. 
After the feedback manipulation, the student assistant asked the participants if they 
had any further questions and then left the room to a separate video control station, where 
she monitored and videotaped the interaction. Via a microphone, she remained in contact 
with the participants and explained that the interaction format required that the person in 
the right chair (seen from the camera) was first in talking about his or her important life 
domains. The person in the left chair was instructed to interview his or her partner about 
the reasons why he or she regarded this life domain as personally important. 
It was explicitly stressed that the purpose of this interview was not for the 
interviewee to „justify” his or her life domain. Rather, the interviewer was to achieve an 
understanding of the subjective role of the domain in the life of the interaction partner.20 
For this purpose, questions like „Why is this life domain so important to you?” or „What 
do you associate with this life domain?” were suggested. The interviewer was instructed to 
open the interview with the standard question „About which life domain do you want to 
talk first?“ Participants were informed that they could talk about up to three life domains in 
each interaction half. 
After the instruction, the participant in the left chair started the interaction by 
playing the role of the active interviewer whose task it was to explore the subjective 
meaning of the other person’s life domain. This interaction half was interrupted by the 
student assistant after 10 minutes to instruct the participants that they were to pick up the 
questionnaire on the table and fill out the section regarding the first interaction half (the 
student assistant kept monitoring the participants during this time). When the participants 
were ready, they proceeded to the second interaction half in which the roles of interviewer 
and interviewee were reversed. After this, the student assistant instructed the participants to 
fill out the second part of the questionnaire. When they were ready doing this, participants 
were thanked, debriefed, and paid. 
                                                 
20
 It was also stressed that the interaction did not serve to draw conclusions about the participants’ 
level of ability. Rather, it was stressed that the study examined factors that play a role in human 
communication.  
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3.3 Measures 
In the following, the instruments that were used to assess MU, intelligence, 
dispositional valuations, and control variables are described. These instruments include 
both psychometric instruments (summarized in Table 4) and self-report measures 
(summarized in Table 5). 
 
Table 5 
Overview of Self-Report Scales Across Samples 
Self-Report Instrument Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
Social network questionnaire X X X  
Self-concept of peer relationships (SDQ-III) X X   
Self-concept of intelligence X X   
Intelligence self-rating (single item) X X  X 
Big Five (NEO-FFI) X X  X 
Big Five (BFI)   X  
Values (RVS)    X 
Interests (AIST)    X 
Loneliness (UCLA Loneliness Scale) X X   
 
3.3.1 Mutual Understanding and Related Constructs 
3.3.1.1 Social Network Characteristics (Sample 1-3) 
Social network characteristics were sampled with a measure taken form Asendorpf 
and Wilpers (1998) and Neyer (1997) (see Appendix 7.2). In a first step, this measure 
requires participants to list all personally meaningful persons with whom they interact at 
least once per month. Contact persons were sampled from a wide range of family and non-
family categories. Additionally, data on age, sex, duration of the relationship (between 1 = 
less than one year, and 4 = more than five years), and contact frequency (between 1 = once 
per month or less, and 5 = daily) were collected. 
Table 6 summarizes some average features of the social networks of the different 
samples. As can be seen, Mensa participants reported an average of 16.4 network partners, 
whereas the university graduates reported an average of 22 to 23 partners. A similar 
difference was found for the category of friends, with Mensa members reporting less 
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friends in their social network (4.8) compared to the alumni sample (between 9.1 and 
10.3). Most participants in Samples 1 and 2 mentioned their mothers and fathers as 
members of their social network, whereas at least half also mentioned a romantic partner. 
On average, the social networks people reported were quite diverse in terms of 
demographic variables, with a reasonably balanced age distribution and gender ratio (close 
to 50% in all samples). 
The social network data can be compared with data from Neyer (1999), who used 
an almost identical (P&P) instrument as used in the present study in a sample of N = 495 
representative German adults (aged between 17.1 and 29.8 years, M = 24.3, SD = 3.7). In 
this study, participants reported an average number of 17.9 (SD = 8.5) network partners, 
with 51% females. On a 3-point Likert scale, they also reported the age of their network 
partner and the frequency of contact. The average age score was 2.2 (i.e., close to 2 = 
„about the same age”), and the average contact frequency category was 2.6 (i.e., between 2 
= „multiple times a month” and 3 = „once a week”). Finally, participants listed 0.9 
mothers, 0.9 fathers, 0.8 partners, and 5.7 friends. As can be seen in Table 6, the network 
composition reported by Neyer (1999) best matches the social network of Sample 1 
(Mensa members). 
In a second step, participants were asked to rate every contact person according to 
the following dimensions (in order of appearance): importance (what impact would the 
termination of the relationship have: 1 = I would feel better, 5 = I would be strongly 
burdened for a long time; assessed in Sample 2 and Sample 1.I), felt closeness of the 
relationship (1 = very distant, 5 = very close), frequency of conflict (1 = never, 5 = almost 
always), opportunity for meaningful communication (about themes that are important to 
you: 1 not at all, 5 = very good), availability of emotional support (1 = never, 5 = for 
almost every problem), felt understanding (1 = very much misunderstood, 5 = very much 
understood), and felt acceptance (assessed in Sample 3 and Sample 1.II) (to what degree 
do you feel accepted by this person: 1 = not at all accepted, 5 = completely accepted). 
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Table 6 
Social Network Composition Across Samples 
  
 
Sample 2: 
University alumni 
 
Sample 1: 
MENSA 
members HA AA 
Sample 3: 
Internet 
users F a 
k(mother) 0.8 (0.4) 1.0 (0.2) 1.0 (0.3) 0.9 (0.4) 11.72** 
k(father) 0.6 (0.5) 1.0 (0.3) 0.9 (0.4) 0.6 (0.5) 25.33** 
k(friends) 4.4 (4.2) 10.6 (6.0) 9.0 (5.4) 3.7 (3.3) 126.77** 
k(partner) 0.5 (0.5) 0.7 (0.5) 0.7 (0.5) 0.6 (0.5) 6.86** 
k(total) 14.2 (9.5) 22.8 (8.5) 21.8 (8.8) 10.1 (6.1) 129.48** 
age 39.7 (8.6) 35.2 (4.2) 36.8 (6.2) 36.0 (7.2) 21.70** 
gender (% female) 0.5 (0.2) 0.5 (0.1) 0.5 (0.1) 0.6 (0.2) 2.75* 
rated intelligence 15.9 (2.2) 14.6 (1.7) 14.5 (1.9) 13.3 (2.6) 93.19** 
contact duration 3.3 (0.5) 3.2 (0.5) 3.3 (0.4) 3.3 (0.4) 4.14** 
contact frequency 2.7 (0.7) 2.5 (0.5) 2.4 (0.5) 3.1 (0.7) 53.05** 
Note. k = average frequency of reporting a relationship category 
a
 Univariate difference between samples, df (between) = 3, df (within) = 985-992 
* p = .05 ** p = .01 
 
3.3.1.2 Self-concept of Social Relationships With Peers (Sample 1-2) 
To measure the participants’ self-assessments of the quality of their relationships 
with same-sex and opposite-sex peers, 8 items from the German translation of the Self 
Description Questionnaire III (SDQ-III; Marsh, 1992) were used (5-point Likert scale). 
These items were drawn from a study by Schwanzer (2002), who created short 4-item (half 
of them negatively framed) versions of the SDQ-III scales on the basis of item-total 
correlations (see Appendix 7.3). In the current study, both scales had good reliabilities ( = 
.81 for same-sex peers; .84 for opposite-sex peers). 
 
3.3.1.3 Loneliness (Samples 1-2) 
Mixed with the SDQ-III items, 10 items from the German translation of the UCLA 
Loneliness Scale (Döring & Bortz, 1993) were included to measure subjective feelings of 
loneliness on a five-point Likert scale. Five of these items referred to social loneliness, 
Method 64 
whereas the remaining 5 concentrated more on emotional aspects of loneliness. Because 
these two facets correlated very highly (r = .71, p = .01), they were combined into a 
composite loneliness score ( = .83). 
 
3.3.1.4 Evaluation of Dyadic Communication 
After each interaction, participants completed a short questionnaire (5-point Likert 
scale) assessing the level of felt understanding (4 items, e.g., „I [the interviewee] 
succeeded in explaining the interviewer [me] what personal meaning the discussed life 
domains have for me [him/her]”), empathic ability of the interviewer (4 items, e.g., „It was 
often difficult for me [the other person] to follow the thoughts of the interviewed person 
[my thoughts] with my [his/her] questions)”, interaction flow (4 items, e.g., „I did not 
enjoy the conversation”), and comfort (1 item, „I felt relaxed during the conversation”). 
Some of the items of this questionnaire were adapted from Hecht’s (1978) Communication 
Satisfaction Inventory, but others were especially constructed for the current dissertation 
(see Appendix 7.4). 
 
3.3.2 Intelligence 
3.3.2.1 Intelligence Ratings (Samples 1-4) 
Following the ratings of social relationship quality, participants were asked to rate 
their own intelligence (in Samples 1-2) and the intelligence of each contact person 
(Samples 1-4). For this, the unpublished „Intellectual Ability Questionnaire” developed by 
O. Wilhelm was used (2000; see Bailey & Lazar, 1976, for a similar measure). Participants 
were first instructed about the intelligence distribution in the population with the help of a 
graphical normal curve (see Appendix 7.5). In a next step, participants were asked to rate 
the intelligence of every contact person as well as their own intelligence on a 1 (0-5%) to 
20 (95-100%) percentile scale. 
Self-ratings of intelligence have been shown to be moderately accurate in 
predicting psychometric intelligence. In several reviews of the relevant literature, it has 
been stated that the validity of self-ratings approximates .30 (Furnham, 2001; Paulhus, 
Lysy, & Yik, 1998). Appendix 7.6 lists some empirical studies that calculated the 
correlation between psychometrically measured and self-rated intelligence. As can be seen, 
these studies report an average correlation of .29, which is consistent with previous 
reviews. This value is also somewhat similar to, though slightly lower than, agreement 
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between self-ratings and informed acquaintances (Borkenau & Liebler, 1993: r = .29; 
Paulhus & Morgan, 1997: r = .37; but see Bailey & Mettetal, 1977b). 
Especially with regard to self-ratings of intelligence, the level of predictive validity 
has been regarded as disappointing (Paulhus et al., 1998). Indeed, a correlation of .3 
between measured and rated intelligence is considered small (Cohen, 1992). However, it 
should be noted that most studies using college students as participants suffer from 
restriction of range in intelligence, which leads to reductions of predictive correlations.21 
For example, Paulhus et al. (1998, p. 549) found a correlation of .22 between (single item) 
self-ratings and psychometric intelligence, but applying a correction formula22 increased 
the correlation to .30-.35. In addition, intelligence rating scales are often not very reliable. 
Again using Paulhus et al.’s (1998) data as an example (who reported an alpha of .43 for 
single item ratings and .81 for the psychometric test), correcting for attenuation23 resulted 
in an increase of the „true validity” of the single item ratings to levels above .50, which is 
more acceptable. Accordingly, the validity of single items self-ratings seems „strong 
enough to be useful in [nomothetic] research, if not in diagnosing individuals” (Paulhus et 
al., 1998, p. 549). 
Because of the evidence for the (modest) validity of intelligence ratings, the current 
study used them as proxies for general intelligence (Studies 1-3). However, it needs to be 
taken in mind that intelligence ratings are biased by a number of sources. First of all, such 
ratings are prone to self-serving biases (Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994; Dunning & Cohen, 
1992). Second, intelligence ratings have been shown to be confounded by stereotypical 
influences associated with number of factors, such as gender (Furnham, 2001; Rammstedt 
& Rammsayer, 2000), age (Furnham, 2001), and physical attractiveness (Zebrowitz, Hall, 
Murphy, & Rhodes, 2002). To adjust for some of these stereotypical influences, the current 
dissertation used the residuals of a regression analysis predicting intelligence ratings with 
                                                 
21
 For example, Paulhus et al. (1998) used the Wonderlic intelligence test; instead of the typical SD 
of 7.1, they reported a SD of only 4.6. 
22
 rxy´ = rxy*{/SD} / (1 - rxy2 + rxy2*{/SD}2, where rxy´ is the corrected correlation, rxy is the 
uncorrected correlation,  is the unrestricted „true” standard deviation, and SD is the corresponding observed 
value.
 
23
 rxy´ = rxy / (rxx*ryy) 
Method 66 
age and gender. The degree of physical attractiveness was not measured in the current 
study and could thus not be corrected for. 
In the current study, there were significant differences in self ratings between 
Samples 1 and 2, F(3, 520) = 239.12, p < .01. As expected, Mensa members (Sample 1) 
rated themselves as very high in intelligence (M = 19.7, SD = 0.8), followed by the highly 
achieving (M = 16.3, SD = 2.1) and average achieving (M = 15.7, SD = 2.3) university 
alumni (Sample 2). The university students comprising Sample 4 had the lowest self 
ratings (M = 14.2, SD = 2.3). Average ratings by all samples of university students/alumni 
were higher than the scale midpoint, which is not unexpected given their high educational 
status. As can be seen in Table 6, network partners were also rated as above-average in 
intelligence, with the Mensa members reporting the most intelligent partners (M = 15.7, SD 
= 1.9), followed by the highly achieving and averagely achieving university alumni (M = 
14.6, SD = 1.7 and M = 14.5, SD = 1.8, respectively) and the Internet users (Sample 3) 
coming last (M = 13.2, SD = 2.4). This difference is significant, F(3, 949) = 73.69, p < .01. 
 
3.3.2.2 Self-Concept of Intelligence (Samples 1-2) 
In Samples 1 and 2, the self-concept of intelligence was assessed alongside the 
SDQ-III scales (see Appendix 7.3) with four specifically devised items (half of them 
negatively formulated) that were calibrated towards a high intelligence level to avoid 
ceiling effects in the gifted sample (e.g., „compared to others, my level of intellectual 
abilities is unusually high”). This scale had a 1-5 Likert format and very good internal 
consistency ( = .87). 
 
3.3.2.3 Psychometrically Tested Numerical Intelligence (Sample 4) 
Numerical intelligence has been found to be a good estimate of fluid intelligence 
(Bickley et al., 1995), especially when tested in the context of new problems. Sample 4 
took a test developed by O. Wilhelm (2000; see Appendix 7.7). This test requires 
participants to complete 17 series of 9 numbers. To find the solution, it is necessary to 
discover regularities in the first 7 numbers and then to apply this rule to the two empty 
slots. Item difficulties ranged from .94 (Item 4) to .53 (Item 12), with an average of .77 
(average SD = .39). For the 144 participants who also completed the laboratory phase, 
alpha reliability was .77 (item total rs between .09 and .60), which is comparable to the .73 
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reported by Wilhelm (2000). The test loaded very highly on a general intelligence factor in 
a battery of 12 tests (Wilhelm, 2000). 
 
3.3.2.4 Psychometrically Tested Figural Intelligence (Sample 4) 
As a test of figural intelligence, the Matrices subtest of the Intelligence Structure 
Test [Intelligenz-Struktur-Test] 2001-R (IST-2001; Amthauer et al. 2001) was used. This 
test is very much akin to the Raven’s Progressive Matrices test (see figure 4) that is 
considered as one of the best markers of fluid intelligence. The IST-2001 Matrices test 
consists of 18 series of 3 figures and 2 series of 8 figures that are built up according to 
some rule. Out of 4 alternatives, participants need to choose the figure that would complete 
the series. Following the manual, a time limit of 10 minutes was set for the test, which 
allowed participants to skip over certain items and proceed to the next one. 
On average, participants answered 14.1 items, with difficulties for answered items 
ranging from .95 (item 1) to .16 (item 20), paralleling the values reported in the test 
manual. The reliability of this speeded test was calculated by correlating (using 
Spearman’s Rho) the number of correct odd items with the number of correct even items 
and correcting this index with the Spearman Brown formula. This resulted in an estimated 
reliability of .65, which comes close to the .70 reported in the manual for students of the 
Gymnasium. Applying the .70 reliability criterion that is acceptable according to Nunnaly 
(1978), this value is somewhat low, even for a short test of 20 items. Accordingly, results 
based on this test should be interpreted with some caution. 
 
3.3.2.5 Psychometrically Tested Vocabulary (Samples 3-4) 
In Samples 3 and 4, vocabulary was measured with the Multiple-Choice 
Vocabulary Test [Mehrfachwahl Wortschatztest] (MWT; Lehrl, 1995). This test consists of 
35 sets of five alternative letter combinations, only one of which is a correctly spelled 
word. In the manual, Lehrl summarizes the results from 26 studies that report a median 
correlation coefficient of .71 with several global intelligence tests. In both samples, a large 
number of items (12 in Sample 3, 13 in Sample 4) were answered correctly by almost all 
participants (difficulty  .90; Items 1, 3, 4, 6-8, 10, 11, 14-16, 22, 26), with an average 
difficulty of around .70 (SD .11). The number of correctly answered items was used as the 
total score ( = .70 in both samples). 
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3.3.2.6 Self-Reported IQ-Test Results (Sample 1) 
In Sample 1, a total number of 76 Mensa members (32%) provided the result of 
their latest IQ test results.24 Although the accuracy of this information was not checked, the 
voluntary nature of participation in the current study makes the possibility of fake 
answering less likely. As expected, the mean intelligence level was very high and severely 
restricted (M = 135.6, SD = 4.4). An arbitrary cutoff of 135 (median score) was used to 
create a „moderately gifted” (mean IQ = 132.5, SD = 1.5, n = 42) and an „extremely 
gifted” group (mean IQ = 139.4, SD = 3.6, n = 34). 
 
3.3.3 Dispositional Valuations 
3.3.3.1 Interests 
Interests were measured with a short version of the German General Interests 
Structure Test [Allgemeiner Interessen-Struktur-Test] (AIST; Bergmann & Eder, 1992), 
with scales corresponding to Holland’s (1959) six basic interests (see Section 2.1.3). The 
unpublished short version (see Appendix 7.8) included 18 items and was developed by G. 
Nagy from the Berlin Max Planck Institute for Human Development on the basis of a 
factor analysis of the original 60 items (personal communication, 2 February, 2005). The 
items of the short form were selected on the basis of their discriminant factor loadings (i.e., 
high loadings on one factor, small loadings on all other factors), which makes them better 
suited for the calculation of profile similarity,25 as was done in the current study. Alpha 
reliabilities were mostly good (Realistic interests .81; Artistic interests .81; Social interests 
.80; Enterprising interests .82), except in two cases (Investigative interests .60; 
Conventional interests .67). 
 
3.3.3.2 Values 
Values were assessed with a German version of the Rokeach Values Survey (RVS) 
adapted by Todt (1989). Participants were required to rank 17 end goals in terms of their 
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 In most cases, this was the Mensa admission test. Note that the IQ tests were taken at different 
time points, which might have influenced results because secular gains in intelligence (Flynn, 2003) lead to 
an underestimation of average population performance when older test norms are applied.  
25
 Items loading on more than one factor reduce the variability of the different scales, resulting in 
relatively flat profiles. 
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subjective value. In the current study, the three most listed values were health, friendship, 
and love (rank M = 5.6, SD = 3.9 for health; M = 5.2, SD = 3.5 for friendship; M = 4.8, SD 
= 3.9 for love). The least important value in this sample was material wealth (rank M = 
13.0, SD = 4.6). The median correlation between the different values was -.0826, with 
correlations ranging between -.46 (between humanity and leisure time) and .36 (between 
children and family life). Because of the singe-item nature of the RVS, reliability 
coefficients could not be calculated. The forced (relative) independence of the RVS items 
provides a good basis to calculate profile correlations in order to assess the similarity in 
values between two persons. 
 
3.3.3.3 Openness to Experience 
In Samples 1, 2 and 4, openness to experience was assessed with the German 
version of the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFF; Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993), 
using a 5-point Likert scale. Sample 3 completed the German version of the Big Five 
Inventory (BFI; Rammstedt, 1997). To ensure BFI scales of equal length (the original 
instrument has 7-10 items per scale), the seven highest-loading items according to a study 
by Lang et al. (2001) were selected for use in the current study. With one exception, all 
items of the Openness scale were are formulated in the positive direction (items of the 
other Big Five scales are phrased in both the negative and positive direction). As can be 
seen in Table 7, the NEO Openness scale had quite low reliability in both the Mensa group 
and the alumni sample (  .70).27 For the BFI scale, reliability was acceptable ( = .75).  
The current sample’s scores on the NEO-FFI scales were compared to norm data of 
1,908 representative German adults (community sample), collected by Körner, Geyer, and 
Brähler (2002).28 The BFI scales were compared to a representative sample of around 
1,450 German adults collected by Lang and Lüdtke (in preparation). As can be seen in 
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 The negative correlation was expected because of the forced ranking procedure (e.g., if a value 
gets a rank of one, other values will automatically get lower ranks). 
27
 Inspection of the matrix of item-total correlations uncovered that this was mainly due to the 
negative item-total correlation of Item 8: „I think we should pay more attention to the opinion of our religious 
authorities in making ethical decisions”. Contrary to the indented purpose, the open individuals in Samples 1-
2 generally agreed with this item, perhaps because of its emphasis on complicated ethical problems. 
28
 The Körner et al. (2002) data were deemed superior to data reported in the German NEO-FFI 
handbook (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993) that rely on a sample that is biased towards younger adults. 
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Table 7, all tested samples were very high in openness, placing them on average in the 94th 
percentile29 of the population. One possible reason is that the current samples were 
characterized by high levels of intelligence and education, which are correlates of openness 
to experience (Ashton, Lee, Vernon, & Lang, 2000; Gignac, Stough, & Loukomitis, 2004). 
A second possibly is that the offer to provide personal feedback to participants attracted 
more psychologically-minded people high in openness. However, despite the extreme 
mean values, Samples 1, 2, and 4 did not seem to be restricted in range, as evidenced by 
the fact that the standardized SD was close to 1. Only in Sample 3 did the openness scale 
show a slight restriction in range. 
 
3.3.4 Control Variables 
3.3.4.1 Big Five (Samples 1-4) 
In all samples, extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness 
(i.e., the remaining four Big Five factors) were assessed as control variables. As can be 
seen in Table 7, the reliability of these four scales was acceptable to good. Across all 
samples and factors, data were quite comparable with norm data, except for neuroticism in 
Sample 3, where the mean score trailed almost one SD below the population mean. On 
average, the studied samples were somewhat more extraverted, emotionally stable, and 
agreeable than the corresponding norm groups. The range in the four remaining traits was 
in no way restricted in range, with values tending instead towards somewhat higher 
diversity. Comparisons between Samples 1, 2, and 4 (i.e., the samples that completed the 
NEO-FFI) showed significant differences in extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness, Fs (2, 710) > 17, ps < .01. Planned contrast showed that this was due to 
the lower extraversion and agreeableness of the Mensa sample compared the alumni and 
laboratory participants, Fs > 13, ps < .01, whereas the university alumni were more 
conscientious than the other two samples, Fs > 20, ps < .01. 
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 Estimate based on an average z-score of 1.55. 
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Table 7 
Psychometric Properties and Normed Scores of Big Five Scales Across Samples 
 E N O C A 
Sample 1 (NEO-FFI)      
 Alpha .82 .90 .63 .78 .83 
 Mean z a 0.04 -0.05 1.75 0.01 0.04 
 SD 1.28 1.28 1.04 1.10 1.09 
Sample 2 (NEO-FFI)      
 Alpha .76 .83 .70 .71 .87 
 Mean z a -0.18 0.53 1.70 0.54 0.48 
 SD 1.02 1.01 1.08 0.94 1.03 
Sample 3 (BFI)      
 Alpha .90 .85 .75 .82 .72 
 Mean z b 0.02 0.34 1.54 0.38 -0.09 
 SD 1.06 1.09 1.16 0.96 0.99 
Sample 4 (NEO-FFI)      
 Alpha .81 .87 .76 .84 .76 
 Mean z a 0.24  0.07  1.56  -0.11  0.34  
 SD 1.10 1.11 1.16 0.99 0.97 
      
Aggregated mean z 0.03 0.22 1.64 0.21 0.19 
Note. E = Extraversion, N = Neuroticism, O = Openness, C = Conscientiousness, A = 
Agreeableness  
a
 Norm data by Körner, Geyer, and Brähler (2002) 
b
 Norm data by Lang and Lüdtke (in preparation) 
 
3.3.5 Coding of MU From Behavioral Observations in Study 4 
The videotaped material from Study 4 was used to assess aspects of both the 
individual participants’ personality and the dyadic interaction that unfolded between them. 
In general, two kinds of procedures can be used. First, it is possible to code distinct 
(molecular) behaviors that occur in an interaction. Such behaviors have the advantage that 
they are relatively unambiguous and easy to code. Second, it is possible to use impression 
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ratings to assess interaction quality. Such a procedure allows judges to use all available 
information in an interaction (e.g., frequent smiling, touching) and integrate it into a 
composite rating (Cappella, 1997). Indeed, in judging rapport, this method has been 
recommended because of its cost-efficiency and accuracy (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991). 
For this reason, the latter method was used to assess the level of MU from the video 
observations. 
Mutual understanding was coded by two student assistants, who were trained in the 
use of the coding system by the present author using 8 interaction halves as stimuli to 
ensure adequate reliability and internal validity. Both the training procedure and the 
eventual coding took place in a room with a video projector (with sound). The student 
assistants were equipped with computers into which they fed the ratings. The videotape 
was forwarded to the point where the interviewer speaks the opening sentence („About 
which life domain do you want to talk first“?), which served as the anchor for the start of 
the interaction. Every 30 seconds of the interaction, coders rated the amount of MU during 
the time frame that had elapsed. 
 The coders were instructed to rate their impression of the amount of understanding 
the interviewee would feel during the relevant 30-second. To achieve this, they were told 
to rely on two sources of information. First, they were to use the observable reactions of 
the interviewee. If the interviewee seemed comfortable while talking about his or her life 
domains, the relevant interval was rated as higher in understanding than if the interviewee 
was visibly strained and uncomfortable talking. Such behaviors could also consist of 
nonverbal behaviors, such as an „open” body posture, an interested face, etc. Second, they 
were to take the perspective of the interviewee into account and assess the amount of felt 
understanding they themselves would experience given the interviewer’s behavior during 
the interval. 
Perceived understanding was rated on a 1 (extremely misunderstood) to 7 
(extremely understood) Likert scale. Intervals in which no rating was possible (e.g., 
because of inadequate audio quality) were assigned a missing value. Because reliability 
across 30s intervals was adequate ( = .78 across coders), both judgments were combined 
into a composite index of perceived understanding. After each 10-minute interaction, 
coders discussed their ratings with each other to re-calibrate rating criteria if necessary (yet 
they did not change any ratings in retrospect). When the mean value of all intervals was 
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aggregated across separate interaction halves, a highly reliable composite was achieved ( 
= .88). 
 
3.4 Analysis Strategy 
In addressing the hypotheses outlined above, multiple statistical techniques were 
used. First, because of the large number of variables that were assessed, factor analytical 
techniques were used to create composite scores (see Section 3.4.1). Second, many 
variables assessed in the current study were hierarchically related. To account for this 
„nested” structure, Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) was 
used when appropriate (see Section 3.4.2). Third, Section 3.4.3 describes the calculation of 
difference scores and profile similarities to test dyadic effect hypotheses and discusses 
some of the statistical difficulties of this approach. Finally, Section 3.4.4 briefly touches 
upon the logic underlying the extreme group comparison. 
 
3.4.1 Data Reduction 
To reduce the number of independent and dependent variables, exploratory factor 
analyses (principal component analysis with Varimax rotation) were conducted to create 
composite scores whenever possible. Following conventional criteria (Eigenvalue = 1, 
scree plot inspection), it was tested whether the observed associations between variables 
can be summarized by one or more latent factors. Whenever the pattern of factor loadings 
was sufficiently clear-cut (i.e., high primary, low secondary factor loadings), factor scores 
were used in subsequent analyses. 
 
3.4.2 Nested Structure of Data 
A nested data structure occurs when observations are hierarchically organized, so 
that units on the lower-order level of the hierarchy can be characterized by their 
membership in some higher-order category (see Appendix 7.9, for a schematic depiction). 
An often-used example of such a structure comes from educational psychology, where 
pupils (Level 1) are nested in classes (Level 2) that are in turn nested in schools (Level 3). 
In the current study, social relationships assessed with the ego-centered network instrument 
are nested within participants. Specifically, they are organized according to two 
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hierarchical levels: Level 1 consists of the network partners within an ego-centered 
network, whereas the Level 2 units are the individual participants („egos”). 
According to a number of authors, HLM is ideally suited to deal with such 
hierarchical data because it accounts for interdependencies between different levels 
(Cooper, 2002; Gonzalez & Griffin, 2002; van Duijn, van Busschbach, & Snijders, 1999). 
To illustrate the necessity of a multilevel approach in analyzing the data from the current 
study, consider the following example, in which individuals differ in their calibration of 
the scale they use to rate people’s intelligence. Individuals who have calibrated their 
intelligence ratings around a mean scale level of 17 may rate themselves with a 18 (+1), a 
friend with 15 (-2), and a colleague with 19 (+2). By comparison, individuals who have 
calibrated their ratings around a mean scale level of 12 may use the same relative rating 
pattern but arrive at difference absolute values: self-rating = 13 (+1), rating of friend = 10 
(-2), and rating of colleague = 14 (+2). If the differences in calibration are a result of error 
variance and not of differences in network partners’ „true” intelligence level, ignoring the 
nested structure of the network ratings would result in falsely treating the high intelligence 
colleague in the low-calibrated network matrix as less intelligent than the low intelligence 
friend in the high-calibrated network matrix. 
HLM differentiates between multiple, hierarchical levels of the data. For every 
Level 2 unit, a separate Level 1 regression is estimated, which typically includes an 
intercept (0), at least one coefficient that describes the association between an independent 
and dependent variable (1), and an error term (random coefficient = r).30 For example, the 
relation between MU and intelligence for network partner i of participant j could be 
described as follows: 
 
MUij = 0j + 1j*IQij + rij (1) 
                                                 
30
 In HLM, the error term is not simply the difference between the predicted and observed score. 
Rather, the program uses an Empirical Bayes (EB) estimation strategy that optimally integrates the 
coefficients gained from an „ordinary” Ordinary Least Square regression of Level 1 units and the values of 
these coefficients as predicted by the Level 2 equation. This is done while taking the Level 1 data quality into 
account. Specially, Level 2 units that contribute very little Level 1 data points are given less weight 
(shrinkage). Especially when the number of Level 1 units is small, this method produces superior results 
(Raudenbush, 1988). 
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where 0j is the average31 level of MU reported by person j, 1j is the average relation 
between IQ and MU across j’s social network, and rij is the difference between the 
corresponding observed and predicted values for network partner i. 
 
As stated above, a crucial feature of HLM is that it uses the Level 1 -coefficients 
as outcomes in an additional regression equation at Level 2 (see Appendix 7.8). In other 
words, the program allows the user to specify a separate Level 2 regression from which to 
predict the Level 1 coefficients. For example, it can be tested whether there is a difference 
between men and women in their social networks’ average level of MU or in the 
association between network partner IQ and MU. This would result in the following Level 
2 equations: 
 
0j = 00 + 01*(GENDERj) + u0j (2) 
1j = 10 + 11*(GENDERj) + u1j (3) 
 
where 00 is the average 0j coefficient in the sample (i.e., the average level of MU across 
all participants), 01 is the moderating relation between gender and the 0j intercept (this 
provides information regarding gender differences in the average level of MU), 10 is the 
average association between IQ and MU, and 11 is the moderating relation between gender 
and the IQ-MU association (for example, it may be that only men perceive a link between 
relationship quality and partner intelligence, whereas women do not). 
 
Note that equations 2-3 include two Level-2 error terms: u0j for each individual 
participant’s residual variance in 0j, and u1j for the residual variance in 1j. When these 
                                                 
31
 The interpretation of this and all other parameters depends on the scaling of the raw data. Like any 
other regression approach, HLM estimates the beta coefficient for one variable while controlling for all other 
variables in the model. The intercept thus conforms to a situation where all other parameters are set to zero. If 
the variables in the model are centered, this approximates the “average case”. When the model includes 
dummy variables, the intercept corresponds to the average case of non-members of the dummy categories 
(e.g., when female gender is coded with 1 and male gender with 0, then the intercept corresponds to the 
average male).  
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error terms are significant, it means that there are individual differences in Level 2 
parameters that are not explained by the variables in the regression model. In HLM terms, 
Level 1 coefficients that are allowed to vary across Level 2 units (independent of Level 2 
covariates) are called random effects, whereas those who are the same for all Level 2 units 
are called fixed. In the above example the coefficient specifying the association between 
IQ and MU (1j) is a random effect because the error term u1j allows this effect to differ 
across participants. In contrast, when the individual-specific error term would have been 
lacking, the effect of IQ on MU would be termed a fixed effect (even though it is allowed 
to vary according to gender). 
 
3.4.3 Testing Dyadic Effects 
Dyadic effects are dependent on indices of similarity. Difference scores are the 
most basic form of interpersonal similarity, but they have been criticized for combining the 
measurement error of both constitutive elements, rendering them less reliable (Burr & 
Nesselroade, 1990). It should be noted, however, that the bad reputation of difference 
scores mostly originates from their use in longitudinal research. As is shown by Burr and 
Nesselroade (199032), the reliability of difference scores is reduced when its components 
covary. In longitudinal research, it is the general rule that people’s personality scores at 
two points in time are substantially correlated. In dyadic research, however, the degree of 
association between two individuals’ personality scores is variable, ranging from complete 
interdependence to complete independence. In the latter case, difference scores are just as 
reliable as their constituting components (see Section 4.1.4). 
The calculation of profile similarity indices has been recommended as an 
alternative to difference scores (Cronbach & Gleser, 1953). Such indices aggregate the 
differences between two or more variable pairs (e.g., by means of calculating the Euclidean 
distance between two persons in a multidimensional space of k variables). When similarity 
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where rdiff is the reliability of the difference score, s1 and s2 correspond to the SDs of the constituting 
variables, r1, r2 correspond to the reliabilities of the constituting variables, and r12 is the correlation between 
them. 
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in more than one variable is the focus of analysis, the current study will use such indices 
(e.g., in the case of the k = 17 Rokeach values). When similarity is the independent 
variable, as in the current study, a disadvantage of using profile similarity indices is that 
they are unspecific with regard to the explanatory power of each of their constituting 
elements. For example, if a dyad that is very dissimilar in terms of the Five-Factor Model 
experiences a lower level of MU, it is not clear whether this is related to differences in 1) 
extraversion, 2) neuroticism, 3) openness, 4) conscientiousness, 5) agreeableness, 6) 
several, or 7) all of the above. This poses a problem for testing the hypotheses of the 
current study that postulate an effect of specific dyadic differences on the MU process. In 
such cases, the only viable option is to use difference scores. 
A final note needs to be made regarding the calculation of intelligence differences 
between gifted individuals and their network partners in Sample 1. Because these 
individuals are located at the extreme high end of the intelligence distribution, the 
magnitude of interpersonal intelligence differences depends only on the intelligence of the 
interaction partner. Because for Mensa members, there is no effective difference between 
the (rated) absolute intelligence level and relative intelligence difference (r = -.94, p = .01), 
intelligence differences could not be calculated for this sample. 
 
3.4.4 Groups Comparisons 
One hypothesis of the current study was that gifted individuals experience less MU 
in their social relationships than control individuals. For this purpose, Sample 1 was 
compared to the highly and averagely achieving university alumni of Sample 2. It is clear 
that these different samples differ on a lot of dimensions other than just intelligence. As 
can be seen in Table 3, Mensa members were older on average, had a slightly lower 
educational level, and were more likely to use the Internet questionnaire (compared to the 
P&P version). To account for these differences, these factors were inserted as covariates in 
the corresponding analyses (mainly GLM). 
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4 Chapter 4: Results 
In the following chapter, results regarding the different hypotheses are reviewed. 
Section 4.1 presents the results of a number of factor analyses, which were used to create 
composite scales whenever possible. In Section 4.2, the outcomes of the hypotheses 
regarding main effects of fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and openness to 
experience on the MU process are described. Section 4.3 addresses the hypotheses 
regarding the dyadic effects of these factors on the MU process. Finally, Section 4.4 
compares gifted to non-gifted individuals in terms of their social and general adjustment. 
 
4.1 Data Reduction 
4.1.1 Ego-Centered Social Relationship Quality 
4.1.1.1 Samples 1 and 2 
In Samples 1 and 2, participants used an ego-centered social relationships 
instrument (Neyer, 1997) to rate each contact person on the following dimensions: 
importance, felt closeness, frequency of conflict, quality of communication, emotional 
support, and felt understanding. Correlations between these variables ranged between -.22 
(between conflict and felt understanding) and .71 (between closeness and importance).33 
Principal component factor analysis (with Varimax rotation) was performed to reduce the 
number of variables, which resulted in two factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1 that 
explained 55% and 18% of the total variance. Inspection of the unrotated factor loadings 
yielded clearly interpretable factors (see Table 8), with high primary (	.74	) and low 
secondary loadings (	.34	). Accordingly, a Relationship Quality Scale was formed by 
averaging the items loading on the first factor, which had very good reliability ( = .87). 
Because the current study was only interested in MU as an indicator of relationship quality, 
the conflict item that dominated the second factor was not used in further analyses. 
 
                                                 
33
 Because the current study was not interested in possible idiosyncratic differences in evaluations of 
relationship quality, these analyses ignored the nested structure of the data, treating Level 1 relationships as 
the information unit. 
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Table 8 
Loadings of Social Relationships Ratings on Relationship Quality Factors in Samples 1-3 
 Identified Factors 
 Sample 1.I-2 Sample 3 Sample 1.II a 
  Quality Conflict Quality Quality Conflict 
Importance b .74 .34    
Closeness .84 .19 .80 .78 .29 
Conflict -.17 .90 -.41 -.29 .92 
Communication .76 -.26 .84 .84 .04 
Support .85 .12 .79 .77 .30 
Understanding .85 -.20 .85 .84 -.10 
Acceptance b   .79 .79 -.18 
% explained variance 55% 18% 58% 56% 18% 
Note. Factor loadings greater than .4 printed in bold. 
a
 Results are only based on the analysis of Mensa members’ responses 
b
 The importance item was not assessed in Samples 1.II and 3, whereas the acceptance item 
was not assessed in Samples 1.I and 2 
 
4.1.1.2 Sample 1.II 
In Sample 1.II, the ego-centered relationships questionnaire was supplemented with 
an item measuring the amount of acceptance felt in the relationship but did not longer 
include an item measuring the importance of the relationship (all other items remained the 
same as in Sample 1-2). As can be seen in Table 8, a factor analysis of all items resulted in 
a clear two factor structure, explaining 56% and 18% of all variance. Because of the 
incomplete overlap of items between Samples 1-2 and 1.II, coefficients of congruence 
could not be calculated to quantify factor resemblance. However, inspection of the factor 
loadings in Table 8 suggests clearly comparable factors. Like in Sample 1-2, a 
Relationship Quality scale was formed by averaging all items that loaded highly on the 
first factor ( = .86). 
 
4.1.1.3 Sample 3 
Sample 3 completed the same relationship questionnaire as Sample 1.II (i.e., with 
acceptance but without importance ratings). Factor analysis of these items showed that, 
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unlike in Sample 1-2 and 1.II, all evaluative items, including the ratings for conflict 
frequency, loaded on a single factor. However, because the (absolute) factor loading for 
conflict (.41) was considerably lower than for the other items (range .78-.85) and to 
improve comparability with the composite measures collected in Samples 1 and 2, it was 
decided to treat conflict as a separate dimension of relationship evaluation and to average 
the remaining items in a composite scale with excellent reliability ( = .87). 
 
4.1.2 Post-Interaction Ratings in Sample 4 
In Sample 4, after the end of their conversation, participants completed the 
interaction evaluation questionnaire (see Appendix 7.4). The items of this post-interaction 
questionnaire were factor-analyzed to reduce the number of variables. Results of this 
analysis are presented in the following section. 
 
4.1.2.1 Assessment of Conversation Quality 
The post-interaction questionnaire items were factor-analyzed separately for each 
interaction role (i.e., interviewer/interviewee). Table 9 shows the factor solutions for the 
participants’ evaluations of the interviewer, separately for self-ratings and partner-ratings. 
As can be seen, analysis of interviewers’ self-ratings resulted in a three-factor solution that 
explained 55% of the total variance. In contrast, analysis of the interviewees’ ratings of the 
interviewers’ behavior resulted in two factors that explained 53% of the variance. 
The factor loadings of the self-ratings of the active interviewer role are displayed in 
the left three columns of Table 9. As can be seen, the first factor was dominated by items 
that tap into a successful understanding of the interview partner. Participants with high 
scores on this factor stated they could comprehend their partners well and had the 
impression that their partners were successful in explaining the meaning of their life 
domains. Accordingly, this factor was labeled Interviewer Understanding (IU). The second 
factor was dominated by items emphasizing a smooth, pleasant and synchronized 
conversation. This factor was labeled Interviewer Flow (IF). Finally, the third factor was 
almost exclusively dominated by the (reverse coded) dissatisfaction item. This factor was 
labeled Interviewer Satisfaction (IS). 
As stated above, the factor analysis of the ratings for the interaction half in which 
the participants played the role of interviewee only resulted in a two-factor solution. An 
inspection of the factor loadings shows that the first factor was dominated by items 
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expressing satisfaction with the interviewer’s behavior (e.g., saying the right things, 
providing ample opportunity to explain the importance of life domains) and a subjective 
feeling of being understood. Accordingly, this factor was called Partner Understood (PU). 
The second factor was characterized by items that emphasized a smooth, relaxed, and 
satisfactory conversation. This factor was labeled Partner Flow (PF). 
Despite the similar labeling of the first two factors of the post-interaction ratings of 
conversation quality, there were differences in accent. Indeed, coefficients of congruence 
between the first two factors were .85 for the first and .75 for the second factor, suggesting 
broadly similar, but by no means identical factors. Inspection of the factor loadings showed 
that this was mainly caused by Item 2 (interviewer made constructive remarks) and 8 
(interviewer followed up on the interviewee’s thoughts). Whereas these items loaded on 
the Flow factor of the interviewer ratings, they contributed to the Understood factor of the 
partner-ratings. Presumably, this is due to the fact that interviewers can discriminate 
between (covert) subjective understanding and (overt) communicative behavior (e.g., it is 
possible to understand another person without succeeding to communicate this feeling to 
him/her), whereas the interviewee cannot. For both interaction halves, participants’ factor 
scores on the interviewer and interviewee “Understanding” factors were used as variables 
in subsequent analyses. 
 
4.1.2.2 Effect of Manipulation on Intelligence Ratings 
As stated previously (Section 3.2.3), an experimental manipulation was carried out 
before the participants started to interact. Specifically, in half of the interactions (n = 39), 
participants were given feedback about the relative difference in measured intelligence 
between them. In half of these cases (n = 19), they were told that the test had indicated a 
large intelligence difference between them, whereas in the other half (n = 20), they were 
told that there were only minimal differences. It was expected that this manipulation would 
affect perceived intelligence differences, so that participants in the difference-feedback 
condition would perceive a lot of differences, whereas participants in the similarity-
feedback condition would not. 
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Table 9 
Loadings of Ratings of Interviewer Behavior on Conversation Quality Factors in Sample 4 
  
Self-rated interviewer 
behavior 
Partner-rated 
interviewer 
behavior 
Item Content IU IF IS PU PF 
1 I [the interviewer] could comprehend well why the 
discussed life domains are so important to my 
interview partner [me] 
.80 .00 .11 .66 .31 
2 I [the interviewer] often said things that did not 
contribute much to the conversation (R) 
.00 .65 -.31 .69 .05 
3 This conversation half went smoothly .01 .73 .24 .20 .82 
4 The interviewee [I] succeeded in explaining the 
interviewer [me] what personal meaning the 
discussed life domains have for him/her [me] 
.79 .13 .26 .61 .30 
5 I [the interviewer] showed great interest in the 
things my interviewer partner [I] said 
.59 .46 -.08 .57 .41 
6 I did not enjoy the conversation (R) .43 .32 .37 .19 .56 
7 My conversation partner [I] had little opportunity to 
explain why certain life domains are important to 
him/her [me] (R) 
.60 .02 .01 .75 -.01 
8 It was often difficult for me [the other person] to 
follow the thoughts of the interviewed person [my 
thoughts] with my [his/her] questions (R) 
.21 .72 .01 .67 .22 
9 I felt relaxed during this conversation half .27 .62 .30 .27 .82 
10 I [the interviewer] showed my conversation [me] 
partner that I [he/she] understood, what he/she [I] 
said 
.49 .31 -.14 .72 .32 
11 I was very dissatisfied with the conversation (R) .04 .02 .85 .06 .62 
Note. Factor loadings greater than .40 printed in bold. 
IU = Interviewer Understanding, IF = Interviewer Flow, IS = Interviewer Satisfaction, PU 
= Partner Understanding, PF = Partner Flow, (R) = reverse coded 
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The effectiveness of the experimental manipulation was tested with a t-test of the 
difference between independent sample means. Specifically, participants in dyads who 
were told to be very similar in intelligence were compared to participants in dyads who 
were told to be different. As the dependent variable, the absolute difference between 
participants’ ratings of themselves and their partners was used (i.e., perceived difference). 
Because the dependent variable varied across individual participants (in contrast to the 
experimental manipulation, which varied across dyads), the model was tested with 
participants as between-subjects unit (n = 77). In contrast to expectations, however, results 
did not show a significant difference between the two feedback groups, t(76) = 1.08, p = 
.14 (one-sided). Accordingly, the manipulation was deemed a failure and its effects were 
not further analyzed.34  
 
4.1.3 Agreement Across Data Sources 
To assess data quality, the level of agreement across data sources was calculated. 
First, it was tested whether persons who thought they were very understanding as 
interviewers actually had partners who felt understood during that interaction half. In 
addition, self- and partner-ratings were correlated with the aggregated MU observations by 
the student assistant judges. Table 10 shows the results of these analyses. As can be seen, 
all correlations were positive and at least marginally significant. Specifically, if 
interviewers reported being very understanding, their interaction partners felt better 
understood during the corresponding interaction half (rs = .31 and .26 for the first and 
second interaction halves, respectively). In addition, both partners’ impression of the 
degree of MU was corroborated by the observational ratings, with correlations ranging 
between .22 and .36 (all ps  .10). 
 
                                                 
34
 The student assistant in charge of the experiment rated the intelligence of both interaction partners 
in 114 out of 144 cases. As the assistant also assigned the participants to similar or dissimilar dyads on the 
basis of their intelligence score, it is no surprise that this impacted her ratings. In line with expectations, she 
perceived an average difference of .82 points in similar dyads, against 1.38 points in dissimilar dyads, which 
is statistically significant, F = 10.37, p = .01. 
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Table 10 
Correlations Between Self-Reported and Observed Indices of MU 
 IU(2) PU(2) PU(1) MU(1) MU(2) 
IU(1) .12 .27* .31** .22† .23† 
IU(2)  .26* .66** .31** .28* 
PU(2)   .14 .22† .36** 
PU(1)    .34** .30** 
MU(1)     .74** 
Note. IU = Self-rated understanding as interviewer, PU = felt understanding as partner, MU 
= mutual understanding rated by outside observers; index of interaction half in brackets 
** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
 
To obtain at a dyadic measure of MU, a factor analysis of both participants’ self-
rated Interviewer and Interviewee Understanding, and the amount of observed MU for 
each interaction half (i.e., six variables) was conducted. Inspection of the scree plot 
suggested a one-factor solution, with the first factor explaining 45% of the variance, and 
factor loadings ranging between .50 and .76. Accordingly, the average of these six 
variables was taken as a composite index of MU, which had an acceptable reliability ( = 
.74), especially considering the heterogeneity of information sources. In addition, similar 
composite indices were created for each interaction half (because these consisted of only 
three items each, reliabilities were deflated to .54 and .57 for the first and second half, 
respectively). 
 
4.1.4 Interdependence of Data 
An important issue in using dyadic data is that the individual members of the dyad 
can be interdependent. That is, for whatever reason, members may resemble each other in 
terms of certain characteristics. Failing to account for this interdependency may lead to 
biased conclusions (Kenny & la Voie, 1985). Because the dyads were formed 
unsystematically (with the exception of pretest intelligence) and did not have contact 
previous to the interaction, interdependence in Study 4 can only be due to the interaction 
itself (e.g., when both participants act in a relaxed way because of a nice conversation). 
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Accordingly, no dyadic associations between partners on any of the pretest measures were 
expected.  
In line with the expectation of non-interdependence, (intraclass) correlational 
analyses showed that correlations between participants’ crystallized and fluid intelligence 
scores ranged between -.11 and .03 and were not statistically significant, ps > .30. 
Similarly, openness to experience did not correlate across interaction partners, r = -.05, p = 
.69. Finally, both participants’ self-ratings and partner-ratings were uncorrelated between 
dyadic partners, r = -.05 and .02 (ps > .60), respectively. Accordingly, it was not necessary 
to account for dyadic interdependency regarding the current predictor variables.  
Because the data were virtually non-interdependent, applying the formula by Burr 
and Nesselroade (1990) results in estimates of the reliability of the difference scores 
between two participants that approximate the reliability of the corresponding scales. The 
only exception is the difference between participants’ self-ratings of intelligence and their 
ratings of the intelligence of their interaction partners, which were significantly correlated 
(r = .40, p < .01). When the reliability of the single-item measure is estimated at .70, then 
the reliability of the (intra-individual) difference score does not exceed .50. Of course, the 
low reliability of the intra-individual difference score also affects the results of Studies 1-3. 
 
4.2 Main Effects of Intelligence and Dispositional Valuations 
The current study tested a number of hypotheses regarding the main effects of 
intelligence and dispositional valuations on the level of MU in social relationships. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and 
openness to experience are positively related to MU. 
 
4.2.1 Samples 1-2 
To address the main effect hypotheses regarding fluid intelligence and openness to 
experience on the amount of MU in relationships (Main Effect Hypothesis 1 and 3, 
respectively), the ego-centered network data were analyzed using HLM. On the 
relationship-specific Level 1, the composite relationship quality index served as the 
dependent variable. The intercept (i.e., average level of relationship quality within a 
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person’s social network) served as outcome variables in a participant-specific Level 2 
regression. As predictors of the intercept35, self-rated intelligence and openness to 
experience were included. All continuous Level 2 variables were standardized to facilitate 
comparison of the HLM coefficients. Level 2 random effects were included for both 
intercept and the IQ x relationship quality slope parameter. In addition, gender, age, and 
network size36 were entered as control variables on Level 2. 
Table 11 shows the regression coefficients of the HLM analysis of main effects in 
Samples 1-2 and 3. As can be seen, the Table is divided into two horizontal halves 
covering the different samples. The first line of each half specifies the Level 2 intercept 
(the average relationship quality), followed by the slope of the association between rated 
intelligence and relationship quality. In lines 2-5, Level 2 moderators of the Level 1 
intercept are displayed. For example, in Sample 1-2, an elevation of 1 SD in Openness 
increases the Level 1 intercept by .04 points. 
As can be seen in Table 11, the parameter linking partner intelligence with 
relationship quality was significant and positive on Level 1, indicating that relationships 
with more intelligent network partners were rated as higher in quality. Thus, Main Effect 
Hypothesis 1 was confirmed regarding the relationship-specific Level 1. In contrast, self-
rated intelligence on Level 2 had a significantly negative influence on the average level of 
relationship quality. That is, highly intelligent individuals reported less satisfying and 
understanding relationships, which is inconsistent with Main Effect Hypothesis 1. Finally, 
participants’ openness to experience was positively related to average relationship quality 
on Level 2, but this effect was not significant. Accordingly, Main Effect Hypothesis 3 was 
not supported. 
 
                                                 
35
 No covariates were included as predictors of the intelligence rating x relationship quality slope 
because the analysis focuses on main effects, not on moderator effects. 
36
 Network size was included as a control variable to avoid diluting effects: If participants are not 
very selective in listing contact persons, they are more likely to include less intimate relationships, which 
might lead to decreased mean levels of relationship quality. 
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Table 11 
HLM Regression Coefficients of the Effect of Rated Intelligence, Openness, and 
Vocabulary on Relationship Quality in Samples 1-2 and 3 
 Level 1 (relationship partner) 
 
Relationship quality 
intercept 
Rated partner IQ  
slope 
 Sample 1-2 
 0.00 0.40** 
Level 2   
-Openness  0.04  
-Self-rated IQ -0.21**  
-Network size -0.07**  
-Age -0.01  
-Female gender 0.03  
 Sample 3 
 -0.20** 0.41** 
Level 2   
-Openness 0.01  
-Vocabulary -0.05  
-Network size -0.04*  
-Age -0.06*  
-Female gender 0.28**  
Note. IQ = intelligence rating, corrected for age and gender. All continuous variables were 
standardized before entering in the analysis. In Samples 1-2 (Level 1, N = 7,863; Level 2, 
N = 410), random effects were estimated at .36, .20, and .86 for the Level 1 intercept, the 
IQ x relationship quality slope, and the residual variance, respectively (ps < .01). In 
Sample 3 (Level 1, N = 5,153; Level 2, N = 511), the corresponding estimates were .50, 
.22, and .79 (ps < .01). 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
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In the current case, there were extreme differences between the Mensa (Sample 1.I) 
and alumni (Sample 2) in the mean level and range of the single item intelligence rating. 
Specifically, the average (single-item) self-rated intelligence was 19.7 for the Mensa 
members against 16.2 for the university alumni, a highly significant difference, F(1, 431) = 
555.74, p = .01. In addition, Mensa members had a SD of .62 on the single item rating, 
whereas university alumni had a SD of 2.15. An F-test showed that this difference is 
significant, F(221, 219) = 3.49, p = .01. Because of these large differences in distribution, 
the single item intelligence rating is confounded with sample membership (i.e., a 
participant with a self-rating of 20 points almost certainly belongs to the Mensa sample). 
Because of the potentially unmeasured selection bias accompanying Mensa 
membership (besides having a high intelligence), the single item intelligence rating scale is 
not ideal to test for the effects of intelligence on social relationships. Sample differences 
regarding the four-item intelligence self-concept scale were comparably smaller, though 
significant, F(1, 435) = 82.47, p < .01, whereas the SD of this scale did not differ between 
the Mensa members (SD = .68) and the university alumni (SD = .73), F(222, 223) = 1.09, p 
= .26. When the single-item intelligence ratings were replaced with the intelligence self-
concept scale, no significant effect on the relationship quality intercept was found (p = 
.27), even though the trend was again negative (b = -0.03). Accordingly, the negative effect 
of intelligence self-ratings found for the single item measure was not replicated for the 
intelligence self-concept scale. 
In sum, a negative/null association between participants’ self-rated intelligence and 
their social network’s average level of MU was found on Level 2. In contrast, a positive 
association between participants’ rating of their network partners’ intelligence and the 
quality of their relationship was found on Level 1. Thus, results differed between the 
relationship-specific (dyadic) Level 1 and the participant-specific Level 2. In interpreting 
this discrepancy, it should be noted that these two levels are mathematically independent of 
each other and represent different research questions. For example, whereas the Level 2 
association between rated intelligence and MU is dependent of the relationship quality 
intercept, the association on Level 1 is independent of this parameter. 
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4.2.2 Sample 1.II 
Like in Sample 1.I, 39 Mensa members filled out the NEO-FFI personality 
questionnaire, provided a list of their network partners and rated each partner’s intelligence 
and the quality of the corresponding relationship. In addition, a total of 172 network 
partners rated their own openness to experience and intelligence as well as the quality of 
the relationship with the Mensa member. Because the intelligence self-ratings of the Mensa 
members did not show any variation, they could not be used to assess main effects. In 
addition, it turned out that also the network partners’ ratings of the Mensa members’ 
intelligence were extremely right skewed (kurtosis -2.35, se .18, p < .01). As 42% of the 
network partners used the highest or second-highest intelligence rating (i.e., 19 or 20), 
many were apparently aware of the gifted status of the Mensa members, most likely 
because of their publicly known membership in an organization for the gifted. Because the 
intelligence ratings of the network partners were highly confounded with the availability of 
this information, they were not further used in the subsequent analyses. 
Because two rating sources (Mensa members and network partners) for both 
dependent and independent variables were available, main effects were tested with four 
separate HLM analyses. The dependent variable in these regressions was the amount of 
relationship quality, predicted by ratings of partner intelligence while controlling for the 
total size of the social network and participants’ gender.37 Table 12 shows the outcomes of 
these analyses. Note that this Table is divided into four rows, depending on the source and 
the target of the intelligence and relationship quality ratings (in the Table, the source of a 
rating is placed left of colon, whereas the target is placed on the right; in the case of self-
ratings, source and targets are identical). As can be seen, the effects of intelligence ratings 
on relationship quality were only statistically significant when the Mensa member 
provided both intelligence and relationship quality ratings. Because the positive 
association between intelligence and relationship quality ratings found in Samples 1.I and 
2 was only replicated in one out of four possible analyses, Main Effect Hypothesis 1 
received only weak support. 
 
                                                 
37
 Different from the previous analyses, age was not included because the relatively high number of 
missing values for this variable would have reduced the already limited sample size. 
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Table 12 
HLM Regression Coefficients of the Effect of Ratings of Network Partner Intelligence on 
Relationship Quality in Sample 1.II 
 Level 1 (relationship partner) 
 
Relationship quality 
intercept 
Rated partner IQ  
slope 
 MM: Quality/MM: IQ 
 0.24 0.24** 
Level 2  
 
-Network size 0.00 
 
-Female gender 0.04 
 
 MM: Quality/NP: IQ 
 0.40** -0.05 
Level 2   
-Network size -0.03 
 
-Female gender -0.06 
 
 NP: Quality/MM: IQ 
 0.01 -0.04 
Level 2   
-Network size -0.01 
 
-Female gender 0.02 
 
 NP: Quality/NP: IQ 
 0.02 -0.07 
Level 2   
-Network size 0.00 
 
-Female gender -0.02 
 
Note. MM = Mensa member, NP = network partner, IQ = intelligence rating, corrected for 
age and gender. All continuous variables were standardized before entering in the analysis. 
Level 1, N = 172; Level 2, N = 39. Mean random effects (across all four analyses) were 
estimated at .26, .10, and .89 for the Level 1 intercept, the IQ x relationship quality slope, 
and the residual variance, respectively (ps  .36). The table is divided into four horizontal 
parts, depending on the source (left of colon) and target , whereas the target (right of colon) 
of the intelligence ratings rating  
** p < .01, * p < .05 
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4.2.3 Sample 3 
Like in Samples 1-2, a HLM analysis with vocabulary and openness as Level 2 
main effect variables and rated network partner intelligence as Level 1 main effect 
variables was carried out. Instead of intelligence self-ratings (not assessed in this Sample), 
the vocabulary test score was included as a measure of crystallized intelligence. Like in the 
previous analyses, gender, age, and total network size were included as Level 2 covariates. 
Table 11 (lower part) shows the results of the HLM analysis. As can be seen, 
neither the effect of vocabulary nor the effect of openness was significant on Level 2. As 
found in Samples 1-2, however, the main effect of rated partner intelligence on relationship 
quality was significant and positive. This is consistent with Main Effect Hypothesis 1, 
which predicts that intelligence and relationship quality are positively associated. 
In sum, results for Sample 3 resulted in positive results for Main Effect Hypothesis 
1, but no support for Main Effect Hypotheses 2 and 3. Consistent with Main Effect 
Hypothesis 1 and replicating results from Samples 1-2, participants’ ratings of their 
network partners’ intelligence (on Level 1) were positively associated with relationship 
quality. In contrast, vocabulary level as assessed with a psychometric test (on Level 2) was 
not associated with relationship quality, which disconfirms Main Effect Hypothesis 2. 
Finally, self-ratings of openness to experience (on Level 2) were not significantly 
associated with relationship quality, which disconfirms Main Effect Hypothesis 3. 
 
4.2.4 Sample 4 
According to the current Main Effect Hypotheses, MU should be positively related 
to intelligence, vocabulary, and openness to experience. In Sample 4, self-ratings, ratings 
by the interaction partner, and intelligence test results were available as information 
sources for fluid intelligence. In addition, vocabulary was measured with the help of a 
psychometric test (MWT), and openness with an established self-rating instrument (NEO-
FFI). The level of observed and self-reported MU after the interaction served as dependent 
variable. 
The intercorrelation matrix of the different predictor measures (see Table 13) was 
inspected to see whether it would be possible to create aggregated variables. As can be 
seen, self-ratings of intelligence were significantly correlated with psychometric numerical 
intelligence and openness to experience. Vocabulary was significantly correlated with 
Results 92 
openness to experience and marginally significantly with numerical intelligence. These 
correlations are consistent with previous research (e.g., Ashton et al., 2000; Paulhus et al., 
1998), but they are not high enough to create composite measures.38 Unexpectedly, 
partner-ratings of intelligence and figural intelligence were unrelated to the other predictor 
variables.39  
 
Table 13 
Correlations Among Predictor Variables in Sample 4 (Intelligence and Openness to 
Experience) 
 IQ SR IQ PR IQ NUM IQ VOC IQ FIG O 
IQ SR 1.00 .03 .23** -.03 .04 .20* 
IQ PR  1.00 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.11 
IQ NUM   1.00 .13† .10 .04 
IQ VOC    1.00 .01 .17* 
IQ FIG     1.00 -.05 
O      1.00 
Note. IQ SR = Self-rated IQ, IQ PR = Rating by interaction partner IQ, IQ NUM = 
numerical IQ, IQ FIG = figural IQ, IQ VOC = Vocabulary, O = Openness. Ns ranged from 
139 (correlations with intelligence ratings) to 200 (correlations among pretest measures). 
** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
 
Main effects in Sample 4 were tested by a series of correlational analyses. As can 
be seen in Table 14, main effects were limited to partner-ratings of intelligence, and 
psychometrically assessed vocabulary. Interestingly, main effects differed between 
participants (i.e., first vs. second interviewer) but generalized across interaction halves 
                                                 
38
 Applying the Spearman-Brown formula shows that aggregating scales that are significantly 
correlated (e.g., self-ratings of intelligence and numerical intelligence) would result in inadequate reliability 
levels (i.e., alpha levels lower than .37). 
39
 The lack of associations with partner intelligence could be due to the limited amount of 
information on which participants could base their judgments. The lack of association with figural 
intelligence may be due to range restriction and the fact that this measure was based on a speeded test, 
whereas the other intelligence measures were not. 
Results 93 
(i.e., first vs. second half). That is, effects that were found for the first interviewer were not 
replicated for the second interviewer (and vice versa), but the effects (and lack of effects) 
of both persons’ personality were not constrained to one interaction half. 
Across both interaction roles and interaction halves, two main effects of 
intelligence were significant. To begin with, the first interviewer’s level of vocabulary was 
significantly positively related to MU during the conversation. The positive effect of 
crystallized intelligence is consistent with Main Effect Hypothesis 2. However, no effect 
was found for the second interviewer’s vocabulary. Second, the rating of the first 
interviewer’s intelligence by his or her interaction partner was positively related to MU. 
However, no effect was found for the first interviewer’s ratings of the intelligence of the 
second interviewer. Besides the effects of the first interviewer’s vocabulary level and 
intelligence ratings by his/her partner, no other personality variables exerted a significant 
main effect on MU. That is, no significant main effects were found for self-ratings of 
intelligence, psychometric (figural, numerical) intelligence, or self-reported openness to 
experience. 
 
Table 14 
Correlations Between Intelligence/Dispositional Valuations and MU in Sample 4  
 Target of personality assessment 
 Interviewer(1) Interviewer(2) 
Source MU MU(1) MU(2) MU MU(1) MU(2) 
Intelligence ratings       
 -Self-rating -.12 -.19 -.01 .08 .15 -.01 
 -Rating by partner .35** .35** .28** -.07 -.09 -.04 
Intelligence tests       
 -Numerical IQ -.04 .00 -.08 .08 .07 .07 
 -Figural IQ -.03 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.01 
 -Vocabulary .30** .27** .27** -.03 -.06 .01 
Openness to experience .13 .14 .09 .12 .15 .06 
Note. MU = Composite measure of self-reported and observed mutual understanding 
(interaction half in brackets) 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
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In sum, Main Effect Hypothesis 1 received weak support, with the ratings of the 
first interviewers’ intelligence by their partners being positively related to MU, but not the 
ratings of the second interviewers’ intelligence. Because the positive association between 
intelligence and MU was not replicated with other intelligence indices, this finding does 
not seem very robust, however. Second, Main Effect Hypothesis 2 received mixed support, 
with the level of vocabulary being positively associated with MU for the first but not for 
the second interviewer. Third, Main Effect Hypothesis 3 received no support since 
openness to experience was not related to the level of MU. 
 
4.3 Dyadic Effects of Intelligence and Dispositional Valuations 
In the following section, the current study’s dyadic effect hypotheses are addressed. 
As a reminder, the prediction was made that between-person differences in intelligence and 
dispositional valuations are related to impairments in the MU process. Specifically, this 
involved the following variables: 
 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 1: Between-person differences in fluid 
intelligence are negatively related to MU.  
 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 2: Between-person differences in crystallized 
intelligence are negatively related to MU. 
 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 3: Between-person differences in openness to 
experience are negatively related to MU.  
 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 4: Between-person differences in interests and 
values are negatively related to MU.  
 
4.3.1 Sample 1.I 
Because the extremely high intelligence level of the Mensa members makes it 
impossible to discriminate between main and dyadic effects in this sample (see Section 
3.4.3), no tests of dyadic effects were conducted (for tests of main effects, see Section 4.2). 
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4.3.2 Sample 1.II 
Because of the previously discussed problems with the self- and partner-ratings of 
intelligence of the Mensa members (see Section 3.4.3), these indices could not be used to 
test dyadic effects. In contrast, both dyadic partners completed the Openness to Experience 
scale of the NEO-FFI, so this information was available to calculate absolute difference 
scores that were used in three HLM analyses. First, an analysis was carried out to assess 
the effect of between-person differences in openness on a composite index of relationship 
quality (average of both dyadic partners’ ratings). However, because the degree of 
convergence across both raters was only modest (r = .24, p = .01), two separate HLM 
analyses were calculated to assess the impact of between-persons difference in openness on 
each participant’s idiosyncratic relationship quality ratings. As was done for the test of 
main effects in this sample (see Section 4.2.2), Mensa members’ gender and network size 
were included as control variables. 
Inconsistent with Emergent Effect Hypothesis 4, results did not show any effects of 
between-person differences in openness on any of the three relationship quality indices. 
Specifically, the absolute difference score of the two dyadic partners’ openness values 
were neither associated with the average of both persons’ relationship quality ratings (b = -
.07, p = .40), nor to partners’ idiosyncratic quality ratings (bs = -.02 and -.11 for Mensa 
members’ and relationship partners’ quality ratings, respectively, ps > .20). 
 
4.3.3 Sample 2 
In Sample 2, dyadic effects were studied in the following way. For every 
relationship, the difference between the university alumni’s self-reported intelligence and 
their ratings of their network partners’ intelligence was calculated. This difference score 
had an average of 2.7 (SD = 3.2), indicating that the alumni saw themselves as more 
intelligent than the people with whom they frequently interacted. To calculate the impact 
of between-person intelligence differences, the absolute value of this difference score was 
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inserted in an HLM analysis as a Level 1 predictor of relationship quality.40 As before, age, 
gender, and network size were entered as control variables. 
Table 15 shows the results of the HLM analysis for the effects of absolute 
differences scores on the quality of social relationships. As can be seen, there was a 
significantly negative effect of absolute intelligence differences on relationship quality. 
Thus, when participants perceived larger between-person differences in intelligence, they 
also perceived the quality of the social relationship as lower, which is consistent with 
Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 1. 
In only 4.3% of all relationships, participants rated their network partners as more 
than one scale point higher in intelligence than themselves (vs. 57.8% lower in 
intelligence). As a result, if there is a detrimental effect of intelligence differences when 
the network partner is rated as more intelligent, this is likely obscured by the sheer number 
of relationships where the opposite is the case. Because of the bias towards higher self-
ratings, the difference score can also be seen as an index of the degree to which contact 
persons have a lower intelligence than the alumni.  
To test the notion that communication is also hampered when a contact person has a 
higher intelligence level, two additional dummy variables were created. First, a dummy 
was created for all dyads in which participants rated a contact person as more than one 
scale point lower in intelligence than themselves (this concerned 5,006 dyads). The same 
was done for dyads in which participants rated a contact person as more than one scale 
point higher in intelligence (this concerned 376 dyads). Results showed that the dummy 
that specified relationships in which the network partner was rated as less intelligent was 
associated with lower levels of relationship quality (b = -.49, p = .00). In contrast, there 
was a non-significantly positive effect of the dummy that specified relationships in which 
the network partner was rated as more intelligent (b = .15, p = .25). 
Although the lack of significance for the dummy specifying relationships with more 
intelligent network partners may be the result of unequal cell sizes, the positive sign clearly 
disconfirms Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 1, which states that differences in intelligence 
                                                 
40
 Because the difference score varies across different relationships, it was deemed a Level 1 
property. Note, however, that intelligence differences calculated in this way are not pure Level 1 measures 
because they are dependent on Level 2 information (i.e., the self-rated IQ of the university alumni). 
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should be related to lower levels of MU. Instead, the pattern of findings is more consistent 
with a positive main effect of participants’ ratings of their network partners’ intelligence. 
In sum, the Dyadic Hypothesis that intelligence differences between persons are 
related to lower levels of MU received modest support. True, when participants perceived 
network partner as lower in intelligence than themselves, the relationship was rated as 
lower in quality. Yet the crucial prerequisite for a demonstration of a dyadic effect (lower 
quality ratings for relationships with network partners that are perceived as higher in 
intelligence) was not met in the current study. Accordingly, the significant „dyadic” effect 
of intelligent difference is more likely due to a main effect of rated intelligence on social 
relationship quality. 
 
Table 15 
HLM Regression Coefficients of the Effect of Between-Person Differences in Rated 
Intelligence and Relationship Quality in Sample 2 
 Level 1 (relationship partner) 
 
Relationship quality 
intercept 
Between-person IQ  
difference slope 
 -0.03 -0.29** 
Level 2   
-Network size -0.08**  
-Age 0.01  
-Female gender 0.10*  
Note. IQ = intelligence rating, corrected for age and gender. All continuous variables were 
standardized before entering in the analysis. Level 1, N = 4,537; Level 2, N = 205. Mean 
random effects (across all four analyses) were estimated at .30, .19, and .90 for the Level 1 
intercept, the IQ x relationship quality slope, and the residual variance, respectively (ps < 
.01). 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
4.3.4 Sample 4 
In Sample 4, univariate between-person differences in intelligence and dispositional 
valuations were operationalized as the absolute difference between interaction partners’ 
scores. Second, the Euclidean distance between interaction partners’ personality profiles 
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was calculated as an index of multivariate between-person differences.41 Note that, unlike 
in the previous samples, relative intelligence differences in intelligence ratings were much 
more balanced in terms of which person was perceived as more intelligent. In fact, the 
mean relative difference between self-ratings and partner-ratings was -0.27 (SD =  2.42), 
indicating that participants on average rated themselves as .27 scale points less intelligent 
than they rated their network partners. Indeed, no less than 67% of all participants regarded 
their interaction partner as equally or more intelligent as themselves. 
To investigate the effect of perceived intelligence differences more fully, three 
different indices were created. First, an index of self-concept similarity was calculated by 
taking the absolute difference of both participants’ self-ratings of intelligence. Second, an 
index of target agreement, operationalized as the absolute difference between participants’ 
self-rating and the rating provided by their partners, was calculated. Third, an index of 
perceived similarity was calculated by taking the difference between individuals’ ratings of 
their own intelligence and their partners’ intelligence. 
Table 16 contains correlations between MU (composite of participants’ ratings and 
behavioral observations) and between-person differences in intelligence/dispositional 
valuations. As can be seen, only one dyadic effect was marginally significant: The level of 
disagreement regarding the first interviewer was negatively correlated with the amount of 
MU. Thus, conversations between participants with very divergent opinions about the 
intelligence of the first interviewer were less understanding than conversations in which 
there was a large degree of agreement on this issue. The level of agreement regarding the 
second interviewer was not associated with MU. 
Apart from the effect of intersubjective agreement regarding the first interviewer’s 
intelligence level, no other dyadic effects were significant. Between-person differences in 
psychometric intelligence tests and self-reported openness were unrelated to the level of 
MU. Also, profile similarity regarding the psychometric intelligence measures (i.e., 
numerical and figural intelligence, and vocabulary), the Big Five factors (excluding 
                                                 
41
 Using the formula where dij is the Euclidean distance between persons i 
and j, m represents the number of personality dimensions, and xia and xja are the scores on personality variable 
a for person i and j, respectively. 
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openness), the AIST interests scales, and the Rokeach value rankings was not significantly 
related to MU. Accordingly, the emergent effect hypotheses did not receive much support. 
 
Table 16 
 Correlations Between MU and Between-Person Differences in Intelligence and 
Dispositional Valuations in Sample 4 
 Impact of absolute difference 
 MU MU(1) MU(2) 
Difference scores    
Intelligence ratings    
 -Self-concept similarity a -.06 -.05 -.06 
 -Target agreement (Interviewer 1) a -.22† -.17 -.23† 
 -Target agreement (Interviewer 2) a -.06 .04 -.15 
 -Perceived similarity (Interviewer 1) a -.05 -.05 -.04 
 -Perceived similarity (Interviewer 2) a .07 .08 .04 
Intelligence tests    
 -Numerical IQ .00 -.06 .05 
 -Figural IQ -.09 -.01 -.16 
 -Vocabulary -.01 -.03 .02 
Openness .04 -.08 .14 
    
Profile similarity    
 - Intelligence + vocabulary -.04 -.06 -.01 
 - FFM (excl. Openness) .10 .09 .09 
 - Values -.12 -.07 -.14 
 - Interests -.10 -.11 -.07 
a
 More positive values are indicative of less similarity 
Note. MU = Composite measure of self-reported and observed mutual understanding 
(interaction half in brackets), FFM = Factors of the Five-Factor Model of personality 
description. N = 68-72. 
** p = .01, * p = .05, † p = .10 
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4.4 Group Differences 
In the previous Sections 4.2 and 4.3, main and dyadic effects of intelligence and 
dispositional valuation were discussed. In the following section, it is tested what effect the 
combined impact of these factors has in a sample that is extreme with regard to one 
important cognitive personality trait: intelligence. Specifically, it was tested to what degree 
intellectually gifted individuals, highly achieving university alumni, and averagely 
achieving alumni in Samples 1-2 differ from each other in terms of a number of (indirect) 
indicators of adjustment and MU: Neuroticism, general self-esteem, self-esteem of 
relationships with people of the same and opposite gender, self-esteem of relationships 
with parents, loneliness, and social network size. Because MU is hypothesized to be an 
important first step in the establishment of intimate relationships, these comparisons 
indirectly address the following hypothesis: 
 
Extreme group hypothesis: Intellectually gifted individuals experience a lower level 
of MU in their social relationships 
 
4.4.1 Differences in Self-report Scales 
Multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) were carried out with sample 
membership (Mensa member, highly achieving alumni, and averagely achieving alumni) as 
between-subjects factor and the above described adjustment and MU indicators as 
dependent variables. Except for neuroticism, significant group differences were found for 
all variables (see Table 17 and Figure 6), multivariate F(6, 431) = 27.82, p < .01. Planned 
contrasts showed that this was due to differences between Mensa members and alumni (ps 
 .01 for all variables except neuroticism). In contrast, differences between highly and 
averagely achieving university alumni were not significant except for self-esteem of 
opposite-sex relationships, with somewhat higher values for the high achievers (p = .02). 
Results 101 
Table 17 
Differences Between Mensa Members and University Alumni in Self-Reported Social 
Adjustment 
Dependent variable Sample Mean SD F a d b 
Neuroticism Mensa members 2.65 0.84 2.01 0.15 
 High achievers 2.50 0.64   
 Average achievers 2.57 0.61   
General self-esteem Mensa members 3.72 1.03 5.88** -0.30 
 High achievers 4.03 0.76   
 Average achievers 3.96 0.73   
Opposite-sex self-esteem Mensa members 3.50 0.95 14.92** -0.43 
 High achievers 4.00 0.74   
 Average achievers 3.74 0.83   
Same-sex self-esteem Mensa members 3.23 0.86 46.19** -0.90 
 High achievers 3.95 0.70   
 Average achievers 3.93 0.72   
Parents self-esteem Mensa members 3.26 1.00 31.31** -0.72 
 High achievers 4.00 0.85   
 Average achievers 3.88 0.92   
Loneliness Mensa members 2.30 0.70 49.37** 0.92 
 High achievers 1.73 0.44   
 Average achievers 1.79 0.42   
Size of social network Mensa members 16.41 9.06 29.86** -0.71 
 High achievers 22.91 8.39   
 Average achievers 22.29 8.51   
Note. Because of the lack of significant differences between high achievers and average 
achievers, these groups were pooled together in the comparisons with the Mensa members.  
a
 Based on the difference between Mensa members and university alumni 
b
 Calculated with Cohen’s formula d = (M1 - M2) / SDp, where M1 is the mean for the 
Mensa group, M2 is the mean for the alumni, and SDp is the pooled SD across the entire 
sample 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
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An inspection of the effect sizes of the difference between the Mensa members and 
university alumni42 showed that the difference between both groups in terms of general and 
opposite-sex self-esteem were small to modest following Cohen’s guidelines. However, the 
differences regarding self-esteem of the relationships with parents and same-sex peers, 
subjective feelings of loneliness, and total network size ranged between .70 and .90 and 
can be described as large (i.e., around .80). 
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Figure 6. Mean Level Differences in Self-Rated Social Adjustment Between Intellectually 
Gifted Mensa Members, Highly Achieving University Alumni, and Averagely Achieving 
University Alumni. 
 
Group comparisons between Mensa members and university alumni are somewhat 
biased because these groups differed in a number of respects. For example, Mensa 
members were older and less educated, which may have affected the comparisons. To 
correct for this potential bias, GLM analyses with participant age as a covariate and 
gender, sample, questionnaire format, and their interaction terms as a between-subjects 
factors were carried out. 
                                                 
42
 High and average achievers were pooled together because they did not significantly differ from 
each other in their level of social adjustment. 
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Findings showed that the multivariate effect of participant sample remained 
significant, F(6, 401) = 4.55, p < .01. Inspection of univariate follow-up tests showed that 
Mensa members no longer differed from the university alumni in terms of general self-
esteem and total network size. However, the effects for the self-esteem of same-sex, 
opposite-sex and parental relationships, and loneliness remained significant (ps  .03). 
Accordingly, the lower social self-esteem and higher loneliness of the Mensa members was 
not a by-product of differences in gender, age, education or questionnaire format. This 
result is consistent with the Extreme Group Hypothesis. 
Finally, an especially stringent test was created to compare Mensa members and 
highly achieving university alumni in terms of their social adjustment. This test included 
the average absolute difference between participants’ and their network partners’ rated 
intelligence as a control variable (in addition to the covariates listed above). The inclusion 
of this control variable provides an indication whether the differences in adjustment 
between Mensa members and university graduates are due to larger between-person 
differences in intelligence (as the Simonton model would predict) or to other, unknown 
factors (e.g., selection bias). Results of this stringent analysis replicated the lower level of 
social adjustment for Mensa members, multivariate F(6, 318) = 3.25, p < .01. In contrast, 
the multivariate effect of intelligence differences became only marginally significant after 
controlling for Mensa membership, F(6, 318), = 1.90, p = .08. This clearly speaks against 
the notion that the lower social adjustment of the Mensa members is due to between-person 
differences in intelligence. 
 
4.4.2 Differences in Social Network Composition 
As described above, group comparisons between Mensa members and university 
alumni uncovered significant differences in terms of their social self-esteem and feelings of 
loneliness. These differences were found in spite of the absence of sample differences in 
more generalized emotional tendencies such as Neuroticism and general self-esteem. 
Because MU theoretically is an important determinant of the quality of social relationships, 
the lower relationship quality observed for gifted individuals indirectly supports the 
hypothesis that they experience a lower level of MU in their social relationships. 
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To investigate whether this hypothesis is also confirmed by the ego-centered 
network data, a HLM analysis was carried out. As covariates , network size43, age, gender,  
and education were inserted as covariates. To test whether there are group differences in 
the overall level of MU, a dummy variable indicating Mensa membership was inserted as a 
predictor of the relationship quality intercept and as a moderator of the effect of different 
relationship categories. This procedure allowed a fine grained analysis of the impact of 
Mensa membership on specific types of relationships. For example, a negative association 
between Mensa membership and the parent-dummy x relationship quality slope would 
indicate that Mensa members have less satisfying relationships with their parents. Because 
the importance of certain relationships may vary across different age groups (Carstensen, 
1992), participant age was included as an additional predictor of the relationship category 
slopes. 
Results of the analysis are shown in Table 18. As can be seen, Mensa members did 
not differ from the university alumni in terms of the average relationship intercept. Thus, 
the level of MU in relationships with „typical”44 network partners did not differ between 
both groups. However, there were consistent moderator effects of Mensa membership on 
the impact of relationship category. First, across the entire sample, relationships with 
parents were rated as above-average in quality, but this effect was less strong for the 
Mensa members (
 = -.44, p < .01). Second, an even stronger relative effect was found for 
other family members, with university alumni perceiving a larger increase in quality than 
the Mensa members (
 = -.38, p < .01). Third, across the entire sample, relationships with 
romantic partners were rated as higher in quality (+ 1.86, p = .01), but less so for Mensa 
members (
 = -.27, p = .03).  
                                                 
43
 Because only 19% of Mensa members vs. 74% of alumni used the Internet version of the 
questionnaire, the cell sizes for this comparison were relatively unbalanced. Because of this, the inclusion of 
both Mensa membership and questionnaire format would lead to colinearity among predictors (r = .54, p = 
.01) and bias the linear HLM analysis. Note, however, that the most important difference between both 
questionnaire formats seems to be the smaller number of contact persons in the Internet condition. Because 
the total size of the ego-centered network was included as a covariate in the HLM analysis, concerns about 
this possible source of bias can be somewhat assuaged. 
44
 In this case, „typical” refers to a relationship with a person who does not belong to any of the 
dummy-coded categories (i.e., who is not a family member, friend or partner).  
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Table 18 
 HLM Regression Coefficients of the Effect of Ratings of Network Partner Intelligence and 
Mensa Membership on Relationship Quality Across Different Relational Categories 
 Level 1 (relationship-specific) 
 Intercept IQ Parent Family Partner Friend 
 -0.60** 0.35** 1.21** 0.81** 1.86** 0.90** 
Level 2  
     
 
-Mensa -0.09 -0.01 -0.44** -0.38** -0.27* -0.12 
-Network size -0.02      
-Age 0.00  -0.15* 0.06 -0.06 0.02 
-Female gender 0.10**  
    
-Education -0.04  
    
Note. IQ = intelligence rating, corrected for age and gender. All continuous variables were 
standardized before entering in the analysis. Level 1, N = 7,808; Level 2, N = 405. Mean 
random effects (across all four analyses) were estimated at .35, .20, and .74 for the Level 1 
intercept, the IQ x relationship quality slope, and the residual variance, respectively (ps < 
.01). 
** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
4.4.3 Compensation Mechanisms 
In light of the above-described social adjustment problems of Mensa members, it is 
interesting that (controlling for age and education) the current study did not find any 
differences between Mensa members and university alumni in terms of general self-
esteem. This raises the possibility of a potential compensatory function of the Mensa 
membership. That is, it may be that gifted individuals who experience social adjustment 
problems somehow “compensate” this threat to their self-esteem by means of their higher 
self-concept of intelligence, of which the Mensa membership is the symbolic emblem.45  
                                                 
45
 Alternatively, it may be that the lower social self-concept of the Mensa members is a result of an 
intra-individual contrast effect resulting from their high self-concept of intelligence (Marsh, 1986). Note, 
however, that the highly achieving university alumni can also be expected to have a high self-concept of 
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If the above interpretation is correct, then the Mensa members should have a lower 
social-concept, a higher intellectual self-concept, and an equally high general self-concept 
when compared to the university alumni. To test this notion, a GLM analysis with 
participant age and education as a covariate and Mensa-membership, gender, sample, 
questionnaire format, and their interaction terms as between-subjects factors were carried 
out (i.e., equivalent to the procedure described in Section 4.4.1). As dependent variables, 
the self-concept scale of intelligence and the mean of the self-concept with relationships 
with parents, same-sex, and opposite-sex peers were used. Results indicated that Mensa 
members (M = 3.33, SD = .66) had a significantly lower social self-concept than the 
university alumni (M = 3.95, SD = .53), F(1) = 19.33, p < .01. By comparison, Mensa 
members (M = 3.89, SD = .68) had a higher intellectual self-concept than the alumni (M = 
3.28, SD = .74), F(1) = 35.10, p < .01.46 Because the group comparison reported above 
showed no differences in general self-esteem, the above results are consistent with the 
compensation hypothesis. 
 
In sum, comparisons between Mensa members and university alumni resulted in a 
number of clearly delineated social differences. After controlling for  age, gender, and 
education, Mensa members had lower self-esteem of relationships with peers of the same 
and opposite sex, a lower self-esteem of the relationship with parents, and a higher self-
perceived loneliness. In terms of relationships with specific partners, these self-views were 
corroborated for relationships with family members and partners. Note that the differences 
in social adjustment were found despite a lack of effects for more generalized constructs 
such as Neuroticism or general self-esteem. In addition, Mensa members did not differ 
from university alumni in terms of their relationships with friends, colleagues, neighbors, 
and co-workers, so the differences found for family members and partners were not due to 
generalized response tendencies in completing the social network questionnaire. Because 
                                                                                                                                                    
intelligence, yet their social self-concepts are significantly more positive when compared to the norm data 
reported by Schwanzer (2002; z-scores = .18 and .50 for the self-concept of peers of the same and opposite 
sex, respectively, ps < .01). 
46
 Note that results did not change when the Mensa members were compared to the subgroup of 
highly achieving alumni (M = 3.34, SD = .78), F(1) = 23.04, p < .01 
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of these consistent social adjustment differences to the disadvantage of the Mensa 
members, the Extreme Group Hypothesis received strong support. 
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5 Chapter 5: Discussion 
The following chapter discusses the results and implications of the current study. 
First, Section 5.1 discusses how the current findings relate to theoretical conceptions 
regarding the measurement and process of mutual understanding. After this, Sections 5.2 
and 5.3 review the outcomes of the main and dyadic effect hypotheses, respectively, and 
how the findings from the current study relate to the theoretical framework discussed in 
Chapter 2. Section 5.4 discusses the combined influence of main and dyadic effects in 
intellectually gifted individuals. After this, limitations of the current dissertation are 
reviewed in Section 5.5, followed by an overview of strengths in Section 5.6. Finally, 
general conclusions and recommendations for future research are discussed in Section 5.7. 
 
5.1 The Process of Mutual Understanding 
As stated in Chapter 1, MU has not received much attention in psychological 
research. In social relationship science, a number of related constructs such as empathy, 
social support, rapport, and intimacy exist. In addition, communication research has 
identified a number of mechanisms that facilitate the process of MU, such as audience 
design, perspective taking, and reference to shared experiences. In the following, the 
present dissertation’s findings regarding the MU process are reviewed critically. A more 
thorough understanding of the mechanisms behind this process will serve as a background 
for the subsequent discussion of the findings regarding main and emergent effects in 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
 
5.1.1 Discriminant Validity of MU 
In the introduction, it was contented that MU can be an important first step in the 
establishment of social support, rapport, and intimacy. However, it was also argued that 
MU can occur without being followed by social support and feelings of relational 
harmony, especially in the early stages of relationship formation. Sample 4 provides a 
good opportunity to test this notion, because it involved two previously unacquainted 
persons interacting with each other. Although it is not unlikely that these persons would 
develop a deep sense of understanding of each other’s life domains, it is less probable that 
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they would experience a deep emotional connection to each other during such a limited 
time. 
Results partially supported the relative independence of MU and emotional 
closeness. For example, a factor analysis of the post-interaction questionnaire showed that 
items related to interviewers’ perceived understanding of the interaction partner (i.e., 
comprehending what is said, providing enough room to explain things) load on a different 
factor than items that tap into more emotional, rapport-like aspects of communication (i.e., 
feeling relaxed, experiencing a smooth conversation). This replicates a finding by Emmers-
Sommer (2004), who found two factors after factor-analyzing experience sampling reports 
of social interactions: a Depth factor describing personal and in-depth relationships, and a 
Smoothness factor describing a relaxed communication free of conflict and breakdowns. 
In contrast to the interactions between strangers, evaluations of more established 
relationships in Samples 1, 2, and 3 showed a lower level of differentiation. When 
participants assessed their network partners with the help of an ego-centered social 
relationship instrument, items tapping successful communication and understanding 
(which are most closely related to MU) loaded on the same general factor as more 
generalized assessments of closeness, importance, support, and acceptance. From these 
findings, it may seem that people do not differentiate between MU and broader measures 
of relationship quality. Note, however, that the high degree of association between these 
different indicators is exactly what would be predicted by the theoretical framework 
outlined in Chapter 1. That is, because MU was hypothesized to be a first prerequisite for 
the establishment of intimacy, MU and more emotional aspects of relationship quality 
should become increasingly correlated as relationships develop. 
 
5.1.2 Convergent Validity of MU Assessments Across Information Sources 
One of the potential critiques of the MU construct is that the phenomenon is too 
subjective to be of much use as a variable in nomothetic research. If MU is so idiosyncratic 
that it lacks an “objective” foundation, it may be impossible to test an individual’s claim 
that he or she is not properly understood. Because Studies 1.II and 4 involved multiple 
information sources for the level of MU, it is possible to assess the convergent validity of 
the current operationalizations. The present results indicated a moderate level of 
agreement. In the first half of the conversation in Study 4, the correlation between 
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interviewer and interviewee reports of MU reached a level of .31, and in the second half, 
the correlation was .26 (ps = .05). Although this may seem somewhat low, it is comparable 
to the .37 correlation between self-ratings of rapport found by Bernieri et al. (1996). It is 
also comparable to the correlation of .23 (p = .01) between the dyadic partners’ composite 
ratings of relationship quality in Sample 1.II. 
In addition to the agreement between interviewer and interviewee, there was also a 
moderate level of agreement between participants’ ratings and judgments based on 
behavioral observations. Specifically, across both interaction halves and interview roles, 
the average correlation between subjective ratings (understanding as interviewer and 
interviewee, separately for both interaction partners) and behavioral observations after r-
to-z transformation and back-transformation was .30 (ps  .10).47 These levels are 
comparable to the agreement level of .24 (single coders) and .30 (pooled across N = 45-52 
coders) reported by Bernieri et al. (1996). Together, the current results imply that MU is an 
intersubjective phenomenon that can be reliably inferred from the behavioral stream, 
though the moderate size of the convergent correlations points to idiosyncratic influences 
as well. 
 
5.1.3 Chronological Correlates of MU 
According to Clark (1992), the initial phase of a conversation is used to establish a 
„common ground” of shared interpretational knowledge. After this common ground has 
been set up, it should become easier to understand the utterances of the other person, and 
the level of MU should go up. Because establishing common ground requires time, MU 
should be positively related to interaction duration, at least up to a certain point. This 
expectation could be tested in Sample 4. Specifically, interaction duration was 
operationalized both as interaction half (as the participants were already somewhat familiar 
with each other in the second interaction half) and the number of 30-second intervals that 
had elapsed since the beginning of the interaction. Because of the hierarchical nature of the 
data, this analysis was carried out with HLM. Results indicated a significant effect of both 
                                                 
47
 It could be objected that this level of agreement was partially inflated because the four most 
extreme self-ratings were used to „anchor” the behavioral observations. However, excluding these cases still 
produced an average agreement of .21, which is significant, t(64) = 1.72, p = 0.05. 
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interaction half (b = .34) and time elapsed (b = .14; both ps = .01)48, whereas the 
interaction term was not significant (p = .35). This is consistent with the interpretation that 
as participants in Sample 4 had more time to establish a common ground, they also became 
better at understanding each other’s utterances. 
One of the strongest associations over time found in the current study was the 
correlation between MU measured across interaction halves. Specifically, the aggregate 
behavioral judgment correlated .74 across the two halves, and felt understanding as 
interviewer and interviewee correlated .66 for the person that started the interaction as 
interviewee (ps = .01). Thus, more than 40% of the variance of MU in the second half of 
the conversation could be explained by the level of MU in the first half of the conversation. 
Apparently, participants established a sense of MU that transcended the specific interaction 
half or interaction role they were involved in. This provides strong evidence that MU is a 
truly emergent phenomenon. 
Somewhat in contrast, the ratings of the person that started the conversation as 
interviewer were „only” correlated .27 (p = .05). The difference between these correlations 
was significant, z = 2.75, p = .01. Apparently, first interviewers had a more differentiated 
view of the unfolding interaction, whereas first interviewees transferred their impressions 
of the first interaction half to the second half. As described in Section 4.1.2, this is 
probably due to the fact that the first interviewer could discriminate between his own 
(covert) subjective understanding and (overt) communicative behavior, whereas the first 
interviewee could not. This probably made the judgments of the former person less 
susceptible to the influence of generalized positivity biases that may have contributed to 
the high timely stability of the impressions of the second interviewer. This suggests that 
the participants’ „starting position” shaped their perceptions of the interaction process as 
the conversation unfolded (this point is further discussed in Section 5.7.2). 
 
                                                 
48
 When the interaction half was ignored and the number of 30-seconds intervals was counted from 
the beginning of the first to the end of the second interaction half, the beta coefficient specifying the 
association between time elapsed and MU increased to .23 (p = .01). 
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5.2 Discussion of Main effects 
After discussing the current dissertation’s findings regarding the measurement and 
process of mutual understanding, the following section reviews the outcomes of the three 
main effect hypotheses and their implications for the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter 2. Main Effect Hypothesis 1 predicted that fluid intelligence should be related to 
higher levels of MU. Main Effect Hypothesis 2 predicted that vocabulary is positively 
related to MU. Finally, Main Effect Hypothesis 3 predicted that openness to experience is 
positively related to MU. Table 19 shows the results of the tests of the main effect 
hypotheses, grouped by variable, sample, and assessment method. In the following 
sections, results for each of these hypotheses are discussed in more detail. 
 
5.2.1 Main Effects of Fluid Intelligence on MU 
According to the theoretical background depicted in Chapter 2, fluid intelligence 
facilitates the use and interpretation of contextual cues in encoding the meaning of verbal 
messages and a fluent encoding of ideas. Accordingly, Main Effect Hypothesis 1 predicted 
that fluid intelligence is positively associated with the level of MU. As can be seen in 
Table 19, this hypothesis was generally confirmed when participants rated both their 
network partners’ intelligence and the quality of the corresponding relationship. The only 
exception was Sample 4, where partner-ratings of intelligence were only related to MU 
when the first interviewer was the target, not the second interviewer. Overall, consistent 
evidence for a perceived (within-person) association between ratings of partner intelligence 
and relationship quality was found.  
As can be seen in Table 19, however, the picture for Main Effect Hypothesis 1 was 
quite different when assessment methods other than partner-ratings were used. In Samples 
1 and 2, intelligence self-ratings were negatively associated with the overall MU level 
when the single item rating scale was used, whereas the intelligence self-concept scale did 
not produce any significant effects. In addition, psychometrically assessed fluid 
intelligence in Sample 4 was not significantly associated with MU. Accordingly, Main 
Effect Hypothesis 1 was not supported when intelligence self-ratings or IQ test results 
were used. 
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Table 19 
Summary of Results Across Main Effect Hypotheses 
Sample Variable 
Assess-
ment 
Effect of Va-
riable on MU 
Hypo-
thesis 
Support for 
Hypothesis 
1 +2 Fluid intelligence PR Positive Hm-1 Yes 
1.II Fluid intelligence PR Positive/none Hm-1 Mixed 
3 Fluid intelligence PR Positive Hm-1 Yes 
4 Fluid intelligence PR Positive/none Hm-1 Mixed 
1+2 Fluid intelligence SR Negative/none Hm-1 No 
4 Fluid intelligence SR None Hm-1 No 
4 Fluid intelligence TEST None Hm-1 No 
3 Crystallized intelligence TEST None Hm-2 No 
4 Crystallized intelligence TEST Positive/none Hm-2 Mixed 
1+2 Openness  SR None Hm-3 No 
3 Openness  SR None Hm-3 No 
4 Openness  SR None Hm-3 No 
Note. PR = Partner-ratings, SR = self-ratings, TEST = psychometric test, Hm = Main 
Effect Hypothesis 
 
5.2.1.1 Lack of Psychometric and Self-Report Effects 
The lack of association between psychometric assessments and self-reports of 
intelligence and MU seems to contradict previous accounts that intelligence is an important 
factor in social understanding (Davis & Kraus, 1997; Guilford, 1967). Because fluid 
intelligence is defined as the ability to solve novel problems, most studies have used 
artificial problem situations to test the impact of intelligence on social skills. However, 
social interactions in everyday situations may not involve a great deal of reasoning about 
novel stimuli. For example, Kellermann and colleagues (Kellermann & Lim, 1990; 
Kellermann & Palomares, 2004) have repeatedly argued for the existence of schema-like 
routines that guide the choosing of topics in getting-acquainted conversations. Indeed, 
according to Kellermann and Lim (1990, p. 1178), conversation is “a relatively simple 
structure composed of a limited number of scenes, organized into a limited number of 
subsets, progressed through in a normative manner [...]”Such a pre-structured process may 
not require much elaborate cognitive processing facilitated by fluid intelligence (see 
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Section 5.7.4.4 for a discussion of alternative situational properties that may produce an 
association between intelligence and MU). 
 
5.2.1.2 Presence of Perceived Effects 
In contrast to the lack of effects for self-reported and psychometrically assessed 
fluid intelligence, a consistently positive effect was found for ratings of partner 
intelligence. When individuals in Studies 1-3 rated their partners as more intelligent, they 
also perceived the quality of the corresponding relationship as closer and more 
understanding. In addition, if the first interviewer in Sample 4 was seen by his or her 
interview partner as more intelligent, the amount of MU (assessed by self-reports, partner-
reports, and behavioral observations) was significantly higher. As reviewed above, 
however, no evidence for an association between MU and psychometric and self-rated 
intelligence was found. This creates the need to explain the positive association between 
ratings of partner intelligence and MU. What led participants to perceive a relation 
between MU and their interaction partner’s intelligence level? 
The most likely interpretation for this finding is the presence of a halo effect. That 
is, because intelligence and MU and other indices of relational quality are highly positive 
valenced, participants may confuse a favorable impression on one dimension with 
favorable impressions on the other. Indeed, previous research has provided evidence that 
intelligence ratings are confounded with feelings of interpersonal liking (Paulhus & 
Landolt, 2000). This may be due to the fact that people attribute a higher level of 
intelligence to sympathetic others or perceive intelligent others as more likeable. 
Whereas intelligence and relationship quality were positively associated in Samples 
1.I, 2, 3, and 4, in Sample 1.II such an association was found only when Mensa members 
provided both ratings. In contrast, when a network partner provided the ratings of either 
intelligence or relationship quality, no effect was found. Probably, this difference is due to 
a method artifact. Recall that Mensa members rated the intelligence and relationship 
quality for all contact persons, whereas contact persons rated only one person: the Mensa 
member. It may be that the availability of multiple rating targets made it easier for the 
Mensa members to differentiate between network partners and thus enhanced validity of 
both intelligence and relationship quality ratings.  
The interpretation that the null results for the Mensa members’ network partners is 
due to psychometric problems is backed up by the fact that the network partners provided 
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higher and more restricted ratings of relationship quality than the Mensa members (M = 
4.17, SD = . 30 and M = 3.98, SD = . 55, respectively). The differences between the means 
and standard deviations of the two groups were statistically significant, t(173) = 4.30, p < 
.01 for the means, and F(173, 173) = 1.89, p < .01, for the SDs. Thus, the lack of 
association between intelligence ratings and relationship quality for network partners can 
partly be attributed to a ceiling effect and range restriction in network partners’ ratings of 
relationship quality. 
 
5.2.2 Main Effects of Crystallized Intelligence on MU 
Main Effect Hypothesis 2 predicted that vocabulary size, a facet of crystallized 
intelligence, is positively associated with MU. This hypothesis was not supported in 
Sample 3 and partially supported in Sample 4 (see Table 19). In the latter sample, 
conversations in which the first interviewer had a larger vocabulary were rated as higher in 
MU. In the following section, the theoretical implications of this positive association are 
discussed (possible reasons for the lack of effects in the case of Sample 3 and the second 
interviewer in Sample 4 are explored in Section 5.7.2). 
 
5.2.2.1 Positive Effect of Crystallized Intelligence 
As stated above, the fact that the first interviewer’s crystallized intelligence had a 
positive effect on MU in Sample 4 is consistent with Main Effect Hypothesis 3. According 
to the theory described in Section 2.2.2, having a larger vocabulary should be positively 
associated with both encoding and decoding ability. On the encoding level, research has 
found that having a large number of cognitive constructs is associated with higher 
communication effectiveness (O’Keefe & Sypher, 1981). On the encoding side, it is well-
established that vocabulary knowledge is a crucial first step in verbal comprehension 
(Cain, Oakhill, & Lemmon, 2004). Because both encoding and decoding effectiveness 
should lead to higher levels of MU, the current results point to the important role of 
crystallized intelligence in verbal communication. 
Results from Study 4 are consistent with the dual function of crystallized 
intelligence in facilitating both encoding and decoding processes. That is, when the first 
interviewer had a larger vocabulary, his or her interview partner not only reported a higher 
level of felt understanding as interviewee (r = .30, p = .01), but also as interviewer in the 
second interaction half (r = .26, p = .03). Of course, it is possible that both correlations 
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merely reflect a generalized sense of satisfaction with the conversation, regardless of the 
conversation half and the ordering of interviewer positions. Indeed, recall that the 
correlation between the second interviewer’s felt understanding as interviewer and 
interviewee was .66, which was highly significant (p < .01). This strong association was 
not mediated by the first interviewer’s vocabulary level, as controlling for this factor did 
not affect the correlation (partial r = .64, p < .01). Accordingly, it seems possible that the 
second interviewer’s higher sense of MU was already firmly established in the first half of 
the interaction as a result of the superior interviewing skills of the first interviewer and not 
further enhanced by the latter’s superior encoding skills when acting as interviewee. 
In the current dissertation, no association was found between psychometrically 
assessed fluid intelligence and MU, whereas there was a significant relation between the 
first interviewer’s crystallized intelligence and MU in Sample 4. It should be noted that 
previous research has mostly ignored this distinction when reporting associations between 
mental ability and social skills (e.g., Davis & Kraus, 1997). In spite of strong empirical 
associations between fluid and crystallized intelligence (Carroll, 1993), there exist 
plausible reasons why they may be differentially associated with the ability to understand 
the utterances of other people. A link to theories regarding the decoding of nonverbal 
displays can be helpful here. An important concept in this field are so-called nonverbal 
decoding rules, which are defined by Buck (1983, p. 217) as “cultural rules or expectations 
about the attention to, and interpretation of, nonverbal displays”. As cultural rules seem at 
least as important in the decoding of verbal messages (in terms of language, conventional 
expressions, etc.), such “crystallized” decoding rules may be more important in verbal 
communication than “fluid” reasoning about the meaning of novel communicative 
utterances. 
Scattered empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that skills that facilitate 
interpersonal understanding are more dependent on crystallized intelligence than on fluid 
intelligence. For example, MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, and Zeidner (2004) reported that 
a performance measure of emotional intelligence is correlated with crystallized but not 
with fluid intelligence (also see Ciarrochi, Chan, and Caputi, 2000). Davis and Kraus 
(1997) reported an average correlation of .23 between observed empathic accuracy and 
„intellectual functioning“ (a category not further specified but probably including both 
crystallized and fluid intelligence). By comparison, a slightly higher average correlation of 
.27 was reported between empathy and “cognitive complexity”, a construct usually 
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operationalized as the number of verbal dimensions used to describe stimuli and thus akin 
to crystallized intelligence. Because this evidence is highly indirect, however, more studies 
are needed to address the hypothesis that crystallized and fluid intelligence are 
differentially related to MU. 
 
5.2.3 Main Effects of Openness to Experience on MU 
According to Main Effect Hypothesis 4, openness to experience should be 
positively associated with MU because open individuals are better able to cope with the 
unstructured, ambiguous process of tailoring their messages to the knowledge background 
of their interaction partners. Results across all samples overwhelmingly disconfirmed this 
hypothesis: In no case was openness to experience significantly associated with the level of 
MU, regardless of the instrument used to measure openness (BFI vs. NEO-FFI), the type of 
social relationships that were assessed (strangers vs. well-established social relationships), 
or the sample that was used (Mensa members vs. university alumni/students). In the 
following, an explanation for this lack of association is offered. 
 
5.2.3.1 Explanation for Inconsistency with Previous Literature 
One of the empirical foundations of Main Effect Hypothesis 4 was a study by 
Richter and Kruglanski (1999), who reported that descriptions of abstract figures by more 
open participants are more likely to be recognized by “naïve” individuals. Specifically, 
their descriptions are more detailed and contain less idiosyncratic references, presumably 
making them easier for others to understand. These results provide indirect evidence that 
open people are more effective actors in the process of audience design. In contrast, the 
current dissertation found no significant main effects of openness on MU. What may have 
caused this discrepancy? 
The most likely explanation seems to lie in differences in experimental setting 
between the two studies. Specifically, participants in Richter and Kruglanski’s (1999) 
experiment only read other people’s written descriptions and thus did not interact directly 
with each other. This made it impossible for them to rely on dynamic discourse cues, such 
as back-tracking responses, facial feedback (e.g., a puzzling look), and clarification 
questions. Such a task likely makes the audience design process a lot tougher, but it may 
not necessarily be representative of more everyday-like conversations. Also, the focus on 
abstract figures in their study may have been quite untypical of naturalistic conversations. 
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As described above, everyday conversations may not be directed so much on novel, 
complex topics but instead proceed in a fairly predictable manner (Kellermann & Lim, 
1990). As indicated by the results of the present dissertation, the ability of open individuals 
to tolerate ambiguity may therefore not be such a crucial asset in more everyday 
interactions. 
 
5.3 Discussion of Dyadic Effects 
Moving from the level of individuals to the level of dyads, one of the overarching 
hypotheses of the current study was that between-person differences in intelligence and 
dispositional valuations limit the degree of overlap in life experiences and the meaning 
attached to these experiences. Accordingly, dyadic personality differences should be 
negatively associated with the level of MU. Specifically, it was predicted that differences 
in fluid and crystallized intelligence, openness to experience, and values would be related 
to decreases in MU. In the following section, the results regarding these hypotheses are 
summarized and discussed. 
 
5.3.1 Status of Dyadic Effect Hypotheses 
5.3.1.1 Dyadic Effects of Fluid Intelligence on MU 
Table 20 summarizes the results of the tests of the dyadic effect hypotheses. As can 
be seen, results were generally not supportive of Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 1. In line with 
predictions, (absolute) rated intelligence differences in Sample 2 were negatively 
associated with relationship quality. However, additional analyses showed that this effect 
was solely due to the fact that participants regarded relationships with people they judged 
to be less intelligent as lower in quality; a similar deleterious effect for relationships with 
more intelligent partners was not found. In addition, negative dyadic effects of perceived 
intelligence differences in Sample 4 were neither found for rated intelligence nor for 
psychometric intelligence. 
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Table 20 
Summary of Results Across Dyadic Effect Hypotheses 
Sample 
Between-person 
difference 
Assess-
ment 
Effect of 
difference on 
MU 
Hypo-
thesis 
Support for 
hypothesis 
2 Fluid intelligence SR (Negative) a Hd-1 Mixed 
4 Fluid intelligence SR None Hd-1 No 
4 Fluid intelligence TEST None Hd-1 No 
4 Crystallized intelligence TEST None Hd-2 No 
1.II Openness SR None Hd-3 No 
4 Interests SR None Hd-4 No 
4 Values SR None Hd-4 No 
Note. PR = partner-ratings, TEST = psychometric test, SR = self-ratings 
a
 Relationships with more intelligence partners were not rated as lower in quality 
 
5.3.1.2 Dyadic Effects of Crystallized Intelligence on MU 
According to the theory outlined in Section 1.2, people face difficulties in if they 
want to communicate words or facts that are not shared by their interaction partners. 
Accordingly, Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 2 predicted that interpersonal differences in 
crystallized intelligence are associated with decrements in the level of MU. This 
hypothesis was tested in Sample 4, which included an assessment of the knowledge level 
of participants involved in a dyadic interaction. However, no effect of absolute knowledge 
differences was found, which is inconsistent with Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 2. 
 
5.3.1.3 Dyadic Effects Openness to Experience on MU 
According to Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 3, open and closed individuals have highly 
different “thinking cultures”, which should produce a negative association between 
between-person differences in openness and their level of MU. However, in Samples 1.II 
and 4, where this hypothesis was tested, no negative dyadic effects of openness were 
found. Accordingly, Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 3 was not confirmed.  
 
5.3.1.4 Dyadic Effects Interests and Values on MU 
Finally, Dyadic Effect Hypothesis 4 predicted there would be a negative association 
between interpersonal differences in interests and values on the one hand, and MU on the 
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other. This hypothesis was tested by correlating the Euclidean distance between interaction 
partners’ interests and values profiles with their level of MU. Inconsistent with Dyadic 
Effect Hypothesis 4, however, between-person differences in interests or values were not 
associated with decreases in MU. 
 
5.3.2 Implications of the Lack of Dyadic Effects 
As becomes clear from the above overview, the basic assumption behind the dyadic 
effect hypotheses was not confirmed in the current study. Of course, there are several 
alternative explanations for the lack of univariate results, such as methodological 
weaknesses that limit the generalizability of the current findings (see Section 5.5). 
Together, however, the pattern of null results suggests that, in contrast to the theory cited 
in the second chapter, people are actually able to bridge personality differences in their 
mutual communication. In the following sections, the implications of this conclusion are 
discussed in more detail. 
 
5.3.2.1 Bridging Personality Differences 
As stated above, participants in the current study were able to bridge between-
person differences in personality in establishing mutually understanding relationships. 
According to Byrne’s (1971) similarity paradigm, people have an active preference for 
interactions with like-minded others. The fact that the current study found similarity in 
intelligence, openness to experience, interests, and interests/values to be unimportant in 
shaping MU appears to contradict this notion.  
In interpreting the discrepancy between the current results and the similarity 
paradigm, it should be noted that the similarity paradigm has relied almost exclusively on 
evidence from the so-called bogus-stranger method. In this method, people are given a fake 
personality profile that either resembles their own personality profile or is very much 
different. Results from these studies have overwhelmingly shown that people are more 
attracted to others with similar personality profiles (Byrne, 1997; Sunnafrank, 1992).  
Although the experimental results obtained with the bogus-stranger method belong 
to the classical canon of social psychology, their implications for more everyday 
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interactions can be questioned. In a series of well-designed though ill-recognized49 studies, 
Sunnafrank (1983; 1984; 1992) showed that this effect is only present when people are not 
allowed to communicate with the unknown person (which is always the case when this is a 
bogus person). When participants engage in a brief getting-acquainted interaction after 
being exposed to each other’s personality profiles, similarity no longer exerts an effect.  
According to Sunnafrank (1992), the failure to replicate results found with the 
bogus-stranger method in real-life communication settings is due to its artificial character. 
That is, each person is assumed to strive for a stable, predictable, and controllable 
environment. This goal is hypothesized to be threatened when people are to discuss 
controversial topics with a person they have not met before (i.e., the bogus stranger). For 
example, imagine a pro-life person who is told he or she is about to meet an unknown pro-
choice person. This makes the activation of stereotypes about people of “the other side” 
more likely (e.g., “a leftist hippy”). In addition, the question may come up whether such a 
stranger will respect the opinion of the participant. When two persons with very different 
opinions actually meet, however, these questions are typically resolved rather quickly. 
After all, except for a few radical persons, most people are able to remain respectful and 
polite when discussing controversial topics with others. 
Of course, some situations are less supporting of such a friendly, polite 
conversation where every person gets to have its say. In competitive, task-oriented 
situations, a different interpersonal dynamic may exist. In his 1985 article on intelligence 
and group influence, Simonton himself acknowledged the possibility that dyadic 
intelligence differences may only be related to interpersonal understanding in situations 
where a group needs to find a novel solution to a problem. Such a situation may be typical 
of many domains (e.g., politics, science). However, communication in emotion-focused 
groups may be much less affected by this limit on complexity. Thus, the current results do 
not contradict the Simonton (1985) model but rather questions its applicability to everyday 
social interactions between acquaintances and strangers. 
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 A quick search of the PsycINFO database uncovered that Sunnafrank’s series of 7 empirical 
articles and book chapters on this topic are only cited 10 times by other authors. 
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5.4 Differences Between Gifted and Comparison Individuals 
A corollary of the hypothesis that dyadic intelligence differences impair MU is that 
people who are extremely intelligent should face difficulties in their communication with 
others. To test this notion, university alumni and intellectually gifted members of Mensa 
were compared in terms of their level of social adjustment. Because university alumni are 
also above-average in intelligence, this comparison provided a stringent test of the 
existence of adjustment problems for gifted individuals. In line with the Extreme Group 
Hypothesis, Mensa members reported less satisfying and understanding social 
relationships. In contrast, no differences were found in terms of more generalized 
adjustment features, such as general self-esteem and neuroticism. These social differences 
of the Mensa members were limited to specific relationship categories, most importantly 
family members and partners. Accordingly, generalized response tendencies cannot be 
invoked to explain away the differences between the gifted and comparison sample. 
According to the theoretical background of the current study, dyadic intelligence 
differences should be associated with communication decrements. This prediction was not 
confirmed in the current data. As such, the fact that Mensa members experience more 
social difficulties than a comparison group of university alumni represents a theoretical 
challenge. That is, in the current dissertation, only the predicted outcome (adjustment 
difficulties for gifted people), but not the predicted mechanism (communication difficulties 
between partners with very different intelligence levels) could be confirmed. Because of 
this, an alternative explanation for the differences between Mensa members and university 
alumni must be offered.  
 
5.4.1 Self-Selection 
The most likely explanation for the apparent social difficulties of the Mensa 
members is self-selection. That is, it is possible that gifted individuals who experience 
social problems are more likely to join Mensa. If this is true, Mensa members’ social 
problems may not be representative of gifted individuals in general. Some evidence is 
consistent with this explanation. Recall that the only descriptive studies of gifted 
individuals that relied on unselected samples are those of Terman in the US (1925; Terman 
& Oden, 1959) and Rost (2000) in Germany. The gifted individuals in the Terman study 
were socially well-adjusted and did not report an elevated frequency of mental-health 
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problems. Somewhat in contrast, Rost’s (2000) gifted individuals50 had a somewhat more 
negative self-view of peer popularity and a lower frequency of meeting friends. Note, 
however, that this does not necessarily represent a subjective problem for gifted 
individuals. Indeed, his gifted children may have set other life priorities that led them to 
voluntarily invest more energy in non-social domains (e.g., by reading more books). 
Consistent with this argument, they did not have a lower self-concept of peer relationships. 
Compared to the general lack of social problems reported for unselected gifted 
individuals, some studies examining members of Mensa have found evidence for 
adjustment difficulties. For example, Taft (1971) studied 244 Australian Mensa members. 
Consistent with the current finding that Mensa members report less satisfying relationships 
with family members, one third of his sample described their family life as unhappy, which 
according to the author is double the figure in comparison groups. Furthermore, Bögels, de 
Mey, and Derksen (1996) found that a substantial subgroup of Mensa members (22.6%) 
report a host of psychological problems as evidenced by their responses on the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Anecdotal evidence from the current study is consistent 
with this evidence. Specifically, one Mensa member emailed the current author to point out 
that many members discover their intellectual giftedness in psychotherapy. This may have 
led to an oversampling of individuals with social problems. 
An empirical indication that the social problems of the Mensa members are caused 
by a sampling bias and not by their higher levels of intelligence per se can be obtained by 
comparing Mensa members with different levels of intelligence. If it is indeed the case that 
extremely high intelligence levels are associated with adjustment problems, then 
“extremely gifted” Mensa members should be worse off than “moderately gifted” 
members. As stated in Section 3.3.2.6, 76 Mensa members reported the result of the 
psychometric intelligence test they had used to become a member of Mensa. Within this 
subsample, 37 individuals were assigned to a „moderately gifted” group (IQ  135, mean 
IQ = 132.1, SD = 1.3), whereas the remaining 39 individuals were assigned to the 
„extremely gifted” group (IQ > 135, mean IQ = 138.9, SD = 3.7). This extreme group 
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 Note that Rost (2000) included both an intellectually gifted and a highly achieving sample. The 
highly achieving sample reported a lower self-concept of peer relationships compared to controls. Although 
the highly achieving sample also had above-average intelligence, however, they cannot be considered as 
gifted according to the conventional IQ > 130 criterion. 
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membership was used as a between-subjects variable in a subsequent ANOVA predicting 
neuroticism, social and general self-concept, and feelings of loneliness.  
Results indicated no significant differences between the two giftedness levels (all 
ps  .18). In addition, a supplementary HLM analysis of group differences in the 
parameters of the ego-centered network did not indicate any differences in the quality of 
relationships with parents, other family members, partners, or friends (ps > 0.26). Thus, no 
evidence was found that moderately and extremely gifted individuals differ in their level of 
social adaptation. These results are inconsistent with the notion that as people’s 
intelligence level becomes progressively more extreme, it is more difficult for them to 
establish mutually understanding relationships with peers. 
 
5.5 Limitations 
A number of factors limit the generalizability of the conclusions of the current 
study. Specifically, these factors include the use of subjective assessments to 
operationalize MU, anomalies in the assessment of intelligence, the use of biased samples, 
and the correlational nature of the evidence. In the following, these limitations are 
discussed in more detail. 
 
5.5.1 Subjective Assessment of MU 
One of the possible limitations of the current dissertation is the use of subjective 
impressions to assess MU. In Studies 1-3, MU was assessed by asking participants to 
evaluate the degree to which they are able to communicate effectively with their network 
partners and felt understood by them. In Study 4, participants rated the degree to which 
they understood their interaction partners as well as the degree to which they themselves 
felt understood during the conversation. In addition, these self-ratings were supplemented 
by trained judges’ ratings of MU. Yet even in the case of the behavioral observations, 
judgments were based on the degree of MU as indicated by these interviewee’s reactions 
and the raters’ own sense of what constitutes an appropriate interviewer reaction.  
As stated previously, subjective ratings of interaction quality have been 
recommended by Bernieri and Rosenthal (1991) as being valid and cost-effective. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on subjective impressions may come with some disadvantages 
when studying a concept like MU. That is, MU requires both partners to grasp the meaning 
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of each other’s thoughts and feelings. In principle, this understanding is a covert, intra-
psychic act. That is, it is possible that a person understands the meaning of his or her 
interaction partner’s utterance without expressing this understanding. Equally possible, a 
person may overtly express understanding without really knowing what the other person is 
talking about. When the goal of the interaction is to achieve a smooth conversation, both 
interaction partners might be quite content with such a state of appearance and thus not 
bother to verify the expressed understanding. Accordingly, both persons may feel 
understood without “true” MU. 
One indication that person’s sense of reciprocal understanding may be only a proxy 
for “true” MU is the moderate convergent validity of the different MU indicators. 
Specifically, the correlation between different rating sources (first interviewer, second 
interviewer, behavioral observations) in Study 4 was only about .30. In addition, the 
correlation between the assessments of relationship quality of Mensa members and their 
network partners in Study 1.II was .23. Although these convergent validities were all 
statistically significant, they point to sizable idiosyncratic influences. For example, it may 
be that some people dispositionally feel more understood by their interaction partners than 
others (Sarason, Shearin, & Pierce, 1987). In addition, it may be that people are not able to 
differentiate the feeling of being understood from other intimacy-related feelings of 
validation and care (Reis, 1990). Finally, it may be that MU is asymmetric between 
interaction partners, in that an individual understands his or her interaction partner but this 
understanding is not reciprocated. In any case, such issues can only be addressed with the 
help of more objective assessment methods (see Section 5.7.4.2 for an example). 
 
5.5.2 Reliability and Validity of Intelligence Assessment 
In the current dissertation, a wide range of intelligence assessment procedures were 
used. In spite of this diversity, some of these procedures suffer from measurement 
problems. Most importantly, this concerns the intelligence ratings. As stated previously, 
intelligence self-ratings can be biased by self-serving tendencies (Paulhus Lysy, & Yik, 
1998). This is especially worrisome when calculating indices that depend on the difference 
between intelligence self-ratings and partner-ratings. One indication that this difference 
score may have been biased is that fact that participants in Sample 2 rated only 4.3% of all 
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network partners as more intelligent than themselves. Of course, this is an extremely low 
value. 
In evaluating these figures, two points need to be kept in mind. First, it may be that 
participants were actually correct in their impression that they have an above-average IQ 
(Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). After all, most of them were 
university alumni with high level of academic achievement and probably had above-
average intelligence. Second, it may that the tendency to oneself as more intelligent than 
others is part of a pervasive phenomenon called the above-average effect (Kruger, 1999). 
Of course, if this tendency to judge one’s own level of skills as higher than other people is 
universal across participants, it would have been possible to mathematically adjust self-
ratings and partner-ratings according to a certain constant. However, as long as no 
psychometrical assessments of intelligence are available, the magnitude of self-
enhancement processes cannot be determined. 
Like self-ratings, partner-ratings of intelligence are also ridden with methodological 
problems. Most importantly, they are affected by stereotypes and halo effects. To 
statistically control the effect of stereotypes, the present dissertation partialed out age and 
gender effects from the intelligence ratings. However, it was not possible to control for the 
presence of halo effects. This is especially problematic as the current study used 
intelligence ratings to predict self-ratings of another highly positively valenced construct: 
relationship quality. As stated previously, it is not unlikely that the associations found 
between partner-ratings of intelligence and relationship quality are a result of a tendency to 
attribute positive qualities to well-liked people, a preference for people with positive 
attributes, or both. 
A final problem regarding both intelligence self- and partner-ratings in the present 
study is the use of the single-item scale. First of all, the use of single items precludes the 
calculation of internal consistency needed for an empirical assessment of the degree of 
attenuation in the relation between intelligence ratings and MU. Second, the single-item 
scale turned out to be confounded by group membership in Sample 1. Specifically, Mensa 
members in this sample were explicitly aware of their maximum intelligence level and thus 
always rated themselves with the highest possible value of the scale (i.e., 20). By 
comparison, most university alumni probably did not know their IQ, so they may not have 
been so inclined to place very high bets on their own intelligence. This confounding of 
group membership and intelligence rating makes the interpretation of results more difficult 
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(e.g., as evidenced by the divergence of results based on the single-item scale compared to 
the intelligence self-concept scale51). 
Although psychometric intelligence tests are not affected by the kinds of problems 
described above, the measures used in the current study might have suffered from some 
additional problems. For example, the figural intelligence test in Sample 4 had an alpha 
level of only .65, which is below the .70 that is considered acceptable. The other two 
intelligence tests had adequate reliabilities, but they were implemented online, which may 
have introduced additional sources of bias. Especially the vocabulary test may have been 
affected by this, since it requires participants to pick the correct word out of a list of five 
possibilities. It cannot be ruled out that internet users used search engines or online 
dictionaries to look up the correct word. Accordingly, it may be that the results of this test 
were not only affected by participants’ vocabulary level, but also by motivational factors. 
Finally, a further problem affecting the psychometric measures is the lack of 
significant correlations between the figural, numeric, and vocabulary tests. Thus, the 
current study could not replicate the general intelligence factor that is so well-established 
in psychometric research. Note, however, that the figural and vocabulary measures showed 
a clear restriction of range as evidenced by a SD almost half of the value reported for the 
norm population (see Table 4). In addition, it should be noted that Sample 4 evidenced a 
high degree of profile specialization with regard to intelligence, with more mathematically-
oriented students having higher values in numerical intelligence and language-oriented 
students having larger vocabularies. Nevertheless, the failure to replicate a general 
intelligence factor gives rise to caution in interpreting the current results. 
 
5.5.3 Sampling Bias 
Another major limitation of the conclusions of the current study is the possibility of 
sampling bias. As stated above, the reliance on university students may have led to 
restrictions in range in intelligence in Study 4. In addition, selection bias may have been 
exacerbated even more by differences in the invitation letter sent to potential participants 
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 Note, however, that the single-item measure and the self-concept scale to rate intelligence were 
significantly correlated in the alumni sample, r = .53, p < .01. In samples that are not explicitly aware of their 
IQ, both measures would probably have produced equivalent results. 
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in Study 2. Specifically, it is possible that most participants who took part in the study did 
so because they felt they received an invitation because of their high intelligence level (see 
Section 3.1.3.2). Finally, a source of bias may also have resulted from indirect hints 
regarding the study’s topic and hypotheses in the recruitment material. Specifically, 
descriptions of the project contained cues that the study was interested in the effect of 
personality similarity on social relationship quality. This may have led to an oversampling 
of participants with highly salient or idiosyncratic experiences in this domain. 
Arguably, the most serious source of sampling bias in the current dissertation is the 
inclusion of Mensa members as representatives of gifted individuals. Because not every 
gifted individual in Germany is a member of this organization, Mensa members may not be 
typical of the general population of gifted individuals. As stated earlier (Section 4.4.3), it 
could be that the Mensa membership represents some kind of compensation for certain 
social problems. For example, it may be that gifted people who do not feel valued by their 
family members join Mensa to bolster their general sense of self-esteem. After all, Mensa 
is highly elitist in the sense that all members have an extremely high intelligence, a trait 
that is very positively valued in present-day society. In any case, the extent to which 
Mensa members are unrepresentative of gifted individuals in general limits the 
generalizability of the current results. 
 
5.5.4 Lack of Experimental Data 
A final limitation of the current dissertation is the lack of controlled, experimental 
data.52 Such data does not permit the drawing of causal inferences. For example, in Sample 
4 it was found that vocabulary level is positively associated with MU. In the theoretical 
framework of Chapter 2, this association is explained by the fact that having a large 
vocabulary facilitates the encoding and decoding of thoughts and feelings, leading to 
higher levels of MU. However, it could also be that the positive association between both 
factors is based on a third factor. One possibility is that individuals from privileged 
socioeconomic backgrounds acquire better language skills during the course of 
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 Because the experimental manipulation in Study 4 apparently failed, only naturalistic observations 
and self-reports were drawn from this source. Therefore, results based on these data are not experimental in 
the strict sense of the word. 
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socialization and are also better equipped to deal with the complexities of social life. If this 
is true, then the correlation between vocabulary and MU has nothing to do with actual 
communication ability but is a spurious result of a shared association with “social capital” 
(Bourdieu, 1986). In this and all other cases of cross-sectional results, statements about 
causal mechanisms must remain tentative at best. 
 
5.6 Strengths 
In spite of a number of limitations, the current dissertation also has a number of 
strengths. Specifically, these include the study of naturalistic situations, the inclusion of 
multiple assessment methods, the use of dyadic designs, and the modeling of the 
hierarchical (nested) data structure with advanced statistical tools. In the following, each of 
these strengths is discussed in more detail. 
 
5.6.1 Use of Multiple Assessment Methods 
A further strength of the current study is the use of a broad array of assessment 
methods. This focus on inclusion was present in the broad range of instruments to assess 
key constructs. For example, intelligence ratings in Samples 1 and 2 were available as a 
single-item and a self-concept scale. In addition, these ratings were supplemented by the 
results of psychometric tests of fluid and crystallized intelligence in Samples 3 and 4. 
Social adjustment was operationalized by the use of self-report scales tapping into 
individuals’ perceived self-worth regarding certain social relationship categories (e.g., with 
parents, peers) and an ego-centered relationship instrument. Finally, the current 
dissertation used two different scales (NEO-FFI and BFI) to assess openness to experience 
and the other Big Five factors. 
In their historical review of seventy years of research on personality and close 
relationships, Cooper and Sheldon (2002) have lamented the pervasive reliance on self-
report measures as a common methodological weakness.53 Because people may be unable 
or unwilling to accurately report certain intra-psychic phenomena (e.g., whether they 
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 In fact, no less than 77% of all studies exclusively rely on self-reports, whereas only 6% of all 
studies include behavioral observations.  
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understood their interaction partner; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), self-reports may be 
inaccurate, especially when studying complex patterns of social interactions (Cooper & 
Sheldon, p. 785). For this reason, the current research supplemented self-report data with 
behavioral observations of the level of MU in their conversation. Although both self-
reports and observations may contain valuable information and none is necessarily “more 
objective” than the other, it is clear that their combined use greatly increases the 
confidence that the current findings are not a result of measurement artifacts. 
 
5.6.2 Use of Dyadic Design 
A second requirement identified by Cooper and Sheldon (2002) for research on 
personality and social relationships is the use of dyadic designs. In fact, it could even be 
claimed that social relationships cannot be studied at all when the focus is on single 
individuals. From such a design, it is only possible to draw conclusions about individuals’ 
construction of relational processes, not about these processes themselves. From research 
on social support (e.g., Sarason et al., 1987), it is well-known that such perceptions 
sometimes have little in common with individuals’ actual social relationships. 
Through the use of a dyadic design, it is also possible to discover possible 
dissociations of effects across dyadic partners. In the current dissertation, Samples 1.II and 
4 included data from both members of dyads. As results showed, the correlation between 
two interaction partners’ assessments of relationship quality was not very high. Indeed, 
results of Study 1.II showed that the association between intelligence ratings and perceived 
relationship quality differs between Mensa members and their network partners. In 
addition, Study 4 found that only the personality of the first interviewer influences MU, not 
the personality of the second interviewer. This dissociation across dyadic partners could 
not have been uncovered without the inclusion of both dyadic informants. 
  
5.6.3 Modeling Nested Data 
A further strength of the current dissertation is the analysis of the ego-centered 
social network data with the use of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). At present, the 
overwhelming majority of studies have used generalized assessments of social support 
(e.g., self-concept of relationships with peers). However, the use of such generalized 
measures can be criticized because people tend to dispositionally under- or overestimate 
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the degree of support they perceive from others (Sarason et al., 1987). In order to anchor 
evaluations to specific relationships, the use of ego-centered networks has been 
recommended as an alternative (e.g., Neyer, 1997). Because of the greater specificity of 
this method, the influence of generalized response tendencies can be reduced. 
Although the use of an ego-centered technique is to be preferred for methodological 
reasons, the statistical analysis of such networks has so far proved tedious. This technique 
allows networks participants to generate networks of varying size and composition. For 
example, one participant may list 3 network partners including a mother, a father, and one 
friend, whereas another participant may list 24 contact persons including 13 co-workers. 
The most common solution thus far has been to aggregate information across certain 
categories that (almost) all networks have in common (e.g., support by mother, number of 
friends). However, this procedure ignores a great deal of useable information, such as 
relationships with categories of persons that are less common (e.g., neighbors, club 
members). More fundamental, findings about processes within a social network (i.e., at the 
level of individual relationships) may not necessarily generalize to comparisons across 
social networks (i.e., at the participant-specific level; Molenaar, 2004). 
By comparison, hierarchical linear modeling approaches allow one to analyze every 
single network partner/social relationship (van Duijn, van Busschbach, & Snijders, 1999). 
Technically, this is done by specifying a participant-specific intercept representing the 
base-line expectation of support in a social network. Moreover, it is possible to include 
Level 1 characteristics that may influence the relationship (e.g., the gender of the network 
partner) or dummy variables that allow for a fine-grained distinction between certain 
relational categories.54 Finally, HLM uses information on the participant-specific Level 2 
to predict each relationship-specific parameter. This methodological innovation holds great 
promise for future research. 
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 According to J. Nezlek (personal communication, 14 April, 2005), the inclusion of Level 2 
variables to predict the beta weights of these relationship-category dummies faces some limitations if certain 
participants fail to list network partners for a category.  
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5.7 Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research 
The current dissertation gives rise to a number of conclusions and 
recommendations for future research. First, the current dissertation provides arguments for 
the usefulness of MU as a construct in personality and social relationships research. 
Second, the presence of limited main effects of vocabulary on emerging social 
relationships has theoretical implications for understanding dynamic transactions between 
persons and their environment. Third, it seems that people are able to bridge between-
person differences in personality. Finally, some recommendations for future research are 
formulated. In the following, each of these points is elaborated in more detail. 
 
5.7.1 Usefulness of MU Construct 
First of all, the current dissertation points to MU as a potentially important 
construct in social relationship research. The data from Study 4 demonstrate that MU is 
only moderately related to more generalized indicators of interpersonal liking, such as 
rapport. Results from Studies 1-3 were consistent with theoretical accounts that have 
postulated a high degree of convergence between MU and more diffuse, emotional 
qualities in well-established relationships (Reis, 1990). The lack of such strong 
convergence in newly establishing relationships supports the notion that MU is more 
independent from generalized relationship quality in newly-emerging relationships. It 
would be interesting to see whether MU and relationship quality become increasingly 
correlated as relationships mature. 
A promising way to investigate the mechanisms by which MU affects the 
establishment of more intimate relationships is to consider its effect on outcome 
expectancies. According to Sunnafrank, Ramirez, and Metts (2004), people getting 
acquainted have perceptions regarding the “outcome value” they can expect from the other 
person. When an individual expects highly rewarding future interactions with an 
interaction partner, he or she will strive to increase interaction intensity. Because felt 
understanding is a highly rewarding state in social relationships (Fehr, 2004), a high degree 
of MU should be an important predictor of relationship continuation and quality. 
In spite of the potential theoretical relevance of MU, its determinants remain 
somewhat elusive. That is, only a few of the hypothesized main and emergent effects of 
personality were confirmed in the current study, and these effects were often restricted to 
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certain assessment methods (self-ratings vs. partner-ratings) or persons (e.g., interviewer 1 
vs. interviewer 2). Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of an association 
between MU and social and personality factors not included in the present study. For 
example, it could be that people feel most understood when they encounter a highly 
acquiescent partner who agrees with everything they say. Moreover, it is possible that 
dyadic partners’ congruence of goals increases their sense of MU. Finally, it is possible 
that MU is maximized when two people are similar in terms of the personality constructs 
that are most central to their identities. Future research is needed to substantiate these 
possibilities. 
 
5.7.2 Limited Main Effects in Study 4 
In Study 4 found main effects of intelligence were limited to the person who played 
the role of interviewer in the first interaction half. Because this phenomenon occurred for 
both vocabulary test results and intelligence ratings by the interaction partner, it is less 
likely that this pattern was produced by chance. Rather, the dissociation between the 
effects found for the first and second interviewer may be a result of different behavioral 
opportunities associated with the experimental context. Specifically, it is possible that the 
first interviewer had more opportunities to “channel” the conversation by asking questions 
and reacting to the utterances of the interviewee. By comparison, the possibilities of the 
first interviewer’s interaction partner to influence the communication were more limited. 
Of course, he or she could choose the topic of the conversation, but because of the 
structured nature of the situation, the establishment of MU during this interaction half was 
probably more dependent on the first interviewer.  
The above-described differential opportunities for the first and second interviewers’ 
personality to influence the quality of their interaction calls to mind Henry Murray’s 
(1938) concept of “press”, which he defined as the directional force of an environment, 
object, or person. As the current results suggest, the “press of personality” (Thorne, 1987) 
may vary according to the dynamic, temporal, and social role properties of the 
environment. Apparently, people who get acquainted develop relatively stable perceptions 
of their emerging relationship rather quickly (Sunnafrank et al., 2004), which limits the 
time frame for personality traits to influence this process. After this initial phase, 
relationships may come to depend more on the (negotiated) interaction history between 
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both dyadic partners (Clark and Marshall, 1992) that is not captured by the additive effect 
of their personalities. 
 
5.7.3 Bridging Between-Person Differences 
The final main conclusion of the current dissertation is that people are able to 
bridge between-person differences in intelligence and dispositional valuations. To speak 
with John Donne (1573-1631), no man is an island; people can reach out and understand 
each other’s thoughts and feelings even though they have different personalities. In a 
sense, this represents an upbeat message. After all, if between-person differences in 
personality were to pose a serious threat to interpersonal communication, society would 
eventually transform into a conglomeration of relatively homogeneous subgroups of like-
minded others (e.g., as predicted by Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, for intelligence). The fact 
that people seem able to overcome such differences, at least in the contexts of well-
established relationships and interactions between strangers, provides indirect evidence 
against this position. 
At first sight, the conclusion that dyadic differences did not seem to affect people’s 
level of mutual understanding runs against common sense. After all, folk wisdom has it 
that “birds of a feather flock together”, and couples break up because “they are just too 
different”. In the context of romantic relationships, work by researchers such as Murray et 
al. (2002) has led to some intriguing conclusions regarding this common wisdom. That is, 
when people think they are very much different from their partners, they tend to report less 
satisfying and stable relationships. Researchers have also shown, however, that this 
perception is independent of actual between-person differences, which are unrelated to 
relationship quality. Consistent with this, the current study provides evidence that people 
are able to establish mutually understanding relationships even when they have very 
different personalities. 
Simonton (1985, p. 536) acknowledged that it may be possible for “a truly 
intelligent individual [… to] avoid ‘talking over the heads’ of fellow group members [and 
thus] get around the comprehensibility limitation […]” However, he hypothesized that 
highly intelligent people will not usually lower the complexity of their utterances, as “it is 
probably more difficult in small problem-solving and social groups to accomplish such 
simplification without sounding insincere or condescending.” In contrast to Simonton’s 
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assumption, the current findings suggest that people place a high importance on 
establishing a sense of MU with their interaction partners, even if this comes at the price of 
lowering the complexity of their utterances. 
 
5.7.4 Recommendations 
From the current dissertation, a number of recommendations for future research can 
be derived. Specially, it is argued that future research would benefit from the use of more 
representative samples, a variation of task demands, the inclusion of objective tests of MU, 
and the online assessment of interpersonal perceptions. In the following, each of these 
recommendations is discussed in more detail. 
 
5.7.4.1 More Representative Samples 
First of all, it is imperative that future studies are conducted with more 
representative samples. For example, it would be highly informative to compare an 
unselected gifted sample with a matched comparison group of average intelligence. Only 
this way, can it be ruled out that differences between both groups are the result of sample 
selection bias. Another possible effect of sample bias may stem from the use of university 
students in Study 4, who can be expected to have a restricted range of above-average 
intelligence scores. Because range restriction attenuates the correlation between two 
variables, the inclusion of a more diverse sample may have uncovered significant 
associations between mutual understanding and between-person differences in personality. 
Note, however, that the inclusion of more representative samples comes with a 
number of additional methodological challenges. Because society is segmented according 
to intelligence, people with different intelligence levels may also have quite different 
habitats, which may act to limit the exchange of shared experiences (Duck, 1994). For 
example, if a university professor is not able to communicate satisfyingly with a 
construction worker, this may be due to the former person’s more sophisticated 
vocabulary. However, it may also be that the two persons live such different lives that they 
have “nothing to share”. Thus, future studies need to deal carefully with the problem of 
separating the effects of “pure” intelligence from more lifestyle-related aspects of 
personality. 
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5.7.4.2 Objective Tests of MU 
According to Jones and Guerrero (2001, p. 571), normal conversations are 
characterized by a minimal level of person-centeredness. That is, there exist strong social 
pressures to act in a civilized manner and react with a modicum of interest and respect to 
other people’s utterances. Such “polite” expressions of understanding may obscure an 
inability to understand deeper layers of meaning and hinder the progression of the MU 
process. Accordingly, future studies should include more precise, performance-based 
indicators of MU that transcend the immediate reactions of both dyadic partners to the 
interaction (see also Section 5.5.1 for the limitations of relying on subjective assessments 
of MU).  
A starting point for the development of more objective tests of MU could be Ickes’s 
(1993) mind-reading paradigm. This paradigm works with videotaped interactions between 
two people. In Ickes (1993) original method, the tape is shown to each interaction partner 
separately, who have to indicate when they remember having had a significant thought and 
describe the content of that thought. In a second step, the other person is shown the video, 
which is paused at the moments where the interaction partner had previously stated 
thinking about something. Empathic accuracy is operationalized as the degree to which 
participants are able to predict what their interaction partners were thinking about at that 
time.  
An interesting approach would be to adapt the method developed by Ickes (1993) to 
conform to the dynamic features of the MU phenomenon. For example, participants could 
be made to view a tape of their dyadic interaction, which is stopped after each speaking 
turn. MU could then be operationalized as the degree to which the listener’s interpretation 
of the meaning of the utterance corresponds to the intended meaning by the speaker. 
Alternatively, when the focus on such short, verbatim interaction turns does not produce 
enough diverging interpretations, listeners could be asked to provide a short summary of 
the subjective, psychological meaning of their interaction partners’ narrative. In this case, 
the measure of MU would be the degree to which the speaker can identify with this 
summary. 
 
5.7.4.3 Online Measurement of Perception Changes 
A final recommendation for future research concerns the use of more dynamic 
designs to measure perceptions of MU and dyadic differences across time. In the current 
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Study 4, half of the participants were told that they were either very similar or dissimilar to 
their interaction partners. Unexpectedly, intelligence ratings provided after the 20-minute 
conversation failed to show a significant effect of this manipulation: Participants who were 
told they were very different did not perceive more differences than participants who were 
told they were highly similar. Provided that participants believed the performance feedback 
(based on their pretest results) at the time it was given, these first impressions seem to have 
given way to an alternative view based on cues from the ongoing conversation. Possibly, 
they engaged in a process of identity negotiation (Swann, 1987) during the conversation, 
eliminating the effect of the experimental manipulation. 
Similar to perceptions of dyadic differences, the perceived level of MU might go up 
or down as well, depending on experiences made within the conversation. In the current 
study, there was an increase in observed MU across time, but it is not known whether this 
increase was paralleled by an increase in subjective feelings of understanding and being 
understood. According to Sunnafrank et al. (2004), people quickly develop expectations 
regarding the predicted outcome value of certain relationships. These expectations 
supposedly guide the selection of topics that are discussed during the conversation. If 
people want to increase relational contact, they will choose a topic they think will be of 
interest their interaction partner. If this is the case, both dyadic partners may stick to this 
topic instead of broadening their conversation (i.e., as Duck, 1994, predicts). In such a 
case, perceptions of MU may be highly stable across the conversation. However, when a 
chosen topic receives a more mixed reception by the interaction partner, the feeling of 
being understood may momentarily drop and only become reestablished once a “secure” 
alternative topic is found. 
A way to test this notion is to assess social perceptions of both dyadic partners’ 
personalities and MU at multiple moments of their interaction history. Ideally, this would 
involve pre-interaction assessments of interpersonal sympathy and expected MU on the 
basis of personality profiles, followed by similar assessments after participants are shown a 
picture of each other. When these individuals eventually meet, regular assessments may 
then capture dynamic changes in their perceptions of themselves, their interaction partners, 
and the emerging relationship between them. These changes could then be contrasted with 
pretest measures or modeled with dynamic statistical methods. Note, however, that such 
designs may be difficult to implement because of constraints in participants’ motivation 
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and cognitive capacity. In addition, they also go hand in hand with a danger of disclosing 
the research hypothesis by asking repeated and/or obvious questions (Sunnafrank, 1992). 
 
5.7.4.4 Variation of Task Demands 
Of course, the conclusions of the current dissertation may only apply to a limited 
context. After all, there are many more personality variables than intelligence, openness to 
experience, interests, and values. In addition, different relationship contexts other than the 
ones studied here exist. For example, it may be that dyadic similarity is more important 
when people engage in conversations about idiosyncratic or unusual phenomena or when 
they have to rely on less than optimal communication media (e.g., telephone calls in long-
distance relationships). Accordingly, future studies should try to vary communicative task 
demands when they want to assess the impact of between-person personality differences. 
One of the most promising ways to vary task demands may be to increase the level 
of intellectual demands of the communicative situation. This follows directly from 
Simonton’s (1985) model, which states that in competitive, task-focused groups, between-
person differences in the intelligence of group members limit the ability of the more 
intelligent members to make themselves understood. Although the current study failed to 
replicate this notion in more emotion-focused situations, this does not mean that the 
premise of the Simonton model is wrong. Future studies could explicitly test this option by 
creating conditions in which participants are motivated to display their highest possible 
level of intellectual sophistication (e.g., by awarding rewards to more complicated 
messages) while interacting with another person. It is predicted that this will produce the 
conditions where between-person differences impair the level of MU. 
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 7 Appendices 
7.1 Setup of Dyadic Conversation in Study 4 
 
 7.2 Ego-Centered Social Network Instrument 
 
Die folgenden Fragen beziehen sich auf die Personen, die in Ihrem Leben eine 
wichtige Rolle spielen –positiv oder negativ- und mit denen Sie in den letzten 
Monaten mindestens einmal pro Monat Kontakt hatten. Kontakt haben kann bedeuten, 
länger mit einer Person zu sprechen, zu telefonieren, oder eine schriftliche Nachricht mit 
persönlichem Inhalt von ihr zu erhalten oder ihr zu senden.  
 
Schritt 1: Erstellen einer Personenliste 
 
In einem ersten Schritt möchten wir gemeinsam mit Ihnen die betreffenden Personen 
einzeln bestimmen. Nehmen Sie zu diesem Zweck bitte die beigefügte Personenliste zur 
Hand. Hier können sie im Folgenden die Personen, die Ihnen als Kontaktpersonen in den 
Sinn kommen, der Reihe nach eintragen. 
 
Gehen Sie bitte die in dem unteren Kasten aufgeführten Personengruppen von oben nach 
unter durch. Überlegen Sie, zu welchen einzelnen Personen aus den aufgeführten Gruppen 
Sie in den letzten drei Monaten Kontakt hatten und wer davon für Sie eine wichtige 
positive oder negative Rolle spielt.  
 
Tragen Sie für jede Person, zu der Sie Kontakt hatten und die für Sie eine entsprechende 
Bedeutung hat, auf der Namensliste den Vor- oder den Nachnamen ein sowie den 
zugehörigen Kennbuchstaben der unten aufgeführten Gruppen (Beispiel: M für Ihre 
Mutter, oder P für den Partner). Sie können bis zu 35 Personen eintragen, aber natürlich 
auch weniger. Sollten es insgesamt mehr als 35 Personen werden, ersetzen Sie diejenigen, 
die Ihnen gefühlsmäßig am wenigsten bedeuten, durch andere. 
 
 Kasten: Personengruppen 
Kennbuchstabe 
 
 
M 
V 
G 
O 
K 
 
Q 
 
P 
X 
F 
N 
C 
 
Ko 
Y 
A 
Mutter (auch Stiefmutter) 
Vater (auch Stiefvater) 
Geschwister (auch halbverwandte und Adoptivgeschwister) 
Großeltern (auch Eltern von Stiefeltern) 
Kinder (eigene, Kinder des aktuellen oder ehemaligen Partners, 
adoptierte) 
sonstige Verwandte (z.B. Onkel, Tante, Cousin, Cousine, Nichte, 
Neffe) 
Partner (Ehepartner, Lebensgefährte) 
ehemaliger Partner 
Freunde bzw. Freundinnen 
Nachbarn, Mitglieder desselben Wohnheims /Internats/ Kaserne 
Mitglieder von Clubs, Vereinen oder Gruppen, in denen Sie Mitglied 
sind 
Kommilitone/Kommilitonin 
sonstige Personen (z.B. ehemalige Lehrer, Ärzte, Pfarrer) 
Arbeitskollege/ Arbeitskollegin 
 
Schritt 2: Eintragen der Kontaktpersonen in die Merkmalsliste 
 
Übertragen Sie bitte danach in einem zweiten Schritt der Reihe nach alle Personen, die 
Sie auf der Personenliste festgehalten haben, in die getrennt beigefügte Merkmalsliste. 
 
Auf den Namen der Personen können Sie verzichten. Es genügt, wenn Sie Zeile für Zeile 
in Spalte 2 im Anschluss an die Personennummer immer den Kennbuchstaben der 
zugehörigen Gruppe, den Sie auch auf der Personenliste notiert haben, für jede Person 
der Reihe nach eintragen. 
 
Schritt 3: Beschreibung Ihrer sozialen Beziehungen 
 
In einem dritten Schritt möchten wir Sie bitten, Ihre Beziehungen zu den Personen zu 
beschreiben. Machen Sie bitte spaltenweise für jede Person die folgenden Angaben und 
tragen Sie die Ziffer der jeweils zutreffenden Antwortvorgabe in die Merkmalsliste ein. 
 
Beginnen Sie also mit Spalte 3 und füllen Sie die Spalte 3 für alle Kontaktpersonen von 
oben nach unten gehend aus. Wenn Sie die Spalte 3 vollständig ausgefüllt haben, füllen Sie 
die Spalte 4 für alle Kontaktpersonen aus usw. Dieses Vorgehen erleichtert Ihnen die 
Beurteilung Ihrer Beziehungen zu den verschiedenen Kontaktpersonen; es ist auch 
schneller als ein zeilenweises Vorgehen. 
 
Spalte 3: Geschlecht  
Welches Geschlecht hat diese Person? 
m männlich 
w weiblich 
 
 Spalte 4: Schätzung des Alters 
Wie alt ist diese Person (schätzungsweise)? 
 
Spalte 5: Dauer der Bekanntschaft mit der Person 
4 Länger als 5 Jahren 
3 Zwischen 2-5 Jahren   
2   Zwischen 1-2 Jahren 
1   Kürzer als 1 Jahr 
 
Spalte 6: Kontaktfrequenz 
Wie oft hatten Sie in den letzten vier Wochen mit dieser Person Kontakt?  
5 täglich 
4 mehrmals in der Woche 
3  einmal in der Woche 
2 mehrmals im Monat 
1 mindestens einmal im Monat 
 
Spalte 7: Bedeutsamkeit der Beziehung 
Wie wichtig ist Ihnen die Beziehung mit dieser Person? 
5 Beendigung würde mich stark und lange belasten 
4 Beendigung würde mich vorübergehend stark belasten 
3 Beendigung würde mich nur kurz belasten 
2 Beendigung würde mir nichts ausmachen 
1 Es wäre besser für mich, die Beziehung zu beenden 
 
Spalte 8: Nähe 
Wie nah fühlen Sie sich dieser Person? 
5 sehr nahe 
4 ziemlich nahe 
3 weder nah noch fern 
2 ziemlich fern 
1 sehr fern 
 
Spalte 9: Konflikt 
In wiefern gibt es zwischen Ihnen und dieser Person Konflikte, in denen mindestens einer 
von Ihnen starken Ärger, starke Eifersucht, starke Trauer, starke Scham oder starke Angst 
empfindet? 
5 fast bei jedem Zusammensein 
4 oft 
3 manchmal 
2 selten 
1 nie 
 
 Spalte 10: intellektueller/künstlerischer Austausch 
In wiefern können Sie sich mit dieser Person austauschen über Themen, die Ihnen viel 
bedeuten (z.B. Wissenschaft, Kultur, Politik, Hobbies). 
5 sehr gut 
4 eher gut 
3 weder gut noch schlecht 
2 eher nicht so gut 
1 überhaupt nicht 
 
Spalte 11: emotionale Unterstützung 
In wiefern können Sie sich an diese Person wenden, wenn Sie emotionale Probleme haben?  
5 bei fast jedem Problem 
4 bei vielen Problemen 
3 bei manchen Problemen 
2 bei wenigen Problemen 
1 nie 
 
Spalte 12: Verständnis 
In wiefern fühlen Sie sich von dieser Person verstanden?  
5 sehr verstanden 
4 eher verstanden 
3 weder verstanden noch unverstanden 
2 eher unverstanden 
1 sehr unverstanden 
 
 7.3 Self-Concept Questionnaire 
 
Selbstkonzept 
 
Im folgenden Teil finden Sie 34 Aussagen, die sich auf eher instabile Merkmale Ihrer 
eigenen Person beziehen, also langfristig durchaus Änderungen unterworfen sein könnten. 
Achten Sie bitte deshalb darauf, die Aussagen jeweils auf Ihr Erleben und Verhalten in den 
letzten 4 Wochen zu beziehen. Lesen Sie bitte jede Aussage aufmerksam durch und 
überlegen Sie, ob diese Aussage auf Ihr Erleben und Verhalten in den letzten 4 Wochen 
zutrifft oder nicht. Kreuzen Sie bitte an: 
 
1 gar nicht wenn Sie der Aussage auf keinen Fall zustimmen 
2 wenig wenn Sie der Aussage eher nicht zustimmen 
3 teils-teils wenn Sie die Aussage weder für richtig noch für falsch  halten 
4 ziemlich wenn Sie der Aussage eher zustimmen 
5 völlig wenn Sie der Aussage nachdrücklich zustimmen 
 
Bitte lesen Sie jede Aussage genau durch und kreuzen Sie als Antwort die 
Kategorie an, die Ihre Sichtweise am besten ausdrückt. Falls Sie Ihre Meinung nach dem 
Ankreuzen einmal ändern sollten, streichen Sie Ihre erste Antwort bitte deutlich durch. 
Auch wenn Ihnen einmal die Entscheidung schwerfallen sollte, kreuzen Sie trotzdem 
immer eine Antwort an, und zwar die, welche noch am ehesten auf Sie persönlich zutrifft. 
 
  
 Stimmt: 
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Im Umgang mit Personen des anderen Geschlechts bin ich ziemlich 
schüchtern.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Insgesamt habe ich ein sehr negatives Bild von mir.  1 2 3 4 5 
Ich bin künstlerisch oder musikalisch sehr talentiert.  1 2 3 4 5 
Meine Eltern haben mich nie besonders respektiert.  1 2 3 4 5 
Es gibt Menschen, die mich wirklich verstehen  1 2 3 4 5 
Mit anderen Personen meines Geschlechts komme ich nicht so gut 
klar.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Ich habe niemanden, an den ich mich wenden kann. 1 2 3 4 5 
Ich kann mit anderen zusammensein, wenn ich das  
will.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Ich fühle mich von den anderen isoliert. 1 2 3 4 5 
Ich kann mich gut mit Personen des anderen Geschlechts unterhalten.  1 2 3 4 5 
Nur wenige Personen meines Geschlechts mögen  
mich.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Alles in allem kann ich mich selbst nicht besonders gut akzeptieren.  1 2 3 4 5 
Alles in allem kann ich mich selbst gut leiden.  1 2 3 4 5 
Im Vergleich zu anderen habe ich eine weit überragende Intelligenz.  1 2 3 4 5 
Ich schließe leicht Freundschaften mit Personen meines Geschlechts.  1 2 3 4 5 
Es gibt kaum Aufgaben, die ich nicht lösen kann.  1 2 3 4 5 
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Ich habe viele gleichgeschlechtliche Freunde.  1 2 3 4 5 
Ich zweifele fast nie an meiner eigenen Intelligenz.  1 2 3 4 5 
Ich habe Menschen, an die ich mich wenden kann.  1 2 3 4 5 
Ich bin sehr gut darin, meine Gedanken und Gefühle durch Kunst oder 
Musik zum Ausdruck zu bringen.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Ich fühle mich allein.  1 2 3 4 5 
Mit Kunst oder Musik kenne ich mich gut aus.  1 2 3 4 5 
Alles in allem habe ich ein sehr positives Bild von  
mir.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Ich fühle mich sozial ausgeschlossen.  1 2 3 4 5 
Ich habe Menschen, die mir nahe stehen.  1 2 3 4 5 
Meine Eltern haben mich gerecht behandelt als ich jung war.  1 2 3 4 5 
Der herzliche Umgang mit Personen des anderen Geschlechts fällt mir 
leicht.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Meine Eltern verstehen mich.  1 2 3 4 5 
Ich habe Menschen, mit denen ich sprechen kann.  1 2 3 4 5 
Ich betrachte mich selbst als äußerst begabt.  1 2 3 4 5 
Es war oft schwierig für mich mit meinen Eltern zu reden.  1 2 3 4 5 
Es fällt mir leicht zu verstehen, was durch Kunst oder Musik zum 
Ausdruck gebracht werden soll.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Ich bin zu viel allein.  1 2 3 4 5 
Ich schließe nicht schnell Freundschaften mit Personen des anderen 
Geschlechts.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 7.4 Interaction Quality Questionnaire 
 
Construct Items  
Interviewer 
Ich konnte gut nachvollziehen, warum der 
befragten Person die besprochenen 
Lebensbereiche so wichtig sind 
Interviewee 
Die andere Person konnte gut 
nachvollziehen, warum mir die 
besprochenen Lebensbereiche so wichtig 
sind 
Es ist der befragten Person gelungen, mir zu 
erklären, welche persönliche Bedeutung die 
besprochenen Lebensbereiche für sie haben 
Es ist mir gelungen, der fragenden Person zu 
erklären, welche persönliche Bedeutung die 
besprochenen Lebensbereiche für mich 
haben 
Die befragte Person hatte in der 
Unterhaltung wenig Gelegenheit, die 
Hintergründe zu erläutern, warum ihr 
bestimmte Lebensbereiche wichtig sind 
Ich hatte in der Unterhaltung wenig 
Gelegenheit, die Hintergründe zu erläutern, 
warum mir bestimmte Lebensbereiche 
wichtig sind 
Mutual 
under-
standing  
Ich zeigte der anderen Person, dass ich 
verstand, was sie sagte a 
Die andere Person zeigte mir, dass sie 
verstand, was ich sagte a 
Ich habe oft Dinge gesagt, die wenig zum 
Gespräch beitrugen a 
Die andere Person hat oft Dinge gesagt, die 
wenig zum Gespräch beitrugen a 
Ich zeigte der anderen Person, dass ihre 
Kommunikation effektiv war a 
Die andere Person zeigte mir, dass meine 
Kommunikation effektiv war a 
Ich zeigte der anderen Person, dass ich viel 
Interesse hatte an dem, was sie zu sagen 
hatte a 
Die andere Person zeigte mir, dass sie viel 
Interesse hatte an dem, was ich zu sagen 
hatte a 
Empathic 
ability of 
Interviewer 
Es fiel mir manchmal schwer, mit meinen 
Fragen an die Gedankenwelt der befragten 
Person anzuschließen 
Es fiel der anderen Person manchmal 
schwer, mit ihren Fragen an meine 
Gedankenwelt anzuschließen 
Diese Gesprächshälfte verlief reibungslos a 
Ich habe die Unterhaltung nicht genossen a 
Ich war sehr unzufrieden mit dem Gespräch a 
Interaction 
flow 
Ich habe diese Gesprächshälfte als locker und unverkrampft wahrgenommen 
Comfort Ich fühlte mich während des Gespräches entspannt 
a
 Adapted from Hecht (1978) 
 
 7.5 Single-Item Intelligence Rating Instrument 
 
Wir möchten Sie bitten, die Intelligenz Ihrer Kontaktpersonen einzuschätzen. Bevor wir zu 
den einzelnen Einschätzungen kommen, erläutern wir kurz die Skala.  
 
Gehen Sie bei den folgenden Einschätzungen davon aus, dass im Allgemeinen die meisten 
Personen eine mittlere Intelligenz besitzen, wenige Personen eine hohe bzw. niedrige 
Intelligenz und sehr wenige Personen haben eine sehr hohe bzw. sehr niedrige Intelligenz. 
Dieser Sachverhalt wird grafisch durch die folgende Kurve illustriert: 
 
 
Intelligenz 
Sehr niedrig niedrig mittel hoch sehr hoch 
 
 
Im Folgenden bitten wir Sie einzuschätzen, wo Sie die intellektuellen Fähigkeiten Ihrer 
Kontaktpersonen im Vergleich zu den durchschnittlichen Fähigkeiten dieser Altersgruppe 
einordnen würden. Vergleichen Sie Ihre Kontaktpersonen also mit dem 
Bevölkerungsdurchschnitt und nicht ausschließlich mit Personen aus dem persönlichen 
Umfeld von Ihnen oder der jeweiligen Kontaktperson. 
 
Um Ihnen die Aufgabe der Selbsteinschätzung zu erleichtern, haben wir Prozentzahlen 
angegeben, wie viele Menschen in der Allgemeinbevölkerung einen bestimmten 
Fähigkeitswert oder einen niedrigeren erreichen. Betrachten Sie zum Beispiel die folgende 
Grafik: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
Wie Sie sehen, ist eine Einschätzung von 1 bis 20 möglich, wobei 1 einer sehr niedrigen, 
20 einer sehr hohen Intelligenz entspricht. Jede Zahl entspricht einem Prozentwert. Die 
Zahl 13, wie hier als Beispiel markiert, bedeutet, dass Sie die Fähigkeit Ihrer 
Kontaktperson so einschätzen, dass diese ungefähr 60-65% der Vergleichsgruppe 
übertrifft, und dass gleichzeitig 35-40% der Bezugsgruppe über eine höhere Fähigkeit 
verfügen als diese Kontaktperson. 
 7.6 Summary of Studies Assessing the Validity of Intelligence Self-
Ratings 
 
Study 
Target 
sample Intelligence test r 
Bailey & Lazar (1976) 40 students Concept Mastery Test / WAIS-
similarities 
.37 
Bailey & Mettetal (1977a) 20 students + 
spouses 
Otis-Quick Test of Mental Ability .42 
Bailey & Mettetal (1977b) 44 students Otis-Quick Scoring Test of Mental 
Ability 
.40 
Borkenau & Liebler (1993) 100 non-
students 
Leistungsprüfsystem  
(subtests 1-6, 8 and 9) 
.32 
Furnham & Fong (2000) a 172 students Raven’s Progressive Matrices .19 
Furnham & Rawles (1999) a 193 students S&M test of mental rotation .16 
Paulhus et al. (1998) b 636 students Wonderlic Personnel Test .22 
Paulhus & Morgan (1997) 103 students Wonderlic Personnel Test .35 
Schmitt & Strein (1987) c 34 people c WAIS-R .11 
Average d   .29 
a
 Cited in Furnham (2001), b After 7 weekly group meetings, c Average of the range of 
reported correlations; nature of sample unspecified, d after Fisher r-to-z transformation and 
back-transformation 
 7.7 Numerical Intelligence Test 
 
 7.8 Short Version of the German General Interests Structure Test 
 
Der folgende Teil des Fragebogens besteht aus einer Liste mit verschiedenen Tätigkeiten. 
Geben Sie bitte für jede einzelne davon an, wie sehr diese Sie interessiert bzw. 
interessieren würde. 
 
 
gar nicht wenig etwas ziemlich sehr 
Mit Maschinen oder technischen Geräten arbeiten        
Sich mit unerforschten Dingen beschäftigen        
Etwas nach künstlerischen Geschichtspunkten gestalten        
Andere Personen betreuen oder pflegen        
Andere von etwas überzeugen oder etwas veranlassen        
Geschäftsbriefe schreiben         
Konstruktionspläne zeichnen        
Chemische, physikalische oder biologische Versuche 
durchführen 
 
     
 
Dinge tun, bei denen es auf Kreativität und Phantasie 
ankommt 
 
     
 
Sich die Probleme anderer Menschen anhören        
Mit anderen Menschen verhandeln        
Angebote einholen und vergleichen        
Elektrische Geräte oder Anlagen bauen        
Die Ursache eines Problems erforschen        
Etwas mit sprachlichen Mitteln künstlerisch gestalten        
Hilfsbedürftige Kinder oder Erwachsene betreuen        
Das Amt des Sprechers in einer Gruppe übernehmen        
Eine Abrechnung kontrollieren        
 
 
 7.9 Schematic Depiction of HLM Analysis Logic 
 
 
Note. Hierarchical linear modeling distinguishes between multiple hierarchical levels of 
data analysis. In the example, two levels are depicted. Level 1 concerns relationships 
assessed with an ego-centered social network instrument. These relationships are nested 
within participants at Level 2 (because participants have multiple relationships). HLM first 
estimates a separate (intra-individual) regression equation for every Level 2 unit (i.e., 
participants), using all available relationship-specific Level 1 data (Level 1 equation). This 
equation predicts the quality of relationships with individual network partners by means of 
an intercept (baseline level of relationship quality) and Level 1 predictor variables (in this 
case, gender and rated intelligence of a network partner). In the example, the predicted 
relationship quality for network partner 1 is .80: This value is obtained because this person 
is a male with an intelligence z-score of 2, so a value of .40 (2 x .20 = intelligence effect + 
0 x .50 = gender effect) is added to the intercept of .40. The difference between this 
predicted value and the observed relationship quality constitutes the Level 1 residual 
(random effect). On Level 2, participant-specific information can be used to predict the 
 parameters of the Level 1 equation. For this, a population equation is specified that allows 
Level 1 parameters to vary according to participant-specific Level 2 variables. For 
example, the slope of the association between participants’ IQ z-score and the Level 1 
intercept is .10. Because the participant in the example has a z-score of 3, his or her 
intercept is 3 x .10 = .30 higher than the average population intercept of .10. Thus, a Level 
1 intercept of .40 is obtained for this person. When parameters in the Level 1 equation are 
allowed to vary between different participants (independent of other Level 2 variables), 
this constitutes a random effect (depicted by the triangles in the figure). When a Level 1 
parameters is not allowed to vary, it is called a fixed effect (e.g., the slope of the 
association between gender and relationship quality). 
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